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SUMMARY 
This paper seeks to be an introductory te t and aims to present an overview 
of the law and regulation of the futures industry and market in Singapore. 
Chapter 1 begins with a general discussion of the Singapore experience in 
futures trading, highlighted by the Barings crisi . It continues to chart the 
objectives of futures trading law and regulation and describes the gener I 
framework for upervision of the future market in ingapore. 
A discussion of futures trading in ingapore would b inc mpl tc ith ut 
an indication of how futures cam to be trad d and how ingapor th 
global futures explosion. mgap re' xi t nee on th futur cen c nn t d 
intimately with the experi nc . This i r count d in hapt r 2 t th r ith 
general prim r on financial futur . 
r th th . I c nc pt 'utu II m in 
ir t tw h • th m nin 
C ntre ts. r, th 
c ma in lud tltf I '{ 
·hincl 1 min d 11111i 
. 
II\ 
( h I l I n t I th • l th. 
at issue is the identification of a product for statutory go eman e and this must 
depend on the rationale for governance. 
SIMEX, Singapore's financial futures exchange, has intricate and complex 
systems in place for the trading of financial futures, impossible to describe 
comprehen ively herein. However, Chapter 4 pro ides an exposition of the basic 
set-up and trading mechanics in sufficient detail to obtain an elementary 
understanding of an exchange and clearing house system. A necessary description 
of the MA as the overall supervisory authority and its power in relation 
SlMEX and market participants starts off the chapter. 
Chapter 5 deals with market entry requirement a well a the continuing 
obligations that market participants ov e to the h chapt r 
also deals with the common is ue that arise bet een licen d member int r • 
As for the dutie and obligation b t e n a memb r rok r and it n n-rn m r 
cu t m r, hapter xarmn th dutie 
relation hip inher nt in ( r k r-cu t m r rnatri 
by utur law and r ul ti n 
ult 
th r duti rm d 
\ uld a h I ul lllJ ii ti n utur · · 
i. Inti n ind 1 • ul ti n, aud ht hit ht .Ir I • un r 
I •fo1m r cl uif ati I\ , ,m mtr \Jt 
mu ·h I• r :am1 I , th r ul,\ti n u I al uuukct 
intern \li 111l1lt 1. mu l I 'I .nd, t '\ \ t ·nt n inl rn iti t 11 ith 
other markets. The future for futures market governance lies in the international 
arena and the Barings crisis has highlighted this for the island republic of 
Singapore. However, due to limitations of length, this topic is touched 'upon only 
very briefly in Chapter 7. 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION· 
1. The Singapore Experience 
"When written in Chinese the word crisis is composed of two characters. 
One represents danger and the other represents opportunity" 
John F. Kennedy, 12 April 1959 speech 
It takes a crisis to provoke thought and action. he anng debacle did 
much to stimulate excited introspection about the financial futures m rk t in 
Singapore, which until then had ostensibly been another Singapore succe s tory, a 
phenomenon unceasingly applauded and laden with accolade. it pr motional 
literature does not fail t point out the ingaporc Intern ti nal net 
xchange (" 
Yea '1 in l 1992 and l other futur xchan e in th ' rid had n 
ace rd d uch an h nour thr tim arm b II n h . pl 
mg, p re fl d tin 1 fin nci I tur mar urth r int the 
int rnnti nal lim Ii ht Thi' tim it iti 
Thi· i: n thin t u. h m d f. I llSI nu U th 
t I the lnt rn.111 11al 1'111.1n 111g 1 \IC\\, u1 UK ' I 1111c111111 11 I h11 11 1.11 Jul h 11 11 
built upon the legislative and regulatory reactions to one crisis after another. After 
all, Singapore's present infrastructure for securities laws and regulations were 
prompted by and installed after the Pan-Electric scandal of 1985.2 As Joseph B. 
Dial, Commissioner of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC"), 
the US agency responsible for regulating the futures industry, opined in the wake 
of the Barings debacle, the lesson of disaster is not limited to the governance of 
financial markets: "When it comes to the design of regulatory systems, disaster can 
teach some powerful lessons. California's building codes are based on that states's 
experience with earthquakes. 
hurricanes. "3 
Florida's standards owe their structure t 
Nicholas William Leeson fled ingapore on the night of 23 · bruary 1995, 
leaving behind crippling financial losses for arings." Hi f arless forays on behalf 
of Barings into Nikkei 225 tock lnde futures had bu t the mo t blu -blcod d of 
British banks, Barings pie. When ee on ab cond d arin rngap re 
Pte td (" , "), with wh rn h wa mploy had incurr curnulati 
$1.4 illi n due t ft r th th 
group, the cumulative losses had amounted to $2.2 billion.' The rogue trader'" 
made the world of financial futures shake, sit up and ask some pertinent questions. 
How could one man cause so much damage? 
The spectacular collapse of Barings touched the souls of regulatory 
authorities and market participants in jurisdictions all over the world, and caused 
them to engage in empathic assessment of their own market structures, policies and 
practices.7 Preventing the likes of a similar crisis from happening in their own 
jurisdictions was visibly at the forefront of their soul-searching agenda. It was 
appreciated that Singapore neither lacked a regulatory structure nor was known for 
laid back regulatory policies and lax enforcement. On the contrary, ingaporc' 
pride lay in a reliable and credible regulatory environm nt. he fact that Nick 
Leeson managed successfully to break the ueen's bank in, of all jurisdiction , 
Singapore, was startling to many ob ervers. 
2. Objectives of Market Governance 
Market governance has as much to do with the prevention of crises as the 
containment of crises. On the one hand, the fact that the Barings episode did not 
escalate into a major market disruption seems to suggest that tribute is due to the 
present regulatory structure insofar as the systems in place for damage control 
seemed to have worked. On the other hand, the fact that the damage occurred has 
caused many to question whether a stricter regulatory scheme could have 
prevented the unfortunate episode, and if so, at what cost. The reality appears to 
be that the exchange rules existent at the time would have prevented the 
unfortunate episode, had they been adhered to. 
Although the Barings collapse has been attributed largely to Barings' 
internal management's inadequacies and failure , it also highlight the inherent 
limitations of financial markets governance. opious legislation and regulation can 
only be as effective as the corresponding surveillance and enforcement. In 
particular, on the exchange le cl the e change rul re only a ff cti e a th 
exchange' surveillance and enforcement of the ame which hould b an int n 
and purposeful vi ilance. 
at th nd th d y is , 
hi I yer indu try r , ch n I -r ul ti n, 
ntamin ted ith c mm 
it i n 
mm ·r i ll , lf-in: r t an I un ridl nt I n n,n 
h wev r, i 
w II the lindin r 
ul: to1 Il ix. 
The exchange rules in force at the time on position limits \l ould have 
hampered Barings taking on the number of open positions that they did. However, 
position limits were increased for Barings as stated in the Iinistry of Finance's 
Report: 
"Under SIMEX Rules, no client may hold a position in excess of 1,000 
outstanding Nikkei futures except with SIMEX's approval. BFS had 
apparently been granted an extended limit of 10,000 Nikkel futures for 
[Baring Securities Limitedj's trading. This limit was to cover trading in 
both futures and options." 9 
The tenfold increase of position limits by X appears to have b n done 
without the approval of the Monetary Authority of Singapore "M ") whos 
approval was required under the appropriate regulations. '0 o exacerbate matt rs, 
these increased position limits were further relaxed by X when they had be n 
exceeded: 
" a ed on th p ition r ported to it app ar d that had 
exceeded its approv d limit n a fev oc a ion Ho er 
n the fact th t the margin \ r b in, m t in full, and did n t r i th 
matt r with ,, 11 
SIMEX's reactions were not the preferred reflexes of a regulatory body 
free of self-interest. The inescapable reality is that SIMEX is a commercial entity. 
As the legislators and the MAS have to consider the consequences of their policies 
on the competitiveness of Singapore in a global context, SIMEX officials have to 
consider the consequences of their regulatory actions on the exchange' s 
competitiveness and very survival in the global futures jungle. As the Inspectors 
pointed out in their Report: 
"In its efforts to promote the growth of the futures market in Singapore in 
the context of a highly competitive international environment where other 
markets have less stringent rules on segregation of customer funds and 
trading practices, SIMEX may have been overly liberal in granting incr sc 
in position limits. It may not have been sufficiently sensitive to the risks 
associated with the very large volume of business transacted by )) 12 
Rules on position limits, large position reporting margin le el financial 
and other admini trative and accounting requir m nt for mark t particip nt aim 
to protect the market by en urin that mark t participant d not o 
them elv and that th y c nduct th m el in n rd rl and r diet, bl m nn r 
uch that any deviation fr m a r utin and 
r ulat ry Huth iti · t \ pot ·ntinl pr rr nm nt 
utur s tr idin • ·fTi ·cti , r ul tt r must n t1 
unu u 1 n 1 ti it • 'l h ). k tim l 
regulatory intervention at the exchange level could lead to disastrous consequences 
as the Report bemoaned: 
" ... this incident highlights the risk of relying on the integrity of supposedly 
venerable financial institutions. When SIMEX began noticing irregularities 
in BFS' s operations, SIMEX sought and waited for an explanation. With 
hindsight, SIMEX should have promptly conducted a full and thorough 
investigative audit of BFS and informed both MAS and [Baring Securities 
Ltd]'s regulator, the [Securities and Futures Authority], of its concerns, 
instead of waiting for explanations ... That is a matter of judgment. 
However, this episode reflects the need for speedier enforcement action by 
SIMEX, instead of relying an an institution's reputation or on foreign 
regulatory authorities supervising the activitie of the head office o uch 
institutions." 13 
Although an overriding layer of statutory control is imposed on I 
and a governmental authority free of self-interest, namely the appointed t 
oversee the exchange's activities urveillance of day-to-da acti itie 1 n ce 
done by the exchange it elf. T imp a y tern f ch cks ind p ndent th 
exchange is an unreali tic and o tly option in the comp! f t-pac d and hi h- 
tech environm nt f finan ial utur tradin . he pr h n 
the int rity f th xch n in p rf min it· r I, 
1h nfli t 
ma in th th 
mnrk ·t at th · p ,m, 
I pH I, l A'· II Id 
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governance on the whole. At one end of the spectrum is the adoption and 
enforcement of burdensome and comprehensive market safeguards, and at the 
other end, is the encouragement of a competitive and active market through laissez 
fa ire policies. The tightrope that the governors of markets tread is treacherous. 
Singapore's bid to become or retain its status as a world class financial 
centre or, at the very least, one of the more formidable financial centres of Asia is 
boosted by the presence of a financial futures market. "Overregulating" this 
market would be unwise. Overregulating would comprise high capital adequacy 
standards as entry requirements for market participants, high margin deposit lev Is 
or onerous reporting or disclosure requirements for positions undertak n. 
Naturally, what is considered high or onerous is relative and depends n th 
requirements adopted by competing futures markets. Overregulating leads to 
higher regulatory compliance costs for market participants, and in a comp titiv 
global market, a jurisdiction which sacrifices the competiti e edge for ex en 1 
regulatory security would have dimini hing trading alum to how r it. 
ingapore' lo would be hicagc' , ndon' or am. n th oth r 
hand, "underr gulating" a financial mar t v ould p mt rk l v k 
mark t participant un crupul u 
pc ulati n, I' vin it pr n t c 
nfid nee in th mar t. Thi 
n r 
und rminin 
industry . d 
th nut h riti 
ulatin 
ll th 
ti htr nd 
n:t ntl m nit r th di1. inn dt i n ·ith r i 
It is indisputable that futures trading is an activity which requires legislative 
and regulatory oversight to prevent fraud, malpractices market manipulation and 
excessive speculation. The history of various futures markets has proved the point. 
The failure of many unregulated futures exchanges 14 has shown that legislation and 
regulation are required to protect the futures industry and its participants from 
themselves. Trading or broking futures can be a lucrative endeavour and since the 
first century, the warning has been rung: "People who want to get rich fall into 
temptation and a trap and into many foolish and harmful desires that plunge men 
into ruin and destruction.?" A timeless truth for the new millenium. 
At the lowest level, market governance efforts are directed towards the 
protection of the investor from the unscrupulous salesman, hungry for profits and 
commissions. Shoddy service, hard sells, false promises and outright scams where 
deposits are collected and misused were common complaint against brokers 
lacking in integrity. The smell of easy lucre may tempt some to "proffer" future 
contracts for a quick buck in a less than morally defensible manner. egi lation ha 
stipulated licensing requirement for broker or those in: ol cd in d alin ith 
future to ensure their prof ionali m financial tability moral accountabilit and 
the prudent admini trati n th ir aff ir .16 •urther, ther arc trier r quir m nt 
II 
q111rt111c11t. r uure 111.11 ct J • m 1 .u11 , .. I I (I 
for customers' funds to be segregated, 17 to ensure that they are not improperly 
dealt with, and there are rules requiring those broking futures to disclose the risks 
involved to their customers, to discourage and prevent misrepresentations and 
puffs." 
The protection of the "consumer" investor, however, does not appear to be 
the prime nor the sole objective of futures market governance in the Singapore 
context. Dr Richard Hu Tsu Tau, the Minister of Finance, acknowledged at the 
Second Reading of the Futures Trading Bill, which consequently was passed as the 
Futures Trading Act, in 1986, that: 
" ... the players in this market are generally professionals, people who I think 
are well aware of the risks involved and I take the point that the public at 
large should be cautioned again and again that this i not a casino they 
should indulge themselves in. Fortunately, the cornplexitie of the mark t 
are such that I doubt very much that many non-profe ional would indulg 
in it."19 
he financial future market m ingapor ha a lar pr nc f 
in tituti nal invest r f r in lane , und nt r nkin in tituti n 
in urance c rnpam and tr din c mpani 
re th ithc d 
kn wl d n an un \1 
with th th· pr du t •rth It tin I n 
l t h l 
like the requirement of risk disclosure statements are evidently targetted at the 
"consumer" investor. Other provisions which deal with the segregation of 
customers' monies and licensing requirements work to protect institutional 
investors as much as "consumer" investors. Even the big boys" would benefit 
from being protected from shoddy service and unscrupulous conduct on the part of 
those with whom they entrust to execute their hefty orders and with whom they 
deposit hefty margins. 
The protection of individual investors is but a method towards the 
promotion of a futures economy and market ready for play in the international 
arena, which one supposes, benefits the greater societal whole. It is this wider 
objective that appears to overpower. Dr u at the econd Reading of the Future 
Trading Bill stated that: 
" ... the Futures Trading Bill is proposed to ensure that our futures mark t is 
operated properly and that public intere t i pr rv d. Furthermor , th 
ill will provide international in t r v ith the confid nee that ur futur 
market i operated fairly." 0 
The idi yncraci f the in re m1rr 
futur mark t. n t tr d n indi 
lM~ prom t it' I o· • superm ik t ar 111 n it int 
lit pr duct h nnp rt pr du I 
!Mb I mer in ra tructur t m: .nd nt. I tt it 1 th t th I, in 
•0 ' • hi ti rit I. J.11 
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major thrust of futures market governance would appear to be the maintenance of 
a free yet stable, credible, reliable and efficient market. Certainly the investor, 
either a retail consumer or an institutional one, and his investment will be protected 
by such an approach, but the emphasis is not on the indi idual and the protection of 
the individual is a necessary means to an end. Whether the end is nobler than the 
means or vice versa remains interesting food for thought. 
3. The Market Governance Framework 
The legislative and regulatory framework of the futures market in 
Singapore is based on the Futures Trading Act (" T A")21 and the subsidiary 
legislation passed thereunder, the Futures Trading Regulations (" R").22 The 
governmental authority responsible for o er eeing the futures industry is the MAS. 
The FT A and FTR constitute the bare skeletal structure of futures mark t 
governance, stipulating criminal penalties for vanou contraventions of th ir 
provisions. At the exchange level, the busine rule f 
the circular i sued by IME to its member and, to a 
practice adopted on X, con titut th r gim 
At pre ent, the nly futur change 
th "Rul ") 
mark t 
man . 
hu • 
the p licy ad ptcd in in ap ernanc th utur m 
rath 11 • 
ltt1 II, I 
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is one that combines self-regulation on the SIMEX level with statutory regulation 
and governmental supervision by an external body, the MAS.24 
It is imperative to note, however, that the laws, regulations and rules 
promulgated specifically for the futures industry do not solely govern the futures 
industry in Singapore. Due to the colonial legal heritage of Singapore, there is a 
body of common law and equitable principles which are superimposed and impact 
on the relationships between participants in the futures market. One often asked 
question is whether such common law and equitable principles attach greater duties 
to market participants than the mere adherence to the relevant legislation and 
regulations made thereunder. The futures market's licensed participants, one 
would believe, are cautious of keeping their activities and dealings with cust mers 
within the boundaries of the duties and obligations imposed upon them by the 
specific futures laws, regulations and rules. It i not difficult to imagine a certain 
unease amongst such participants when informed of an added burden of amorphous 
common law and equitable dutie and obligations. or instance a future brok r 
could conceivably comply with all requirement under th FT FTR and th Rul 
and variou X circular , and y t enc unter a rtion by u tom r 
broker had fail d t c m ly with r had br ach d c rtain mm 
dutic and o Ii 'ati n . uch nil ati n ma nth 
br k r i they ar • capa I· th 
th 1 wi, e valid claim n rain t th unt · ut t. ndin hi. i 
1~ 
1 hi s th pr ~ 11 d r )'UI 110 1 J It 11 in, f r 111 1111 • th • t 
Au. trnlin 
' 'l he r I 11 OIL h r lh If \I I 111 l llfth r lit· h I tcr 
based on the conjecture that such challenges are worth taking by a customer who 
has suffered heavy trading losses and is keen to ·avoid any liabilities. 
Furthermore, licensed futures market participants and many of their 
customers are structured as companies and the companies legislation in Singapore 
is evidently imposed on such entities. On the whole, this state of affairs requires 
little discussion save that in the area of corporate insolvency, Singapore legislation 
contains provisions" that might be at variance with certain market practices of the 
futures industry, in particular, those practices relating to the automatic liquidation 
of a defaulter's open positions and the subsequent netting procedures. 
The practices of the futures market are designed such that a defaulting 
party would be swiftly dealt with and any of its vulnerable open positions realized. 
Any challenges the defaulting participant might take to such swooping action could 
jeopardize the market. Due to the nature of futures trading, any losses that would 
launch a participant into in olvency would a fortiori be rather large. If the lo e 
of the defaulting party are not dealt with swiftly with the objecti e o prot cting 
the futures exchange, the clearing hou e and oth r v h ha ' dealt ' ith th 
defaulter, one default might lead to another and place the entire futures market at 
risk. In lieu of the present uncertain and disconnected state of Singapore 
insolvency legislation and futures market practice, it is noteworthy but perhaps 
unsurprising that no challenges were made by the liquidator during the Barings 
episode. Yet, it would be unwise to leave the law in such an unsatisfactory state 
on the presumption that liquidators do not in most circumstances wish to fire the 
cannons of a sinking ship. 
Due to limitations of length, the legal issues pertaining to the insolvency of 
a futures market participant will not be explored. Similarly, other areas such as 
futures fraud, abusive practices and market manipulation, which contain some 
overlap with the criminal law, will be left for another expedition. 
15 
CHAPTER2 
THE FINANCIAL FUTURES MARKET 
1. Financial Futures Primer 
The term "financial futures" is not a phrase of art or precision, much less 
legally defined. On the other hand, the phrases "futures contract" and "futures 
market" are defined in certain language by the legislature in the FT A. 1 Essentially, 
the effect of such definitions is to delineate the futures trading activity sought to be 
regulated within the jurisdiction. To put it somewhat cryptically, "what falls within 
the FT A is within the FTA and falls without is without." hat i to say, only the 
trading of futures contracts on futures markets as legally defined is caught within 
the regulatory embrace in Singapore. The trading of futures contracts which fall 
outside the definitions provided by legislature, remain unregulated. 
Leaving a ide precise legal definition ' financial future " may b roughly 
defined as futures c ntract ba ed on a financi I in trum nt which ma b 
currency an interest rate in trument r a har ind , h t rm futur c ntra t' 
in indu try parlance i I n l rd c ntr t \ hi h i t d d n n 
xchan . A f rward c ntr ct i an n zr • m nt t 
p cifi d quantity a P• nicul c mm dit . Th 
w uld n 
tim 
u until ifi utu1 
1 
S 0 "hl111 · nrk I" 111d "Futur 1\1 r I l" I( hilf (Ct 
time. The commodities in question could be physical items such as metals, soft 
commodities such as agricultural products or oil, or they could be financial 
instruments. Where the underlying commodity of exchange-traded forward 
contracts is a financial instrument, the commonplace industry description of such 
contracts is "financial futures". 2 
The concept of a forward contract is not unfamiliar to contract lawyers. A 
forward contract is merely an agreement to buy something in the future for a price 
agreed now or at the time of agreement. However, the additional and distinctive 
feature of a futures contract, not found in the basic forward contract, is the 
standardization of terms across contracts. This means that futures contracts 
pertaining to a particular commodity have the same standard terms as to quality, 
quantity and delivery or settlement dates. This allows the futures contract itself to 
be traded on an organized futures exchange. A contractual model is usually 
provided by the exchange upon which such contracts are traded. In brief the term 
of futures contracts are tandardized save as to price and the partie in ol d. 
Trading on an organized future e change provides a forum wh reby agr m nt a 
to price i obtain d bctw en tw partie . utur c ntra t ar 
characterized by an cl rnent of fungi ility and liquidit ' hich i lackin in th 
forward c ntract. 
2 Whcr; th 1111dcrl in • mm 
fl ntlmc re ·rt d I , 
"n ric111t111 11 futur " 
Ill l t I ,\ ph I ll ii Ill, II h \lhtf 1U 
• ht 111 11 "111 1 llur •i al utu ·• .m · 
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It is important to understand that the product which is bought and sold on a 
futures exchange is not the underlying commodity upon which the futures contract 
is based, but rather, the futures contract itself. What is bought or sold on the 
exchange is the contractual right to buy or sell the underlying commodity, at the 
price agreed on the exchange, at a future date, being a specified time stipulated for 
delivery or maturity. Therefore, whether a futures contract is profitable or not 
would ultimately depend on the price of the underlying commodity in the future, 
for example, on its delivery date. If the cash market price on the delivery date is 
lower than the price stipulated in the futures contract, the seller of the futures 
contract would seek to sell to the buyer at the futures contract price, and 
theoretically is able to buy the underlying commodity at a lower price in the ca h 
market. The buyer of the futures contract is then left with paying a higher price f r 
the underlying commodity than the cash market price, whereas the seller of th 
futures contract has made a profit from the age old adage of "buy low sell high". 
On the other hand, if the cash market price for the commodity on the delivery date 
is higher than the price stipulated in the futures contract, the bu er of the futur 
contract would be able to buy the c mmodity from the s lier at the pric tipulat d 
in the future contract. e 1 then th oretically able to ell th omm dit at a 
higher price in th ca h mark t nd mak a profit. h II r, unf rtun t ly m k 
a I ss by s lling at a I w r pric than th c h mt rk t pr i 
[ Iavin ~ u n ' mpl · in utur it it i 
tr cl that ntim th und dit d ur, 
'hi '· nu m t trnd r. ulur ntr t d fl t p rti i II\ th 
underlying cash market, and opt to "offset" their futures contracts at a date prior to 
the delivery date. "Offsetting':' or "reversing· trade" occurs when the buyer of a 
futures contract or a seller of a futures contract, sells or buys respectively, exactly 
the same contract at a later date. Instead of the cash market price used to calculate 
profits and losses as illustrated in the example above, the benchmark price is the 
futures contract price as listed on the futures exchange at the time of offsetting. 
The difference between the two futures prices would reflect the profit or loss to 
either party. 
In the case of financial futures where delivery of the underlying financial 
instrument may be impossible or impracticable to effect, futures exchanges may 
necessarily stipulate that such contracts are to be cash-settled only on the ate of 
maturity or expiry. This is particularly so in the case of stock index futures and 
interest rate futures." Therefore, even where a futures contract is held to maturity 
or expiry, no physical delivery of the underlying financial instrument is required. 
However, in any case, few futures contracts are actually clo ed through ca h 
settlement on maturity, as they are often off: et at a much arlier tag . 
The futur price i n all inf rm ti n ail I which r lat t th 
price f the und rlyin c mm dit fl th r m turit hit t 
financial analy t have utur p c t I ul t th 
futur ' pric ba d n av ii en h m rkct I ri th n tu I uture 
The 0 I b liquid Ii I\ pt dure i di us d Ill .. I , .1 lcann • I l u ' ill h IC 4 
\\ ti ii 
available on exchanges is often difficult to determine accurately because of the 
indefinite number of factors which influence the markets and investor sentiment. 
On the other hand, futures prices quoted on exchanges are a useful gauge to 
determine future cash market prices. This economic function of financial futures is 
known as price discovery and dissemination. 5 
As a rule of thumb, futures prices converge with the cash market price as 
the delivery or maturity date of the futures contract draws near. This concept is 
explained as follows: 
"The pnce difference between the financial futures contract and the 
underlying security is known as the basis. When the expiration date of a 
contract is far in the future, the basis is likely to be quite wide and volatile, 
as there is likely to be much difference of opinion over the fair futur s 
contract price and the comparable forward market rate. A the delivery 
date approaches, both the opportunity to deliver and the increasingly 
accurate expectations of future cash price cau e the ba i to narr w until 
on delivery date the price con erge.:" 
2. rganized xchange 
inancial futur tradin c njur up th im in rk t 
fl r, with individual' t cradtin h nd t I fl hin me m 
i znnl and y llin ) quall 111 in tru tion . ar th 
charact .ri tic an a tiv ut t fir t blush , n p n ut 
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market floor seems indispensable as a centre for buyers and sellers of futures to 
congregate and trade, and where due to the trading activity prices may be 
constantly quoted to be abided by all who intend to sell or buy standardized futures 
in that marketplace. The existence of a physical marketplace contributes to the 
liquidity of a futures contract. 
The development from a mere physical marketplace to an organized 
exchange, however, sprouted from the desire of market participants to eliminate 
counterparty risk when trading in futures contracts. Counterparty risk is eliminated 
by the clearing house and margining systems typical to a financial futures 
exchange.7 The clearing house clears trades made on the exchange and takes on 
the responsibility of paying the seller and collecting payment from the buyer of the 
relevant futures contract. This way, those who trade on the exchange are not 
hampered by having to make credit checks on counterparties or taking on 
counterparty credit risk. The clearing house is, in essence the creditworthy 
counterparty to all who trade on the exchange. 
In rief, IM X i both th e .change and th clearing hou and i 
con titut d by clearin member wh are entially the lar br k ra 
in tituti n. he cl arin m mb r ntitl d t r 
cl arin . th' cl nrin h u 'th 11 I iii t r th 
'U mitt d y th rn individually a cl arinu m m r . h 
d n t tak ch cl • ri n ) m m r': r lit\ rthin r r nt d. 
I ;\rill! h II 
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itself, the clearing house collects margin, being in theory an amount large enough 
to cover the clearing house for any losses a clearing member could sustain from its 
trading activities and should such member default from making due payment to the· 
clearing house to cover such losses.8 A margining system is a typical and necessary 
feature of an organized futures exchange. 
The traditional futures exchange is one upon which trades are made by a 
system of open outcry. SIMEX is such an example. Trading for specific contracts 
are done in a designated trading area called a pit. The exchange rules would 
stipulate that trading may take place only during official trading hours in the pit.9 
In the pit, traders would make offers to buy or sell to other traders. A system of 
hand signals are used to express wishes to buy or sell, known as "bids" and 
"offers". On SIMEX, the Rules provide that a hand be outstretched with the palm 
towards the bidder when making a bid, and a hand outstretched with the palm 
away from the offeror when making an offer. There is also a highly stylized ystem 
of unofficial hand signals to signify quantitie and bid and offer pric . owe er 
according to the Rules, when a trader desire to buy the going off r in the pit, h 
must literally cry out "buy ' and likewi e the trad r ho de ir to II at th om 
bid mu t lit rally cry ut ' cll".10 Th 
liquidity thr ugh its tran par ncy and th parti ip ti n 
aid t 
ltul 12. 
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local" is generally a trader who trades on his own account for speculative purposes 
as a form of self-employment. 11 
The open outcry system is by no means the only method of trading available 
to a futures exchange. Some newer exchanges in Europe have favoured an entirely 
computerized trading method.12 In London, the London International Financial 
Futures Exchange ("LIFFE") launched an Automatic Pit Trading ("APT') system 
in late 1989 and uses this system to extend futures trading, but exclusively for the 
Japanese Government Bond ("JGB") contract. Following suit, in March 1996, 
SIMEX began using a system of computerized trading to extend futures trading for 
certain contracts. At present, after normal open outcry trading hours, several 
designated contracts are traded using the Automated Trading System ("AT ") on 
SIMEX until l:OOam.13 Orders are executed via ATS terminals which may be 
subscribed from SIMEX. Incorporated into the ATS is an ordering matching 
system which adheres to a strict price and time priority for all orders entered into 
the system. The original FT A's definition of a "future market" wa unclear a 
whether such an electronic marketplace wa considered a 'future market '. h 
1995 amendments to the FT A ha clarified matter by e tend in th definition f 
"future market" t includ "an Iectr nic y t m wh th r peratin in in 
or elsowher thr u h which tra m 111 futur ntr: ct i carri d ut. i1 h 
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FT A, as amended, stipulates that the approval of MAS is required before SIMEX 
may operate any electronic facility for trading. 15 
3. History In Brief 
The history of trading futures contracts based on an open outcry 
marketplace and a clearing house system in the US could be traced to the mid-19th 
century and the rnidwestern city of Chicago." The Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
("CME") specialized in dairy and meat produce whilst its rival exchange, the 
Chicago Board of Trade ("CBOT") specialized in grain. In recent years, Chicago 
has enjoyed the acclaim of being the largest centre of futures trading in the world. 
The trading of financial futures, however, did not begin until 1972 when the 
world's first financial futures were traded on the International Monetary Market 
("Th1M:'') division of the CME. It was only in the 1970s that the need for financial 
futures amongst financial market participant emerged. It i not oincidental that 
the trading of financial future in the US debuted in the 1970 consequent u on the 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1971. he retton 
Agreement had maintained inrernati n I m n tary ord r me l · fi in 
currency exchang rate . Th rn nt I luati n 
fth d II r and th r , Ii nm nt ur nc alu v hich h r Id d in n r 
1 he •clu, I 11 c 11tc111pl 1 cl 1 nlc pr c tH 
R utcr • T lcrntc, ulck nnd Knii ht Rldd r, nil 
I •. 4A, FTA. 
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of unprecedented volatility in foreign exchange rates. With the weak and 
constantly flailing US dollar and rising oil prices due to the oil crisis, the 1970s 
encountered rampant inflation and the phenomenon of interest rate volatility, as 
interest rate restrictions and regulations which had existed in the United States 
since the end of the Second World War were relaxed, in response to rising 
inflation. 
As foreign exchange and interest rates rose and fell, it was realized that 
they had assumed the supply and demand characteristics of other non-financial 
commodities, quite like eggs, butter, pork bellies, wheat and soya beans, to name 
but a few delectable ones. In 1972, the IMM. began trading seven kinds of foreign 
currency futures contracts, on the same principles and practices as futures 
contracts had been traded on the CME. The open outcry mechanics, clearing 
house logistics and regulatory regime in place for the trading of futures in 
commodities were simply adapted to cater for the trading of futures in financial 
instruments. The increased financial risks of holding currency or ca h could not b 
ignored and a mechanism for hedging such increased ri k was se n in futur 
contracts based on the underlying financial in truments like curr ncie and int r 
rates. Price volatility of the underlying com mod it i a prerequi ite f r a ucc ful 
futures mark t. Without price fluctuati n th re w uld d f r h d m 
manage ri k, and without h d in th r w uld n uturc m t.17 
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The establishment of SIMEX came about largely when the CME saw in 
Singapore an opportunity to forge a linkage with a futures exchange in the eastern 
time zone.18 In the 1980's, the CME had apparently viewed Singapore as an ideal 
location for a sister exchange to provide 24 hour global trading capability in certain 
financial futures contracts. Singapore, on the other hand, was seeking to revive 
and expand its futures market and to revamp the moribund Gold Exchange of 
Singapore ("GES"). 19 
Singapore's experience of an open outcry futures market could be traced to 
a domestic gold futures market which was established in 1978 under the aegis of 
the GES.20 By September 1982, 24 gold futures trading firms, some of whom 
were members of the GES, were under investigation for malpractices and abuses in 
gold trading.21 21 of these gold futures trading firms were subsequently wound up 
in September 1983 and there was one successful prosecution of an individual for 
criminal breach of trust. 22 
On the face of it, the short history of the G plagued by candal did not 
appear conducive t the c tabli hm nt f a inancial futur mark t in in 'apor 
which w uld in pire c nfid nc am n 
the hum le r ali ati n f th n d t 
rn ti nal in Ill it \ 
and t ad pt , m 
phi ticat d yst m f tradin • nd r ul ti n in rd r t r ain r in rr u h 
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confidence amongst international investors, that led to the birth of SIMEX under 
the close guidance of the CME. 
SIMEX which was established on 21 September 1983 was conceived as a 
partner of the CME in an east-west linkage through an unprecedented mutual 
offset system. Therefore, SIMEX began its life as the co-pioneer, together with 
the CME, of the world's first mutual offset system." whereby contracts traded on 
one exchange could be cleared on the other exchange. With a mutual offset 
arrangement, market users in either Chicago or Singapore could have access to 
two markets to do their trading, but are obliged to deal with only one exchange, be 
it the CME or SIMEX, for paperwork relating to accounts, reports and margin 
settlements. This would allow market users a functional and cost effective way to 
trade around the clock. 
Although SIMEX began conducting trading on 7 September 1984, the FT A 
was not passed until 1986. It was foremost in the legislators' mind that the gold 
scandals of the early 1980s were to be avoided. Said Dr Hu, the Mini ter of 
Finance, during the econd Reading of the Future Trading Bill in 19 6: 
"In the ab nee f any legi lati n r gulating futur tradin , th re ' uld 
n tr ng d t rr nt t pr v nt th r mpnni · fr rn cm 
the activiti r th arly 1 
t up t r p 
1 11r h 198 
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It was blatantly clear which legislative framework the Singapore legislators 
were decided on emulating. Dr. Hu continued to state: 
" ... the [Futures Trading] Bill has been modelled on the United States' 
Commodities Trading Act [sic]" so that we can follow as closely as 
possible within our laws trading practices as conducted in the United States 
because of the linkage between SIMEX and the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange. We have to be able to assure American investors that the laws 
we apply here for futures trading are similar to the laws in which they are 
familiar with. "26 
Apart from being a partner in an innovative mutual offset arrangement, 
SIMEX made headway as the first financial futures exchange in Asia or rather the 
first futures exchange in Asia to specialize in financial future .27 It does not appear 
ever to have been intended that SI.MEX would be a futures exchange dealing 
exclusively in financial futures. One of SIMEX's first traded contracts wa in gold 
futures. Gold, by any semantic gymnastics, is not a financial instrument? Neither 
is oil. In 1989, SIMEX became Asia's fir t energy futur market with the 
introduction of the High Sulphur Fuel Oil future tradin .29 inc 19 
Crude Oil future have be n traded n pur uant t anoth r mutual off: 
agreement in ffect between and the Int rnati na I P tr I um , chan 
au th 
Ill II " ltt, 
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inaccurate and incomplete. SIMEX may essentially trade any contract approved by 
the MAS.31 As a business entity, it is a matter of course that SIMEX would aim to 
trade any contract that is commercially feasible to do so. 
4. Economic Functions of Futures 
Hedging Tool 
Futures were conceived primarily as hedging tools.32 This is by far the 
most recognized and often cited economic function of financial futures trading. 
This "hedging function" was explicitly acknowledged by the Singapore legislators: 
"Futures contracts enable a person to predetermine the price he has to pay 
or will receive for a commodity which he is liable to purchase or sell at a 
later date. This permits him to protect himself against potential price 
fluctuations. "33 
Hedgers are necessarily entities who have an intere t in or a pr -e i ting 
risk associated with the underlying commodity of a future c ntract. In th cas 
financial future the e would b bank financial in tituti n in uran compani 
and other individual r rganizr tion wh ha ' a th 
f rm f f r ign curr ncy, int r t rat in t rn nts nd . bnr In d, 
111 •.a r I .uh.1111 nt 
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any entity involved in asset and liability management will have potential for the use 
of financial futures. 
Futures trading, however, would only be an effective hedging tool if 
another party would voluntarily assume the risk that hedgers seek to hedge. The 
pre-existing risk perceived by hedgers is inevitably founded upon a prediction of a 
downward movement in the market of the underlying commodity. There is the risk 
that the value of the commodity held or to be produced or obtained by a hedger 
might fetch a lower price in the future. A futures contract would guarantee the 
hedger a certain price in the future for that commodity. A party willing to take the 
opposite position of a hedge would necessarily be taking the view that prices for 
that particular commodity will rise, and that buying at the hedger's predetermined 
selling price at the future date would be a "good buy." A party willing to take such 
an opposite view to a hedger is oftentimes a speculator. 
Financial futures markets enable the ri k as ociated with price volatility t 
be isolated from other types of business risk. uch risk i then tran f rr d from 
risk averse hedgers to ther wh are willing t a ume that ri k in rd r t rn 
return if the odds are in th ir fa ur. In the ab nee rn rk t thi ri k 
associated with price v latility uld n t c m nag d a r < dju t t 
id w w uld ( II be w r · " II d in 
b ·ncfit pr vidcd y futur i tr idine 
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Insofar as holders of certain assets like foreign currency, interest rate 
instruments or stocks and shares are concerned, it may be more attractive to hedge 
one's positions using futures contracts than to liquidate the underlying positions. 
This may be due to the fact that transaction costs associated with financial futures 
are often lower than those associated with liquidating various financial assets. 
Furthermore, the assetholder may not be allowed to liquidate its assets because of 
factors such as regulatory constraint or tax implications. 
Price Discovery 
Price discovery is the revealing of information about future cash market 
prices through the futures market. This is the second most often cited economic 
function of financial futures trading. As the theory goes, the futures price is related 
to the cash market or spot price at the date in the future on which the futures 
·contract expires. In other words, the cash market price at a future dat can 
theoretically be predicted through calculations based on present futures prices. 
Futures markets therefore serve a purpose by assisting busine se mak bett r 
e ti mates f future ca h market price s that they can tail r th ir c n umption and 
pricing or invc tm nt d ci i n a c rdingly. 
In c enc , the futur rn rk t c 
a myriad f uy r and 
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which are then accessible to the public. This price is disseminated for the benefit of 
all market participants to base their commercial decisions. Said Dr. Hu at the 
Second Reading of the Futures Trading Bill: 
"In addition to [the] hedging function, futures contracts perform another 
economic function, that of price dissemination. As trading in futures 
contracts is carried out in a centralized location, this leads to a wider 
dissemination of price information which results in more efficient 
markets. "3~ 
Speculation 
As discussed above, a market consisting solely of hedgers would be illiquid 
and ineffective. Traditionally, speculation is not perceived to serve any economic 
function.36 Indeed, financial futures have been given a bad name because of the 
activities of speculators in the market, the most infamous of them all being Leeson. 
It is undeniable that trading futures is a cheap and easy way for speculator to 
make bets on the future prices of various commoditie . o the peculator the 
commodity itself i in ignificant and the only objectiv f trading acti ity i t 
profit fr m price change . 
Hedging and price di c v ry and di minati n ar u u lly it cl th l 
imp f utur tradin . p ulr ti n 
can nly b difi d a a n ory ii. p ul ti n, t i.t m t I, i 
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indistinguishable from gambling and moral and legal objections to gambling are not 
unfamiliar. 
When disputes over financial futures first surfaced in the courts, there was 
some controversy in common law systems as to whether they were gaming and 
wagering contracts and therefore illegal. 37 Gaming and wagering contracts are 
illegal in Singapore by virtue of s. 6 of the Civil Law Act38 which provides that 
agreements by way of gaming or wagering shall be null and void and that action 
cannot be brought to recover any money alleged to be owing upon the wager. 
However, s. 6( 4) of the Civil Law Act specifically provides that "where any 
contract for the future delivery of any commodity is entered into by one or both 
parties with no intention of actual delivery of the commodity but with the intention 
of realising a profit arising out of differences in the price of the commodity shall 
not affect the validity or enforceability of the contract." As a complement, the 
FTA has also made it clear that financial futures are not gaming and wagering 
contracts. S. 5 8 of the FT A expressly state that "a futures contract made at a 
futures market. .. shall not be regarded a a contract of gaming or wag ring." 
Sl111 Ip I . 
CHAPTER3 
DEFINITIONS OF TERMS 
1. FTA and CEA 
As mentioned earlier, the main legislation governing the futures industry in 
Singapore is the FT A which is acknowledged explicitly by the Singapore legislature 
to be modelled on the Commodity Exchange Act' ("CEA") of the US. However, 
Singapore's regulatory regime based on the FT A is noticeably different from the 
US regulatory regime based on the CEA and headed by the CFTC. For a start, the 
CFTC is a specially formed governmental agency,' established under the CEA, 
whose prime responsibility is to oversee futures trading, inclusive of financial, 
agricultural and metallurgical futures. There is no equivalent specialist regulatory 
body in Singapore. Under the FT A, the MAS is given the responsibility of 
overseeing the financial futures industry. The MA , under variou other piec s of 
legislation, is also given the responsibility of over eeing the banking insuran , 
finance companies and securities indu try in ingapor . 
Th m st fundam ntal di tincti n betv c n th· 111 rk t man r im 
f in ap re and the Ii , in th m ik t. int nd cl t crn 
future mark t ought t be v 111 cl by th cl a ly .mbra · all utur 
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contracts, and does not limit itself to futures contracts based on financial 
instruments. In Singapore, the primary focus· of the FT A is on futures contracts 
based on gold and financial instruments. The FT A is complemented by the 
Commodity Futures Act ("CF A")4 which regulates commodity futures trading in 
Singapore and the government body responsible for overseeing such trading under 
the CF A is the Trade and Development Board ("TDB"). 5 Singapore has only one 
commodity futures exchange authorized by the TDB under the CF A. The 
Singapore Commodity Exchange ("SICOM") trades futures contracts in rubber 
and coffee." Futures contracts relating to commodities other than rubber and 
coffee are, at present, unregulated.7 
4 Cap. 48A (1993 Rev. Ed.), Statutes of Singapore. The CFA is modelled very closely on the 
FT A. The differences arise largely because of the differences whereby trades are carried out on 
SICOM and SIMEX. SICOM does not use the open outcry method of trading. See note 6, infra 
and also see the Second Reading for the Futures Commodity Bill, Singapore Parliamentary 
Debates, vol. 59, cols. 1345~1348 (20 March 1992). 
5 The TDB was established in 1983 under the Trade Development Board Act, Cap. 330, Statutes 
of Singapore. 
6 It is not within the ambit of this paper to consider the jurisdiction of the TDB, SICOM and 
commodity futures trading in Singapore. Suffice it to say that at present SICOM trades only four 
rubber contracts and one coffee contract. SICOM was initially known as the Rubber Association 
of Singapore ("RAS") Commodity Exchange or the RASCE. In February 1994, the RASCE was 
renamed SICOM. Rubber contracts have been traded in Singapore since the 1920s but such 
trading had never been based on an open outcry system. A market making or "whispering" 
system where transactions were executed over the telephone instead of in a centralized trading pit 
was used instead. · SICOM now provides a computerized trading system. 
7 S. 2, CF A defines "commodity" to mean "rubber and such other produce, items, goods and 
articles which are the subject of commodity futures contracts, as the Board may by order 
prescribe, and includes indices, rights and interests in such commodity." The Commodity 
Futures (Coffee) Order 1995, S 65195, which came into effect on l March 1995, prescrib d coffee 
as a "commodity" for the purposes of the CFA. Said G Lee Hsicn oong, the then Mini ter of 
Trade and Industry at the Second Reading of the Commodity Futures Bill, Singapore 
Parliamentary Debates, vol. 59 at col. l346 (20 March 1992): 
"At present, the scope of the ill is limit d to regulating trading in rubber futures 
contracts. Other commodity future contracts will be pr scribed as and ' hen they 
become commercially viable. Until thi i done, futures trading based on other 
commodltic , for example, coITee or red ans, ' ill not be regulated by the law. Persons 
who trade with brokin • firm offering such facilities ha c to ar the ri k invol cd 
them elves." 
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In the US, the CFTC seeks to oversee futures trading as a form of 
economic activity. 8 It matters not what the underlying commodity of the futures 
contracts is, be it frozen concentrated orange juice, pork bellies, silver, copper, 
Eurodollars or JGB's. It is recognized in the CEA that the trading of all types of 
futures "are affected with a national public interest".9 Unlike Singapore, the US is 
an extensive country with natural resources, and itself produces and processes 
many agricultural commodities. As manufacturers, the country utilizes many 
agricultural and metallurgical commodities. Therefore, the prices of such 
commodities which may be affected by the futures trading thereof is of paramount 
concern to the authorities. 
The Singapore scenario is markedly different. The MAS seeks to oversee 
futures trading as a specific form of economic activity mainly where the underlying 
commodity of such futures is a financial instrument. Futures trading in coffee 
beans and rubber, and for that matter, soya beans or rice, is not a concern of the 
MAS. However, the possible impact that futures trading in equity indexes, foreign 
exchange and interest rates might have on the underlying financial instruments 
themselves and consequently on "monetary stability and credit and exchange 
conditions't'" suggests that financial futures trading should be an area of major 
concern for the MAS. The MAS's wider concern can be said to be the wholistic 
8 This is highlighted at §1.01, Philip McBride Johnson and Thomas Lee Hazen, Commodities 
Regulation, 1989, Little Brown and Company. 
9 Sec. 3, CEA continues to state: "The transactions and prices of commodities ... are susceptible to 
excessive speculation and can be manipulated, controlled, cornered or squeezed, to the detriment 
of the producer or the consumer and the persons handling commodities and the products and 
byproducts thereof ... rendering regulation imperative for the protection of such commerce and the 
national public interest therein." 
10 Secs. 4(b), Monetary Authority of Singapore Act and also see haptcr 4, note , infra. 
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preservation of total financial market integrity, credibility and stability in 
Singapore. The governance of financial futures trading is but one aspect of this 
total market governance philosophy. 
In this respect, it is anomalous that the trade of oil and gold futures also 
comes under the purview of an authority and regime designed for financial 
markets. This can be explained by the fact that SIMEX' s infrastructure is one that 
can sustain trading in oil and gold futures. SIMEX is modelled on the CME and 
thereby has a trading system similar or familiar to many international exchanges 
who deal in financial and commodity futures. Trades in oil or gold futures cannot 
be sustained on SICOM which is a smaller exchange, with a smaller clientele base 
and which does not use the open outcry method of trading.11 As a business entity, 
SIMEX would aim to trade any contract that is commercially feasible. The 
regulatory regime allows such flexibility. SIMEX may essentially trade any 
contract approved by the MAS.12 
Upon companng the US and the Singapore regulatory regimes, the 
maturity of the US's regime is evident. The CEA is a detailed and comprehensive 
collection of legislation aimed at the futures market since 1922. The CEA exceeds 
the FT A with regards to length and content. Although the CEA only has 48 
sections, they are lengthy and detailed, having t cater to a regime that cover 
financial and commodity futures as well as a trading community spanning the whole 
11 Sec notes 4 and 6, supra. 
12 Secs. 4A, FTA. 
of the US. The FTA is comparatively shorter.13 However, it is the FTR that 
stands in stark contrast to the body of general regulations made under the CEA. 
The FTR contains no more than 30 regulations" whilst its US counterpart boasts 
over 500.15 
The FT A is necessarily at variance with the CEA in various aspects. For 
instance, the CEA covers the futures trading of virtually anything, tangible and 
intangible. Insofar as the FT A is concerned, although the FT A focuses on the 
regulation of financial instruments or intangible products, tangible products such as 
oil may be prescribed and added on the list by legislative action. There is no check 
or limitation as to what products can be added on by prescription. Certainly, it is 
not limited to products of a financial nature. Further, the CEA covers the futures 
trading of futures contracts whether traded on an exchange or not. As will be 
discussed, the FT A's position on off-exchange products remains uncertain. 
There is still much ambiguity as to the extent of economic activity which 
the FT A seeks to regulate and in attempting to ascertain that extent, an 
examination of the US regime which it sought to emulate might provide some 
insight. After all, the blatant legislative intent behind the FTA was to model the 
Singapore regime on the US regulatory regime. This legislative intent may be 
13 Although the FT A has almost 70 sections, it is shorter in length to the CEA. 
14 Indeed, prior to the Bnrings debacle, the FTR was comprised of only about two dozen 
regulations. A spate of amendments lo the FTR in 1995 and 1996 raised the number of 
regulations to about JO. 
15 Sec from i1200 l, "Regulations", Commodity Futur ·s Law Reports, ouunerco tearing House, 
Inc. 
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taken into account by the courts in interpreting the scope of the FT A.16 However, 
blind emulation of the US model for the sake of emulation is as unpalatable as it is 
ridiculous. The greater legislative object and purpose of the FT A is "to ensure that 
our futures market is operated properly and that the public interest is preserved.v" 
The problem is, what did the legislature mean by "futures market"? 
It should always be borne in mind that the focus of the Singapore regime 
stands in stark contrast to that of the US. Different socio-economic conditions 
exist. Different socio-economic considerations have to be taken into account. 
Indeed, various provisions in the CEA had not been adopted for Singapore use. 
The challenge for legislators and regulators is to develop an autochthonous 
governance infrastructure to suit Singapore's idiosyncratic socio-economic climate 
and culture, with the help oflessons learnt from the US's mature experience. 
2. Underlying Commodity 
The FTA at provides a definition of "commodity" as being: 
"in relation to a futures contract - 
16 There is no longer any controversy regarding the use of parliamentary materials as extrinsic 
aids by courts in interpreting legislation. The Interpretation Act, Cap. l, Statutes of Singapore, 
was amended in 1993 to provide that in the interpretation of statutory provisions, the legislative 
intent, as manifested in parliamentary debates, explanatory statements to bills and other relevant 
materials, may be referred to. It directs courts to give statutory provisions an interpretation which 
would promote the object or purpose underlying the statute. For further discussion on this point, 
sec Robert C. Beckman and Andrew Phang, "Beyond Pepper v. Hart: The Legislative Reform of 
Statutory Interpretation in Singapore," Statute Law Review, vol. 15, no. 2, 1994. 
17 See Second Reading of Futures Trading Bill, Singapore Parliamentary Debates, vol. 47 at col. 
1433 (31Mnrch1986). 
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(a) a financial instrument; and 
(b) gold and such other items, goods, articles, services, rights 
and interests, which are the subject of futures contracts, as the 
Authority may by order prescribe" .18 
Pursuant to the second leg of the definition, the Futures Trading 
(Commodity)" Order came into effect on 3 January 1989. It prescribed that all 
classes of oil be considered a commodity for the purposes of the FT A. It is the 
only order prescribing a good, article service, right or interest as a "commodity'' 
made to date. 
Financial instruments are automatically commodities for the purposes of the 
FT A. "Financial instruments" are defined in the FT A to "include currencies, 
interest rate instruments, share indices, a group or groups of share indices and such 
other financial instruments as the Authority may by order prescribe. "20 The use of 
the word "include" in the definition of financial instruments incontrovertibly means 
that the list is not exhaustive. Foreseeably, a problem may arise if a particular 
instrument is difficult to characterize, for want of being distinctively "financial". 
This problem is academic if the said instrument is to be subject to futures trading 
on SIMEX. For a futures contract to be listed on SIMEX, the MAS's approval is 
required.21 In the course f approval and listing one would expect the MAS to 
make an order prescribing the instrument as a "comm dity" if the po ition is 
18 Secs. 2, FT A. 
10S417/88 
20 Sec . 2, PTA. 
21 Secs. 4A, Ibid. 
unclear or it could be safely assumed that such an instrument is indeed a "financial 
instrument." Upon approval and listing, the MAS is estopped from asserting any 
other position. 
There may be occasions, however, when the problem is not purely 
academic. A futures broker is required under the FTA to be licensed.22 A futures 
broker is one who carries on the business of soliciting or accepting orders, for the 
purchase or sale of any commodity under a futures contract on a futures market in 
Singapore or elsewhere." If a corporation engages in soliciting or accepting 
orders for the purchase or sale of futures contracts based on re-insurance contracts 
and such futures contracts are listed on an overseas exchange, would the 
corporation concerned have to be licensed as a futures broker?" 
The question would turn on whether re-insurance contracts are considered 
financial instruments. The uncertainty could be resolved by the prescription of re- 
insurance as a "commodity" by the MAS, as it is without doubt, either a service, 
right or interest under the second leg of the "commodity" definition in the FT A. 
However, short of such a prescription being made, the issue remains unresolved. It 
might be of assistance to note at this stage that the regulation of insurance 
companies falls within the regulatory umbrella of the MAS, 25 and to interpret a re- 
insurance contract as a financial instrument would not be overly strenuous as a 
matter of semantics. Such an interpretation would not conflict with the MAS' s 
overall regulatory objectives and policy. Considering the fact that the MAS is also 
the overseer of insurance companies, re-insurance may not -have been such a good 
example ·of an instrument which sits on the fence of what is popularly conceived as 
a "financial instrument." 
Perhaps a more difficult example would be that of a futures contract based 
on a property index.26 Would a property index be considered a financial instrument 
for the purposes of the FTA? There is a view amongst practitioners that an index, 
whether based on property or potatoes, would be considered a financial instrument. 
This is consistent with the view that stock indexes are considered financial 
instruments, whereas individual stocks and shares are not.27 
25 Sec "The MA " at hapter 4 below. 
26 These example arc not Iarfctchcd. The Futures and Options xchangc (' 0 ") in London 
was "unable to fire the market's ima tination with pr pcrty-ba cd futures". n the other hand, 
"the introduction of re-in urancc based future in the United t. re hn occurr d. The m rk t 
will study the arrival of thi ncwc t contrnct cln with intcrc t b cau c of the huge potential of 
the in urancc market." Sec M. Desmond Fitz crald with athcrino Lubochin k , nd P~ trick 
Thoma , Flnancial Futur •s, 2nd edition, 199 , uromcnc ook at I . 
27 
It remains to be queried whether n rubber index ' uld consid r d a • Ilnnncial in trumcnt" 
under the PTA. The FA's dcfluitlon of a "commodlty" ' uld indi putnbly include n rubber 
index. Sec note 7, supra. Would n broker, ho proffers Iutur nt 1c1 d n n rubb r index 
have to be Ileen ed both under the FTA and the T'A? It 11p1 r 
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In contrast, the CEA has an exhaustive definition of "commodity" that 
begins by itemizing commodities ranging from wheat to frozen concentrated 
orange juice and ends with the catch all phrase "all other goods and articles, except 
onions" ... , and all services, rights and interests in which contracts for future 
delivery are presently or in the future dealt in."29 The CEA's definition of 
"commodity" encompasses virtually anything that is or becomes the subject of 
futures trading, tangible or intangible" The status as a "commodity" under the 
CEA does not emerge until the good, article, service, right or interest becomes the 
subject of futures trading. There is no requirement of added CFTC prescription. 
Wrote Johnson and Hazen in their important work, Commodities Regulation, of 
this: 
"Although this method of converting something into a commodity may 
seem curious, it illustrates an important principle of commodities 
regulation: Its interest is in a form of economic activity rather than in the 
attributes or character of the underlying subject. The economic activity in 
question is futures and commodity options trading; the nature of the 
commodity does not affect the regulatory result"31 
In Singapore, the nature of the commodity does affect the regulatory result. 
Insofar as the nature of the commodi~y is a financial instrument, it would be within 
the purview of the FT A. In determining whether a product is a financial 
instrument, it is necessary to look at the wider objective of regulation and consider 
28 Futures contracts on onions were prohibited in 1958 because of a perceived adverse effect that 
futures trading had on cash crop prices. See note 3, §1.10, Johnson and Hazen, Commodities 
Regula/Ion. 
29 Sec Sec. la(3), CEA. 
30 Sec §1.01, Johnson and Hazen, ommodittes Regulation. 
31 Sec §1.01, ibid. 
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the contemplated regulatory embrace of the MAS. An opportunity may arise soon 
to consider this point as the futures business is a highly innovative one, and new 
products are constantly being tested on the global marketplace. 
3. Futures Market 
The FTA defines "futures market" as: 
"(a) a market, an Exchange or other place, whether in Singapore or 
elsewhere, at which trading in futures contracts regularly takes place; or 
(b) an electronic system, whether operating in Singapore or elsewhere, 
through which trading in futures contracts is carried out..."32 
To define a futures market as a "market.. at which trading in futures 
contracts regularly take place" inevitably leads to a host of interpretive problems, 
especially when a "futures contract" is then essentially defined as a contract made 
pursuant to the rules or practices of a futures market! A futures market is where 
futures contracts are made, and futures contracts are contracts made on futures 
markets. That, is a precis of what the relevant legal definitions in the FT A have to 
offer. 
So, what constitutes a futures market? This question i pertinent in the 
case of contracts which have many f the characteri tic of a futures contract for 
2 Sec . 2, FTA. 
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instance, a standardized forward contract, save that they are not traded on a 
futures exchange either in Singapore or elsewhere. Standardized forward contracts 
could be regularly and systematically traded amongst a select group of persons. 
Assuming that the subject of the contracts is incontrovertibly a "commodity" under 
the FT A, whether such contracts would be considered "futures contracts" under 
the FT A would depend on their being traded according to the rules or practices of 
a "futures market" whatever that may be. Would a systematic off-exchange trading 
environment wherein standardized forward contracts are regularly transacted in 
accordance with rudimentary and crude, or even complex and advanced, rules and 
practices constitute a market? 
If indeed a "futures market" is constituted, a contract where "one party 
agrees to deliver a specified commodity ... to another party at a specified future time 
and at a specified price payable at that time pursuant to ... the business rules or 
practices of[a] ... futures market," becomes a "futures contract" for the purposes of 
the FT A. Two drastic consequences thereby ensue. First, those accepting or 
soliciting orders for futures contracts or advising on futures contracts on such a 
market without a licence from the MAS would be infringing the licensing 
provisions" under the FT A which results in the commission of an offence resulting 
in a fine or imprisonment or both. Next, it is also an offence resulting in a fine or 
S. 11, FTA in relation to "future broker", and . 12, FTA in r Inti n 10 "future iradina 
advisors" and "futures pool operator ''. The tipulat d penult in . 11( ) nnd . 12(4) i a fine 
not exceeding S 0,000 or impri 011111e11t for n term not cxc cdin • yen or b th. cc "Market 
ntry Requirements" at hnpter 5 below. 
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imprisonment or both to "establish or maintain" a futures market in Singapore that 
is not approved by the MAS.34 
Essentially, the question may be reduced to whether the word "market" in 
the definition of "futures market" connotes "a place where a number of persons or 
companies or businesses operate" or whether it is "the more abstract concept of a 
market created by the activities of a number of competitors. "35 This was a 
question considered by the Supreme Court of Australia in Carragreen Currencies 
Corporation Pty Ltd v. Corporate Affairs Commission of New South Wales.36 
Hodgson J concluded that the definition of "market" related to the former, being a 
physical place rather than an abstract concept. 
The resolution of what a "futures market" is under the FT A has practical 
ramifications. Banks and financial institutions in Singapore regularly partake in 
off-exchange contracts for the forward delivery of interest rates or foreign 
exchange. These are otherwise generically known as OTC or "over-the-counter" 
derivatives. If the term "futures market" is an abstract notion, players in the OTC 
market could conceivably be caught by the FT A, particularly with respect to 
popular transactions where contracts are fairly standardized and constantly traded. 
On the other hand, if the narrow interpretation of a "futures market" is espoused 
the swap market which has no physical marketplace would not constitute a "futures 
34 Sec s. 3, Ff A. The stipulated penalty in s. 3(3) is a fine not exceeding $30,000 or 
imprisonment for a term not cxcccdin • 3 years or both. The offence will be further discussed 
below. Sec note 54, infra. 
35 Hodgson J, Carragreen urrencies orporatlon Pty Ltd v. orporate Affairs ommisston of 
New 'outh Wales, ( 1986) 7 NSLR 705 at 721 -D. 
6 (1986) 7 NSLWR 705. 
market". It may be sensible to conclude that the FT A does not apply to the off- 
exchange market in which many large and sophisticated institutions who do not 
need the protection of the FT A participate. However, such a conclusion would 
necessarily disapply the FT A to schemes which market similar forward contracts as 
vehicles for speculation. Betting on interest rates, foreign currency or even oil 
prices may be cheaply done by the use of forward contracts. Delivery of the 
underlying commodity would not be required as speculators offset forward 
contracts by entering into an equal but opposite contract. In the US, various such 
schemes involving purely speculative contracts in gasoline, coal, precious metals 
and foreign currency have been devised and have become the subject of injunction 
proceedings by the CFTC.37 
Unfortunately, the US position does not assist in the interpretation of the 
phrase "futures market" or "market." The problem of defining a "futures market" 
does not arise in the US. Specific organized commodities markets are designated 
as "contract markets" under the CEA. Members of such "contract markets" would 
have to comply with the CEA and the requirements of their particular contract 
market. The CEA makes it unlawful for any person to deal in any transaction in or 
in connection with "a contract for the purchase or sale of a commodity for future 
37 See Ff, v. o Petro Marketing roup, inc, 680 F.2d 57 (1982). Co Petro had marketed 
speculative contracts for the future purchase of petroleum products cxtcnsi ely to the gen ral 
public through newspaper advertisements, private seminars, commissioned telephone solicitors 
and various other commissioned sales agents. For further c ramples, sec CFTC v. National oaf 
Exchange, inc, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) il 21,424 (1982), and CFTC v. Noble detol 
International, Inc, 67 F. d 766 (1995), both instances of off-cxchnn c contracts for the future 
delivery of coal and precious metals re pcctivcly which ' ere marketed to members of the general 
public and Ft v. tandard -orex, Inc, omm. Fut. L. Rep. ( CH) 26,786 ( 1996), where 
contracts to buy or sell riti h p unds were marketed to m mbcrs of the general public, notabl 
hine c and Korean imml irant . The c ntrnct in the above ca e were held b the court to b 
futures contract for the purpo c of the A ' re thu subj ct to the "c ntract market 
monopoly." 
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delivery?" unless such transaction is conducted on or subject to the rules of a 
contract market39 and is executed or consummated by or through a member of such 
contract market." This so-called "contract market monopoly'?" extends to all 
contracts for future delivery, even to those not "on or subject to the rules of' a 
contract market, thereby covering all privately created non-exchange traded 
forward contracts.42 Such an approach assures that anyone dealing m any 
contracts for the purchase or sale of any commodity for future delivery is a market 
participant regulated under the CEA. This approach is necessarily wide-ranging 
and is pared down by exemptions. For instance, to prevent banks and financial 
institutions who engage in forward transactions in foreign currency from being 
caught out, an exception for large, sophisticated financial institutions was worked 
into the CEA. 43 
The Carragreen case appeared at first blush to offer some insight into the 
question of what a "futures market" or "market" is in lieu of similarly worded 
futures legislation in Australia. However, it is submitted that Carragreen is of 
limited applicability in Singapore as the definition of "futures market" in the 
Australian legislation contains an important difference. The definition of "futures 
38 Sec sec. 6(a), CEA. 
39 See sec. 6(a)(l), ibid. 
40 Sec sec. 6(a)(2), ibid. 
41 Sec § 1.06, Johnson and Hazen, ommodtties R ulation. 
42 Sec ibid. 
4 This exemption is known as the Treasury Amendment, s c sec. 2, EA and e note 4 and 
§l.01, ibid. The scope of this exemption ho' ever ha r cently b en the subj ct of contro ersy. 
On the one hand, the Tr asury Amendment ha 11 interpret d to exempt onl off-cxch: ngc 
transactions in inter alla forei m curr ncy among I bank and lnrge, sophi ticntcd financial 
institutions, sec 'n/0111011 Fore , Inc v. Taub tr, 8 ·. d 6 ( 199 ). n the other hand, it ha 
recently been interpreted to exempt all ff-exchange trnn nctiou in forci n currency, re ardlc 
of tho nature of the participant, sec Vi' v, Frankwell D111//011, 9 ,.3d 299 (199 ). This is 
further discussed in" -uturcs outract'' below. 
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market" in the Australian legislation includes the word "facility?" whereas the 
definition in the FT A does not. 
In Carragreen, the plaintiffs were in the business of granting to its 
customers options to purchase certain types of foreign currency and had brought 
the action seeking declarations that its business did not breach the Australian 
Futures Industry Code. Apart from deciding whether the said contracts for the 
supply of foreign exchange at a future date at a price fixed at the time of entering 
into the contract were "futures contracts" as defined in the Futures Industry Code, 
the courts had to decide whether the infrastructure set up by the plaintiffs for 
business could be considered a "futures market". If a "futures market" existed, the 
plaintiffs would be in breach of the Futures Industry Code by having established 
and maintained a futures market that is "neither a futures market of a futures 
exchange or an exempt futures market.?" The infrastructure of the plaintiffs 
comprised personnel, means of communication, access to relevant foreign currency 
market information, trading arrangements with brokers, as well as an office for 
general administration. It was held that such an infrastructure could not be 
considered a "market" for the word "market" connoted "a place where a number of 
persons or companies or businesses operate. "46 However, it was also held that an 
infrastructure like that of the plaintiffs could constitute a "facility" by means of 
which futures contracts are regularly made and that the office of the plaintiffs was a 
44 S. 4(1) of the Futures Industry Code define "future market" as "a market, exchange or other 
place at which, or a facility by means of which. futures contracts arc regularly made." 
4s Seo s. 45, Futures Indu try (New South Wales) ode which was referred to as the Futures 
Industry Code by Hodgson J sec orrnereen at 7118. 
46 ' 0 Sec note 35, supra. 
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"place" at which futures contracts were regularly made. The plaintiffs business 
enterprise, therefore, fell within the definition of a "futures market" as a "facility.". 
Counsel for the plaintiffs in Carragreen had argued that "facility" must 
mean something of the nature of a market or exchange constituted by some sort of 
electronic network. In essence, he submitted a market should be where a number of 
persons compete otherwise it would be manifestly absurd and unreasonable to have 
a situation whereby a private party regularly making futures contract could be 
' 
guilty of an offence which could result in imprisonment. 47 These arguments were 
summarily rejected as being "insufficient.':" The rejection without reasoned 
riposte is perhaps unsurprising, if looked at in terms of regulatory policy. The net 
effect of the judgment was to catch the leveraged foreign exchange trading carried 
out by Carragreen Currencies Corporation Pty Ltd within the regulatory net, even 
if it meant stretching the meaning of the term "futures market". 
It is interesting to note that if the impugned business of the plaintiffs in 
Carragreen were to be conducted in Singapore today, it would contravene the 
FT A without the need for any further discussion of whether such business was 
transacted on a futures market. The activities would be caught under provisions 
pertaining to "leveraged foreign exchange trading" which have been within the 
purview of the FTA since the round ofFTA amendments in 1995.49 
47 Sec Carragreen at 7210-F. 
48 See ibid at 721 G. 
49 See "Leveraged Foreign Exchange Trading" below. 
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Leveraged foreign exchange trading need not occur on a "futures market" 
to be caught by the FT A, but on a "foreign exchange market." A "foreign 
exchange market" is then defined as a "market, whether in Singapore or elsewhere, 
at which foreign exchange trading regularly takes place. "50 It is clear the word 
"market" in this context is used in its abstract sense. In the Explanatory Statement 
to the Futures Trading (Amendment) Bill,51 the term "leveraged foreign exchange 
trading" was expressed to mean "dealing in foreign exchange in the over-the- 
counter market on a margin basis." The question remains to be asked though: 
what is an over-the-counter market? When is it constituted? 
Whether prior to the 1995 amendments, leveraged foreign exchange trading 
could have constituted a "futures market" would have been an interesting exercise 
in statutory interpretation for the judiciary. The definition of a "futures contract" is 
drafted widely enough to capture certain leveraged foreign exchange transactions, 
in particular, those that are standardized and have clear dates for delivery or offset. 
What is uncertain is whether such off-exchange transactions would have been made 
pursuant to the business rules or practices of a "futures market." 
It has to be remembered that the legislative intent behind the FT A in 
relation to futures contracts was never to cast a wide net at futures trading per se 
as an economic activity. The FTA was not geared towards the "consumer" or 
"noo-professional.?" The legislature appeared more concerned with protecting the 
sos . ee s. 2, FTA. 
51 See Government Gazette Bills Supplement, no. 9 (24 January 1995) at 44. 
52 See Chapter I, note 19, supra. 
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financial sector as a greater whole, rather than the gullible investor as an 
individual. 53 The FT A, modelled on the legislative regime of the US was 
specifically designed for the regulation of SIMEX, primarily to appease the CME 
and the CFTC. The regulatory focus was very much on exchange-traded 
contracts. 
At this point, it is to be noted that s. 3 of the FT A provides that: 
"No person shall ... establish or maintain or assist m establishing or 
maintaining or hold himself out as providing or maintaining a futures 
market in Singapore that is not the futures market of a Futures Exchange 
that has been approved by the Authority ... "54 
This is evidently aimed at preventing unapproved exchanges from being set up and 
the trade thereon of contracts similar to those traded on SIMEX, without any of 
the restrictions found in the FT A, FTR and the Rules. In order to give s. 3 of the 
FT A any bite, the restriction against establishing or maintaining a "futures market" 
should extend to cover the establishment or maintenance of a "market" m 
standardized forward contracts not necessarily involving transactions on an 
exchange. After all, what is an unapproved exchange or market? 
53 Dr Hu, Minister of Finance, Singapore Parliamentary Debates, vol. 47, col. 1433 (31 March 
1986) stated: "Trading in futures contracts based on commodities not listed on SlMEX ... is not 
regulated under this Bill. It is not considered as yet appropriate for the MAS to regulate these 
other activities since they do not involve the financial sector. Broking firms that offer facilities 
solely in commodities futures arc thus not subject to the regulations of this Bill and members of 
the public who trade with them will have lo accept the risks involved in dealing with these 
Iirrns." 
s4 Sec note 34, supra, where the penalties arc stipulated. 
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It is submitted that the Carragreen interpretation of the word "market" as 
denoting a physical place where buyers and sellers compete is too narrow. 
Although dictionaries tend to point towards a "place" for trade as the principal 
meaning of "market", it is undeniable that in modern English usage "market" can 
connote something more abstract, such as "conditions as regards, or opportunity 
for, buying and selling.l'" The FT A itself uses the word "market" clearly in its 
abstract sense in the second leg of the definition of "futures market" where an 
electronic system is described. 56 An electronic facility which does not permit users 
of the facility to "make a market in, futures contracts" is excluded from the 
definition. 
At the end of the day, what constitutes a "futures market" is a policy 
question. The initial legislative thrust behind the FT A was to set up a regulatory 
framework for exchange-traded products of a standard comparable to that in the 
US, to instill confidence in the international investor. It is unlikely that the 
sophisticated international investor would be duped by get-rich-quick or 
investment schemes comprised of contracts resembling futures contracts save that 
they are not executed on an approved exchange. Neither would such investors be 
the target for the marketing efforts of the schemers. Where the marketing and 
trading of financial products reminiscent of futures contracts have led to 
55 From the definition of "market" in the Concise Oxford Dictionary. 
56 The second leg of the definition of "futures market" ins. 2, FT A reads in full as follows: " ... an 
electronic system, whether operating in Singapore or elsewhere, through which trading in futures 
contracts is carried out; but excludes an electronic facility which merely provides price or other 
information on futures contracts (whether the facility is part of or carried on in conjunction with 
the provision of any other information not related to futures contracts) and which does not permit 
users of the facility to channel orders for, execute transactions in, or make a market in, futures 
contracts." 
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malpractices and scams of a pseudo-criminal nature which affect a large cross- 
section of society, the legislature has intervened, for instance, in the case of 
leveraged foreign exchange trading. This was probably a more economical and 
efficient method of dealing with the problem than to embark on lengthy and 
uncertain prosecutions of the offending "forex bucket shops" under the FT A with 
awkward arguments centered on what actually constitutes a "futures market" and 
thus a "futures contract." 
Further reform is necessary, if indeed there is a policy intention behind the 
FT A to protect an evergrowing class of Singaporean society that is affluent yet 
unsophisticated as investors. Where the offer and trade of futures-type products 
are effected on such a scale as to affect the general public, a pragmatist might 
suggest that, as things now stand, a "futures market" would arise and the activity 
caught within the FT A. The ambiguities and uncertainties inherent in the definition 
of a "futures market" give the courts ample leeway. The execution of a few 
semantic gymnastic moves could metamorphose off-exchange trading 
arrangements into a "market." Factors like the fungibility and liquidity of the 
products traded could be taken into account, based upon the regularity and ease of 
trade, the reliability of the trading network, the number of participants, the 
centralization of administration, the method of price quotation, the concretization 
of mies and practices and the standardization of the products traded. However, 
this malleability of the meaning of "market" would ensure uncertainty and 
unpredictability. This might serve to protect the gullible investor, but it might not 
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be conducive to the allure of international investors who thrive on legal certainty 
and predictability for commercial planning purposes. 
Further, a wide, abstract and amorphous definition of "market" risks the 
capture of OTC trades between banks, financial institutions and other sophisticated 
and experienced participants who do not need the protection of the FT A Indeed, 
the imposition of the FT A could arguably stifle such trades by increasing regulatory 
compliance costs. OTC derivatives trading in foreign exchange and interest rate 
instruments is an activity common to major financial centres. In a 1995 global 
survey coordinated by the Bank for International Settlements, Singapore was 
ranked the world's fourth largest trading centre for foreign exchange derivatives, 
the world's sixth largest interest rate derivatives market, and the world's fifth 
largest derivatives market overall with a daily volume of US$103 billion.57 To 
stifle such activity would definitely not be the legislative intent behind the FT A 
Although the trades in financial forward contracts may affect the monetary stability 
or economic policy of Singapore, the defence of which is clearly within the MAS' s 
mandate, and would thus support a wide reading of "futures market" in the FT A, 
the empirical evidence is that no action has been taken so far against off-exchange 
transactions based on breaches of the FT A Insofar as the OTC derivative market 
is concerned, most of the players involved, being banks and financial institutions, 
are regulated under other regimes, and fall within the jurisdiction of the MAS in 
any case." 
57 See "S'porc world's fourth largest Iorex derivatives market," The tralts Times, 20 December 
1995 and "S'porc No 5 derivatives centre," The B11 iiness Times, 20 December 1995. 
58 Sec Banking Act, Cap. J 9 and the Financial Institutions Act, Cap. 108, Statute of Singapore. 
4. Futures Contract 
The FT A defines "futures contract" as: 
"a contract the effect of which is that - 
(a) one party agrees to deliver a specified commodity, or a 
specified quantity of a specified commodity, to another party at a 
specified future time and at a specified price payable at that time 
pursuant to terms and conditions set forth in the business rules or 
practices of an Exchange or futures market; or 
(b) the parties will discharge their obligations under the contract 
by settling the difference between the value of a specified quantity 
of a specified commodity at the time of the making of the contract 
and at a specified future time, such difference being determined in 
accordance with the business rules or practices of the Futures 
Exchange59 or futures market at which the contract is made, 
and includes a futures option transaction". 60 
A contract which is traded on SIMEX, a futures exchange approved by the 
MAS, obviously falls squarely within the definition of a "futures contract." That 
much is clear. Similarly, a financial future traded on a foreign futures exchange 
falls within the definition of "futures contract." That much is also clear. What 
s9 "Exchange" and "Futures • xchangc" have the same meaning ins. 2, FT A. There appears to be 
no reason for the use of two different cxprc sion . The inconsistency is irk omc but of no 
consequence. 
60 Sec s. 2, FTA. 
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remains unclear is the status of regularly traded off-exchange cash-settled forward 
contracts in which there is no intention of delivery of the underlying commodity. 
Such contracts are entered into for speculative purposes and could lead to 
substantial risk of losses, just like exchange-traded futures contracts. To 
participate in such contracts, the customer is asked to place an initial margin or 
deposit with the broker, and may be subject to additional margin calls. This 
participation on a margin basis is also known as leverage. At the end of the day, 
insofar as the customer is concerned, the impact of trading in either off-exchange 
contracts of the type described or that of exchange-traded futures, is similar. He 
could stand to lose more than the amount of money laid down as initial margin. If 
such off-exchange contracts are not considered "futures contracts" pursuant to the 
FT A, such a customer would lose all customer protection afforded by the FT A in 
its dealings with the broker. Insofar as off-exchange leveraged forward contracts 
in currency are concerned, the provisions in the FT A relating to 'leveraged foreign 
exchange trading have clarified the issue. However, the status of off-exchange 
leveraged forward contracts based on financial instruments other than foreign 
exchange, or commodities such as oil and gold, is still unresolved. 
By defining "futures contracts" widely to encompass off-exchange 
transactions would be a step towards affording the public greater protection. 
When confronted with an affluent yet perhaps unsophisticated investing public, it 
appears sensible to regulate leveraged forward contract schemes marketed to the 
general public for speculative purposes. The legislature evinced opinions 
discouraging an on-exchange casino, it should be taken that they would have 
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sought to discourage an off-exchange casino regarding contracts of the exchange- 
traded genre, had they addressed the issue. · It would not serve any agenda to 
interpret "futures contract" narrowly whereby off-exchange schemes reminiscent of 
"futures contracts" may be marketed to the public. 
The problem with this seemingly sensible approach is that a wide definition 
of "futures contract" embracing off-exchange transactions might unwittingly 
include into the ambit of the FT A the active and thriving off-exchange OTC 
derivative or swap market made up of large institutional or other sophisticated 
participants. These participants neither want nor need the protection of the FT A. 
Indeed, in the US, when an action?' challenged a United States Court of Appeals to 
place the US derivative market under CFTC jurisdiction by holding that such 
derivatives were futures contracts regulated by the CEA, the courtroom was awash 
with amici curiae urging that "to regulate the traditionally unregulated markets, 
market efficiency would be reduced and innovation in the development of new 
mechanisms would be inhibitedv'" and that it "would result in extra-ordinary costs 
and would damage the United States' ability to compete as a world financial 
center. "63 The same concerns could be applicable in Singapore, a major centre for 
derivatives trading. 64 
In the US, the CEA has an inbuilt exclusion that disapplies the CEA to 
"transactions in foreign currency, security warrants, security rights, resales of 
61 s ee Salomon Forex, Incorporated v. Laszlo N. Tauber, MD., 8 F.3d 966 (1993). 
62 See ibid at 974. 
63 See ibid. 
64 s cc note 57, supra. 
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installment loan contracts, repurchase options, government securities, or 
mortgages and mortgage purchase commitments" if the transactions are effected 
between parties and are not traded for future delivery on an organized exchange. 65 
The US Department of Treasury had urged this exclusion in 1974 on the ground 
that protections afforded by the CEA were not needed by large, sophisticated 
financial institutions who commonly trade amongst themselves in those instruments 
and in some instances, forward commitments having certain attributes typical of a 
futures contract might occur. This exclusion came to be known as the Treasury 
Amendment. This exclusion in the CEA is not replicated in the FT A, and it is 
submitted that the idea of excluding "sophisticated financial professionals" from the 
grasp of the FT A is a potential avenue of reform. 
Unfortunately, the Treasury Amendment itself is worded ambiguously and 
does not spell out clearly the beneficiaries of the amendment. Does the exemption 
apply to banks only, or to other financial institutions as well, and even to individual 
foreign exchange traders? In Salomon Forex, Incorporated v. Laszlo N Tauber, 
MD.,66 a surgeon from northern Virginia who traded in foreign currency on a large 
scale67 argued unsuccessfully that the Treasury Amendment applied only to the 
interbank derivative market. It was his defence against claims made by Salomon 
Forex that the foreign exchange contracts he entered into with Salomon Forex 
were off-exchange futures contracts which violated the CEA, and were thereby 
65 See sec. 2, CEA and notes 4 and 5 in §1.01, Johnson and Hazen, Commodities Regulation. 
66 8 F.3d 966 (1993). 
67 Tauber had entered into 2,702 foreign currency transactions with Salomon Forex, Inc. and 
related entities and also traded in foreign currency with more than a dozen other companies 
besides those of Salomon Forex. Furthermore, Tauber had a wholly-owned foreign currency 
trading company which held a seat on the Philadelphia Stock Exchange and was estimated 
himself to be worth over half a billion US dollars. See ibid at 969. 
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illegal and unenforceable. Unsurprisingly, the court opined that Salomon Forex 
and Tauber were both "sophisticated financial professionals'"" and that the foreign 
exchange transactions fell within the Treasury Amendment and were legal. The 
court limited their interpretation of the Treasury Amendment to cover only 
transactions between participants of a certain, though undefined and unquantified, 
level of sophistication.69 
In 1997 however, the court in CFTC v. Frankwell Bullion Limited'? held 
that the Treasury Amendment exempted all off-exchange transactions in foreign 
currency regardless of the nature of the participant, since "[t]o hold ... that the 
Treasury Amendment excludes only transactions between banks and other 
sophisticated investors would require this court to craft, without any support from 
the statutory language, some distinction between sophisticated investors and the 
general public."71 The simple lesson to be learned from the interpretive confusion 
surrounding the Treasury Amendment is that any amendment to the FT A aimed at 
excluding transactions between "sophisticated financial professionals" should avoid 
the US precedent. A clear and unambiguous definition of what exactly 
sophistication means is imperative for the smooth working of an exemption. 
Indeed, the idea of exempting traders who deal only with sophisticates has 
already been espoused in the FT A. In 1995, a definition of "accredited investor'' 
68 See ibid at 977. 
69 
See ibid at 978 where Niemeyer, Circuit Judge, who delivered the opinion stated: "We hold 
only that individually-negotiated foreign currency option and futures transactions between 
sophisticated, large scale foreign currency traders fall within the Treasury Amendment's 
exclusion from CEA coverage." 
70 99 F.3d 299 (1996). 
71 See ibid at 304. 
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was inserted into the FT A. Persons who carry on the business of leveraged foreign 
exchange trading only with accredited investors are exempt from the licensing 
provisions of the FTA.72 An "accredited investor" is defined as: 
"(a) an individual whose net personal assets exceed $5 million or its 
equivalent in foreign currencies; or 
(b) a corporation with net assets exceeding $10 million in value or its 
equivalent in value in foreign currencies as determined in accordance with 
the most recent audited balance sheet of the corporation.?" 
This provision was necessary to prevent certain foreign exchange dealers 
who only trade selectively with institutions and sophisticated individuals from being 
unwittingly caught under the licensing provisions. It is noted though that the 
threshold of minimum net worth of $5 million for an individual and $10 million for 
a corporation is rather high.74 Nevertheless, the position regarding those who deal 
only with accredited investors in leveraged foreign exchange trading is clear. 
Uncertainty, however, still attaches to the status of dealers in derivative 
transactions based on financial instruments other than foreign exchange, as well as 
on other commodities recognized by the FT A, such as gold and oil. 
72 See s. 2 and s. 11 (2)(a), FT A. 
73 See definition of"accredited investor" ins. 2, ibid. · 
74 This is particularly so when compared to the threshold in the definition of a "sophisticated 
investor" under the Companies Act, Cap. 50, Statues of Singapore. An offer of shares to 
sophisticated investors is exempt from various requirements under the Companies Act in relation 
to the offer of shares to the public. Sees. 1060(2) of the Companies Act, where a "sophisticated 
investor" is defined, and where it is provided that the individual threshold is $1 million and that 
of a corporation is $5 million. 
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It is pertinent to note that in the US, the CEA does not provide a definition 
of "futures contract". As mentioned earlier, the CEA makes it unlawful to deal in 
"a contract for the purchase or sale of a commodity for future delivery" without 
being a registered participant on a recognized organized exchange. The CEA, 
however, provides that the term "future delivery" "does not include any sale of any 
cash commodity for deferred shipment or delivery.v" The distinction between 
"future delivery" and "deferred delivery" is appreciably blur. The "cash forward 
exemption" may roughly be said to cater for customized forward contracts, 
undertaken neither for speculative nor hedging purposes, and which are not 
characterized by elements of fungibility and liquidity. In their work Commodities 
Regulation, Johnson and Hazen gave this explanation: 
" ... the phrase future delivery eliminates transactions where an immediate 
sale occurs but where, for the convenience of the parties or otherwise, the 
actual transfer of the commodity is deferred. The primary focus of this 
exclusion, in historical context, was on a common practice in agricultural 
trade of making binding sales with postponed delivery; these arrangements 
frequently are referred to as forward contracts. For example, grain 
merchants would often commit to buy a portion of farmers' plantings in 
advance of harvest. The sales price was fixed immediately, both parties 
contemplated that the grain or produce would eventually be transferred, but 
delivery would have to await harvesting. In most cases, commitment was 
personal to the parties, and the obligation to deliver could be excused only 
with the other party's consent.':" 
75 See Sec. la, CEA. 
76 At§ l.03. 
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The narrow reading of the so-called "cash forward exemption" has been 
supported by the courts in a spate of cases, for instance, CFTC v. Co Petro 
Marketing Group, Inc., 77 Transnor (Bermuda) Limited v. BP North America 
Petroleum et at78 and CFTC v. Noble Metals International, Inc et al.79 In 
determining whether a contract was a "futures contract" or a "cash forward 
contract", the cases suggest that a major factor to be taken into consideration is 
whether there is an intention to actually deliver the underlying commodity. Even if 
delivery is stipulated in the documentation, the courts would take into account the 
subjective intentions of the parties and preferred substance over form. The 
emphasis whether or not delivery occurs is not so important in Singapore. In the 
US, the intention to actually deliver may exempt a contract from CEA jurisdiction. 
In Singapore, the wording of the FT A is such that even if delivery actually occurs, 
such a contract could still well be a "futures contract" as futures contracts, by 
definition, can either result in delivery or cash settlement. 
In the process of distinguishing between a futures contract and a cash 
forward contract, however, the US courts examined and attempted to articulate the 
nature of a "futures contract" as the term "futures contract" is not defined in the 
CEA. Even though the Singapore legislature adopted a definition of "futures 
contract" in the FT A, for the reasons mentioned, the definition is inadequate as it 
depends wholly on what a "futures market" is (which in turn depends on what a 
"futures contract" is). A fine tautological conundrum. It would be appropriate, 
77 680 F.2d 573 (1982). 
78 738 F. Supp. 1472 (1990). 
79 67 F.3d 766 (1995). 
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therefore, to look to the US courts' pronouncements on what a "futures contract" 
is for certain guidance. 
Oft quoted is Canby, Circuit Judge in CFTC v. Co Petro, where he opined 
that in determining whether a particular contract is a "futures contract" over which 
the CFTC has regulatory jurisdiction, "no bright-line definition or list of 
characterizing elements is determinative.?" He also stated that each "transaction 
must be viewed as a whole with a critical eye towards its underlying purposes," 
adding that the contracts at issue in the case "represent speculative ventures in 
commodity futures which were marketed to those for whom delivery was not an 
expectation. "81 
It is submitted that the standardization of terms, offsetting arrangements, 
no intention of actual delivery and the provision of participation on a margin basis 
in a forward contract are all factors which contribute to suggesting that a contract 
in question is a "futures contract." Such indications are neither absolute nor 
exhaustive. Difficult issues will anse depending on the particular facts and 
circumstances of each case. How standardized must terms be? In the CFTC v. Co 
Petro, it was acknowledged that while the contracts in issue were "not as rigidly 
standardized as futures contracts traded on licensed contract markets, neither were 
they individualized."82 The court continued to state: 
HO See o Petro at 58 l. 
81 See Ibid. 
82 Sec Ibid at 580. 
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should ·be regulated as a futures contract, is the level of marketing and 
participation. In CFTC v. Co Petro, CFTC v. National Coal Exchange, Inc, 84 
CFTC v. Noble Metals and CFTC v. Standard Forex,85 the CFTC had held that the 
impugned contracts were not cash forward contracts but futures contracts. What 
is a common factor of the cases is that all the contracts held to be "futures 
contracts" had been marketed to the general public. Indiscriminate and at times 
aggressive mass marketing to small investors was a characteristic of the various 
schemes. For instance, in the recent case of CFTC v. Standard Forex, Standard 
Forex advertised in Chinese and Korean periodicals and Standard Forex account 
executives targeted mainly Chinese and Korean immigrants who spoke English as a 
second language.86 The court recorded tragically that "Standard Forex accounts 
almost uniformly lost money ... the uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that in the 
aggregate the customers of Standard Forex lost approximately three-fourths of 
their investment over the lives of their accounts.?" 
The question then is how popularly marketed and participated must a 
contract be before it enjoys the status of a "futures contract." To include in the 
definition of "futures contract" the category of off-exchange transactions is not 
untenable, but as matters now stand, the definition does not provide a delimitation. 
In companies legislation, an offer of shares is considered a public offer if it is made 
to 50 persons or more, each of whom is a sophisticated investor.88 
84 c omm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) iJ2 l,424 ( 1982). 
85 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) i!26,786 (1996). 
86 See ibid at il26,786. 
87 See ibid. 
88 Sec s. 1060, Companies Act. 
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The present state of the FT A is highly unsatisfactory. The situation in the 
US, unfortunately, is not much clearer. In Transnor (Bermuda) Ltd v, BP North 
America Petroleum." 1990, it was held that IS-day Brent transactions did not 
constitute forward contracts excepted from the CEA, since the high levels of 
speculation and performance without delivery as well as the relatively standardized 
contracts, distinguish them from the forward contracts contemplated by the 
drafters of the CEA. The contracts in that case were undertaken mainly to assume 
or shift price risk without transferring the underlying commodity. However, 
Transnor (Bermuda) Ltd v. BP North America Petroleum dealt with the highly 
specialized international market in Brent Crude Oil made up of only over 100 
active traders and brokers.l" There was no evidence that the contracts were 
marketed to the general public. Indeed, the action in question was not taken by the 
CFTC. The suit was instituted by Transnor who had purchased cargoes of oil but 
refused to take delivery of the cargoes because the market value had declined after 
Transnor entered into the contracts. Transnor asserted that the defendants had 
inter alia violated the CEA. 
As a renowned centre for oil refinery facilities, Singapore would 
conceivably have a trade in oil forwards occurring upon its shores. Would such 
contracts, entered into for a mix of both speculative and hedging purposes, be 
considered futures contracts within the jurisdiction of the FTA? It is submitted 
that it is neither wise in law nor economics to regulate a hitherto unregulated 
89 738 F. Supp. 1472 (1990) 
90 See Transnor at 584. 
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market in oil forwards under a regulatory framework that was neither designed nor 
suited to do the job. 
Purely speculative contracts marketed indiscriminately and widely by 
financially weak outfits are the sort of contracts that require paternalistic regulation 
for the sake of protecting the general public. These outfits have been called "bucket 
shops" and the CEA had sought to eliminate them in the US. In Singapore, it is 
clear that the legislature did not seek to eliminate them insofar as contracts based 
on commodities which were neither gold nor financial instruments were concerned. 
The position as to contracts based on financial instruments remains unclear. As 
discussed, "bucket shops" do not affect the sophisticated or the international 
investor. They do, however, affect the novice investor and it has been opined that 
speculation is an activity that should be discouraged amongst the general public. 
Akin to gambling, speculation arguably diverts the time, energy and resources of 
individuals from otherwise productive endeavours.91 However, the fine line 
between investment and speculation is a hard one to draw. What is clear is that th 
unlimited danger of speculative forward contracts stands in stark contrast to the 
limited losses that could be sustained from investing in shares. Inve ting in har 
could be a risky business, but due to the limited liability c mpanie 
shareholders, at the most, lose the wh 1 f their in tm nt. In th 
forward or futures contract the p culat r a ain t wh rn the mark t h 
is left with potentially unlimited I . Th wh II nd mar t han 
forward products essentially take a position against their customers. When the 
market moves against them, in an unregulated arena without minimum financial 
requirements to set up such businesses, they would simply buckle up and leave 
behind uncollectible debts. Rather than ask whether such products sold were 
"futures contracts," the apposite question is whether they ought to be "futures 
contracts." 
5. Options on Futures 
Since the definition of "futures contract" in the FT A includes a "futures 
option transaction", a short discussion of options is warranted. A "futures option 
transaction" is defined in the FT A as: 
"a transaction which gives a person a right, acquired for a consideration, to 
buy or sell within a specified period of time a specified amount of 
commodity or a specified futures contract at a specified price in accordance 
with the business rules or practices of an Exchange or a futures market at 
which the transaction is made. "92 
In other words, an option is a contract between two parties whereby the 
buyer of the option is given the right, but not the obligation to buy or sell a specific 
amount of the underlying commodity, on or until a future date, at a price agreed at 
the time of contracting. This price is known as the exercise price. For the 
exclusive rights conferred by the option, the buyer provides consideration in the 
92 See s. 2, FT A. 
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form of the payment of a premium to the seller. The seller of the option retains the 
premium whether or not the option is exercised. 
Options on futures contracts are traded on SIMEX. 93 However, unlike 
trading futures contracts where there is equal risk for both buyer and seller, the 
nature of the risk exposure on a futures options position is different for the buyer 
and the seller of the option. The buyer of the option need only pay the cash 
premium, so that if he decides to allow the option to expire, he can lose no more 
than that amount. On the other hand, the seller of an option assumes a heftier 
financial exposure. The seller's possible loss is the total difference between the 
spot price for the futures contract and the exercise price, less the premium 
received. 
The incentive to sell options is the ability to earn the premium;94 however, 
the risk taken by a seller of options, as mentioned above, may be gargantuan. A 
potential customer of a futures broker is warned of this in a risk disclosure 
statement95 which reads: "Selling ('writing' or 'granting') an option generally 
entails considerably greater risk than purchasing options. Although the premium 
received by the seller is fixed, the seller may sustain a loss well in excess of the 
amount of premium received. "96 
93 Options are available for JGB, Euroyen, Eurodollar, Nikkei 225 and Nikkei 300 futures. 
94 Selling options was Nick Leeson's undoing. "The reason why the losses grew was that I had to 
sell unhedged positions to bring in a decent premium," wrote Leeson and Whitley, Rogue 
Trader. Also see para. 3.34, Ministry of Finance's Report. 
95 See "Risk Disclosure Statement" at Chapter 6 below. 
96 See Form 12, Second Schedule, Futures Trading Regulations, as amended by the Futures 
Trading (Amendment) Regulations 1996, S 81/96, made on 15 February 1996. The previous 
unamended Form 12 had not provided a similar warning. The amendments embodied by Futures 
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6. Leveraged Foreign Exchange Trading · 
The 1995 amendments to the FT A brought leveraged foreign exchange 
trading, previously an unregulated activity, under the supervision of the MAS. 
Those who engage in leveraged foreign exchange trading are now subjected to 
licensing requirements similar to those who engage in financial futures trading. 
Prior to the 1995 amendments, there had been a number of "forex bucket shops" 
doing business in Singapore. Several had been raided by the Commercial Affairs 
Department, and investigated for various scams. 97 Dr Hu explained at the Second 
Reading of the Futures Trading (Amendment) Bill in 1995: 
"Currently, leveraged foreign exchange trading is not subject to any 
regulation. Any person can incorporate a company and offer such facilities 
to members of the public. The result has been a proliferation of such firms 
which use aggressive marketing and promises of high investment returns to 
entice unwary members of the public to trade in the foreign exchange 
market. MAS has received many complaints from customers on losses 
incurred in trading through such firms ... Since leveraged foreign exchange 
trading and futures trading are similar in nature, leveraged foreign exchange 
trading can and should be regulated under the Futures Trading Act."98 
Trading (Amendment) Regulations 1996, S 81/96 were the first in a series of amendments to the 
Futures Trading Regulations spurred by the Barings crisis. 
97 "Forex 'bucket shops' flee S'pore in the face of tighter controls," The Straits Times, 25 August 
1995. 
98 Dr Hu, Minister of Finance, Singapore Parliamentary Debates, vol. 64 at col. 45 ( 1 March 
1995). 
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As a result of the 1995 amendments to the FTA and the imposition of 
licensing requirements on these leveraged forex trading outfits, they have all ceased 
trading and none have applied for a licence.99 It is obvious that these small outfits 
could not possibly have complied with the financial requirements stipulated in the 
FT A and the FTR. Brokerages which are not members of SIMEX must have a 
minimum paid-up capital of $8 million.i'" The effect of the 1995 amendments is 
such that leveraged foreign exchange trading by small firms has been wiped out. 
There is a lengthy definition of "leveraged foreign exchange trading" in s. 
2A(l )101 of the FT A, but the legislature provided a pithy one in its Explanatory 
Statement to the Futures Trading (Amendment) Bill where "leveraged foreign 
exchange trading" was summarized to mean: 
"dealing in foreign exchange in the over-the-counter market on a margin 
basis, and includes the provision of any advance, credit facility or loan, or 
99 See note 97, supra. 
100 See reg. llA(l)(c). In the case of a brokerages who are members of SIMEX, the requirement 
under reg. l lA(l)(b) is a minimum paid-up capital of $5 million. 
101 Sections. 24A(l) defines "leveraged foreign exchange trading" as: 
"(a) the act of entering into or offering to enter into, or inducing or attempting to 
induce a person to enter into or offer to enter into, a contract or arrangement on a 
margin basis (other than a contract or an arrangement that is made on an Exchange or a 
futures market) whereby a person undertakes as determined by the terms and conditions 
of the contract or arrangement -- 
(i) to make an adjustment between himself and another person according to 
whether a currency is worth more or less, as the case may be, in relation to 
another currency; 
(ii) to pay an amount of money determined or to be determined by reference to 
the change in value of a currency in relation to another currency; or 
(iii) to deliver to another person at an agreed future time and agreed amount of 
currency at an agreed price; 
(b) the provision by any person referred to in paragraph (a) of any advance, credit 
facility or loan, whether directly or indirectly, to facilitate an act of U1e description 
referred to in that paragraph; or 
(c) the act of entering into or offering to enter into, or inducing or attempting to 
induce a person to enter into, an arrangement with another person (whether on a 
discretionary basis or otherwise) to enter into any contract to facilitate an act of the 
description mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b)." 
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the management of customer's funds on a discretionary basis, for dealing in 
foreign exchange."102 
The legislature further made it clear that the definition did not include a contract or 
arrangement made on SIMEX or a "futures market."103 
The economics of leveraged transactions and futures transactions are very 
similar. In both cases, a person agrees to purchase or sell a certain currency at a 
future date, and places at the beginning of the transaction an amount of margin 
with the dealer to cover potential losses. However, the main differences between 
leveraged transactions and futures transactions are that leveraged transactions do 
not take place on a centralized market place or exchange. Furthermore, leveraged 
foreign exchange contracts are of unfixed duration and may have varying terms 
dealing with quantities and delivery plans of the underlying currency. These two 
differences would pose serious difficulties when attempting to squeeze leveraged 
foreign exchange transactions into the definition of a "futures contract" as provided 
in the FT A. The 1995 amendments made it clear that the concept of "leveraged 
foreign exchange trading" did not have to be linked to that of a futures contract or 
a futures market as defined in the FT A. 
102 See Government Gazelle Bills Supplement, no. 9 (24 January 1995) at 44. 
103 Sec ibid. 
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CHAPTER4 
THE INSTITUTIONS 
1. The MAS 
The FTA places SI.MEX under the purview and supervision of the 
MAS. The MAS is Singapore's de facto central bank. It performs all the functions 
of a central bank except that of issuing currency which is done by the Board of 
Commissioners of Currency. The MAS is a statutory board and was established 
under the Monetary Authority of Singapore Act' in 1970. The MAS is controlled 
by the Singapore Government and its Board of Directors is chaired by the Minister 
ofFinance.2 • 
One of the principal objects of the MAS is "to promote, within the 
context of the general economic policy of the Government, monetary stability and 
credit and exchange conditions conducive to the growth of t~e economy." Apart 
from the supervision of the futures industry, the MAS also governs various other 
areas of the finance industry, including banks," insurance companies,' financial 
institutions" and the securities industry.7 
1 Cap. 186, Statutes of Singapore. · 
2 For an introduction to the MAS, see generally Chapter 16, Tan Chwee Huat, Financial Markets 
and Institutions in Singapore, 8th edition, 1996, Singapore University Press. 
3 Sees. 4(b), Monetary Authority of Singapore Act. 
4 See Banking Act, Cap. 19, Statutes of Singapore. 
5 See Insurance Act, Cap. 142, Statutes of Singapore. 
6 See Finance Companies Act, Cap. 108, Statutes of Singapore. 
7 See Securities Industry Act, Cap. 289, Statutes of Singapore. 
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Licensing Regime 
The mainstay of the MAS' s regulatory regime is the licensing of the various 
market participants in the futures market. It is a most effective power and one of 
the many powers in the MAS' s arsenal aimed at the supervision of the futures 
market in Singapore. By controlling the licensing of market participants, the MAS 
controls entry into the futures business. Corporations and individuals who seek to 
enter the futures business have to apply for the appropriate licences from the MAS 
under either s. 11 or s. 12 of the FT A. 8 The MAS shall not refuse to grant or 
renew a licence without first giving the applicant an opportunity of being heard.9 
The criteria established by the FT A upon which the MAS can refuse to 
grant or renew licences is set out in s. 14( 1) of the FT A. 10 The 199 5 amendments 
widened the original criteria to include more qualitative criteria such as the 
applicant's educational qualifications or experience, past performance or expertise 
in the futures business, financial standing, whether the applicant is "fit and proper" 
and whether it is in the interests of the public so to grant or renew a licence. The 
MAS has powers to impose conditions or restrictions on the licences issued. 11 
Concomitant with the power to grant licences is the power to revoke them. 
S. 20 of the FT A provides that a licensee may have its licence revoked on any 
8 See generally Part III, FT A and "Market Entry Requirements" at Chapter 5 below. 
9 Sees. 13(3), FTA. 
1 ° For a full discussion of the criteria in s. 14( I), Ff A, see "Market Entry Requirements" at 
Chapter 5 below. 
11 s ee s. 15, FT A. 
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ground on which the MAS may refuse a licence under s. 14( 1) of the FT A, as well 
as, inter alia, insolvency in the case of a corporation, the failure or cessation of 
business for which the licence was granted, contravention or non-compliance with 
a restriction or condition of the licence, and "if the Authority has reason to believe 
that the licensed person has not performed his, duties efficiently, honestly or 
fairly."12 The MAS would rely on information provided by the licensee under its 
obligations under the FT A, by auditors where the licensee is a corporation and also 
by information provided to it by the public. 
Disenchanted members of the public who make complaints to the MAS 
may initiate an inquiry procedure provided for in the FT A. This may lead to 
serious consequences for the licensee. It appears that anyone may make allegations 
of misconduct.against a licensed person to the MAS. S. 21 of the FTA provides 
that the MAS "may inquire into any allegation that a licensed person is or has been 
guilty of any misconduct or is no longer a fit and proper person to continue to 
remain licensed by reason of any other circumstances which have led, or are likely 
to lead, to the improper conduct of business by him or to reflect discredit on the 
method of conducting his business."13 Misconduct for the purposes of s. 21 means 
(a) any failure to comply with requirements of the FT A, and (b) any act or 
omission relating to the conduct of business "which is or is likely to be prejudicial 
to the public interest.':" However, if the MAS finds that such an allegation was 
12 Sees. 20(2)(a), Ff A in the case of a licensed person who is an individual ands. 20(2)(b), Ff A 
in the case of a corporation. 
13 Sees. 21(1), ibid. 
14 See s. 21 (5), ibid. 
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made in bad faith or was otherwise frivolous or vexatious, the complainant may be 
ordered to pay costs and expenses involved in the inquiry of the allegation. 15 
The procedure for the inquiry is not spelt out in the FT A save that at the 
hearing of the MAS inquiry, the licensed person is given an opportunity of being 
heard.16 If the allegation of misconduct is proved after the inquiry, the MAS may if 
it thinks fit: (a) revoke the licence, (b) suspend the licence for such period, or until 
the happening of such event, as the MAS may determine, or ( c) reprimand the 
person.17 
Where the MAS refuses to grant or renew a licence under s. 14, revokes a 
licence under s. 20, or otherwise revokes, suspends a licence or reprimands a 
person under s, 21, s. 23 of the FT A provides that "any person who is aggrieved by 
the decision of the Authority may, within one month after he is notified of the 
decision, appeal to the Minister" whose decision shall be final." The FTA does not 
provide for appeal to a court. 
The lack of recourse past the Minister and the use of qualitative criteria in 
deciding whether a licence should be granted caused concerned questioning in 
Parliament during the Second Reading of the Futures Trading Bill in 1986 where 
15 Sees. 21(4), ibid 
16 Sees. 21(3), ibid. 
17 Secs. 21(2), ibid. 
18 This means the Minister of Finance, see Interpretation Act, Cap. I, 1985 Ed., Statutes of 
Singapore. 
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one Member of Parliament warned against the "arbitrary exercise of powers by the 
MAS."19 Dr Hu replied: 
"On the issue of appeal on the revocation of licences, this is a problem 
which has been levelled against the Government's other Bills in the past 
where it is considered rather unfortunate that there is no appeal past the 
Minister. The reason for this is, of course, that if we allow complete appeal 
on all licences to be taken to the courts, 20 we would probably have to 
increase our courts many more times than there are now. I also believe that 
in the issue of a licence for a particular trading activity, it is not a 
constitutional right for anyone to have appeal to the courts. It is a privilege 
which the Government grants at its pleasure in order to ensure that the 
proper people are engaged in these activities. "21 
The provision which states that the decision of the Minister shall be final 
does not necessarily rule out judicial review.22 A similar provision in the Securities 
Industry Act stipulating that a decision of a Minister is final has been interpreted to 
be subject to judicial review. For judicial review to be successful, however, it has 
to be shown that the Minister has exercised his discretion and refused or revoked a 
licence, illegally, irrationally or with procedural impropriety. This is no easy task. 
19 See the questions raised by Dr Augustine H. H. Tan at the Second Reading of the Futures 
Trading Bill, Singapore Parliamentary Debates, vol. 47 at col. 1437 (31 March 1986). 
20 The FT A clearly provides that no suit or other legal proceedings shall lie against the MAS, its 
officers and employees for any act done in performance of its duties or powers under the FT A or 
the FTR, or for any neglect or default in performance of such duties or powers, provided that the 
performance of such duties or powers were in "good faith". Sees. 63, FT A. 
21 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, vol. 47 at col. 1439 (31March1986). 
22 This is the view of Walter Woon with regard to a similar s. 39 of U1e Securities Industry Act. 
See Laws of Singapore, Annotated Securities Industry Act, Butterworths. See generally 
Anisminic Ltd v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147, South-East Asia Fire 
Bricks Sdn Bhd v. Non-Metallic Mineral Products Manufacturing Employees' Union (1980] 2 
MLJ 165 and Re Raca/ Communications Ltd (1980] 3 WLR 181. As to the principles on which 
judicial review will be exercised in Singapore, see Chng Suan Tze v. Minister of Home Affairs 
[1988] SLR 132. 
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The inclusion of more qualitative and subjective criteria, by the 1995 
amendments, 23 on the basis of which licences may be refused or revoked raised 
further concern. During the Second Reading of the Futures Trading (Amendment) 
Bill in 1995, Dr Hu assured: 
" ... when licences are refused by the MAS ... the person involved will have a 
hearing. He will. In fact, if he is dissatisfied with the rejection, he can 
apply for a hearing and he will be told what are the reasons for the 
. . ,,24 rejection. 
Although not provided in the FT A, the Minister's comments appear to give a 
legitimate expectation to applicants that reasons for rejection will be provided. 
How detailed such reasons must be is an open issue. 
Approval of Futures Exchange and Clearing House 
MAS approval is required for the maintenance and the establishment of a 
futures market" or a clearing house26 in Singapore. Wide ranging discretion is 
provided for in the exercise of the MAS' s powers to approve a futures exchange or 
a clearing house. Approval will only be granted if inter alia "the interests of the 
23 The amendments are listed and disoassed in "Market Entry Requirements" at Chapter 5 below. 
24 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, vol. 64 at col. 58 (1 March 1995). This statement was made 
in response to a question proposed by Dr Ow Chin Hock at col. 53: " ... some criteria appear to be 
subjective. May I ask the Minister whether MAS will give the reasons of rejection to an applicant 
so that he can make up for his shortcomings?" 
25 Sees. 3, ibid 
26 Sees. 7, ibid. 
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public will be served".27 Incidentally, SIMEX was not approved by the MAS 
either as a futures market or a clearing house. The FT A provides that no approval 
of the MAS is required for the futures market or the clearing house of a futures 
market established and maintained by SIMEX, but SIMEX is subject to all other 
provisions of the FT A 28 
It seems unlikely in the near future that an entity would seek approval as a 
futures exchange in Singapore. A futures exchange is essentially a commercial 
venture and it is doubtful that the financial market of Singapore is capable of 
supporting more than one futures exchange. Nevertheless, upon such an 
application being made, the FT A provides that the MAS shall not refuse to approve 
a body corporate as a futures exchange without giving the applicant an opportunity 
to be heard.29 Oddly enough, the FT A does not stipulate the same opportunity to 
be heard for a body corporate seeking approval as a clearing house." 
Approval of Futures Contracts 
The MAS effectively controls the extent and scope of the futures business, 
as any contracts proposed to be listed by SIMEX have to be approved by the 
27 Sees. 4(2)(b) ands. 8(2)(b), ibid. 
28 Sees. 3(4) and 7(2), ibid. 
29 Sees. 4(3), ibid. 
30 There appears to be inconsistent treatment of futures exchanges and clearing houses insofar as 
approval and revocation of such approval is concerned. The approval of a body corporate as a 
futures exchange may be revoked on various grounds set out ins. 6(1) of the FT A including the 
ground that the body corporate is "operating in a manner detrimental to the public interest". Any 
person aggrieved by a decision of the MAS to revoke an approval may appeal to the Minister 
whose decision shall be final and shall not be called into question in any court. See s. 6(3), ibid. 
Oddly yet again, revocation of approval as a clearing house is not provided for in the FT A. 
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MAS.31 This provision was introduced by the 1995 amendments and surprisingly 
lacking in the original bill. 
The FT A does not stipulate what considerations would be taken into 
account by the MAS with regard to the approval of contracts to be listed on 
SIMEX. It is recognized that the commercial interests of a futures exchange may 
not necessarily sit well with monetary stability and a cautious monetary policy. It 
is telling that the possibility and feasibility of trading a futures contract based on a 
local stock index has been mooted for some time32 and that the profitability of such 
a contract to SIMEX is not inconsequential. However, although it is a matter of 
debate whether trading in stock index futures affects the price of the underlying 
stocks and therefore promotes volatility, the vulnerability of the Singapore stock 
exchange and the Singapore dollar are necessarily factors to be taken into account 
when authorizing such a futures contract. It is generally understood that the MAS 
adopts a conservative approach towards the Singapore dollar. 
Supervision of SIMEX 
One of the key functions of the MAS under the FT A is the supervision of 
SIMEX as a futures exchange and a clearing house. The MAS has broad powers 
and the FT A does not provide for the review of any MAS decisions made in 
31 See s. 4A, ibid. 
32 See "A Stock Index Future For Singapore," BC Ghosh and Abul Faizie, SES Journal, March 
1993 at 22. SIMEX currently trades futures contracts based on the MCSl Hong Kong Index, the 
Nikkei 225 Stock Index and the Nikkei 300 Stock Index. 
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respect of SIMEX. 33 As mentioned earlier, MAS approval is required for the 
listing and de-listing of any futures contracts ori SIMEX. It is also required for the 
operation of any electronic trading facilities.34 Approval may be granted subject to 
such conditions as the MAS may think fit.35 
Furthermore, the making of any amendments to the business rules or Rules 
of SIMEX requires the approval of the MAS. 36 On top of the power of the MAS 
to disallow the whole or part of an amendment submitted by SIMEX whereupon 
the whole or part of the amendment ceases to have force and effect, the MAS is 
given the power to alter or supplement the Rules, or to alter or supplement the 
terms and conditions of any futures contract traded on SIMEX, by its own motion, 
"if it considers such action is necessary for the protection of traders or to ensure 
fair dealing in a futures market.?" The wording of this statutory provision is odd. 
It refers to the "protection of traders" without the slightest hint as to who a 
"trader" might be. If "traders" are, as in industry parlance, market participants 
who execute trades on the floor of the exchange either for their own account or for 
the account of another, it is odd that their interests should be put over and above 
the "interests of the public," or indeed, the interests of all the members of SIMEX. 
33 Where approval for a futures exchange granted under s. 4 of the FT A is revoked, the aggrieved 
party may appeal to the Minister pursuant to s. 6(3) of the FT A. See notes 18 and 22, supra. 
However, SIMEX was not approved pursuant to s. 4, and s. 6(3) would consequently not apply. 
34 Sees. 4A(l), ibid. S. 4A was added to the FT A by the 1995 amendments. 
35 See s. 4A(2), ibid. 
36 Sees. 5, ibid. The procedure for approval set out in s. 5 of the FT A begins with SIMEX giving 
written notice stating the text and date of the amendment as well as an explanation of the purpose 
of the amendment to the MAS. If such a notice is not given within 10 days of the making of the 
amendment, the amendment ceases to have effect. Within 28 days of the MAS receiving such 
notice from SIMEX, the MAS may disallow the whole or parts of the amendment. If this is so, 
the whole or that part of the amendment disallowed ceases to have effect. 
37 s ee s. 5(4), FTA. 
82 
Effective supervision of SIMEX would necessarily consist of the power of 
reviewing SIMEX' s internal disciplinary procedure. Where SIMEX has taken 
disciplinary action against a member, iris required to notify the MAS.38 The MAS 
may then review the disciplinary action and may affirm, modify or set aside 
SIMEX' s decision after giving the member concerned and SIMEX an opportunity 
to be heard.39 
Perhaps more importantly, where SIMEX fails to act against a member, the 
MAS has the power to itself suspend, expel or otherwise discipline a member of 
SIMEX.40 Before doing so, the MAS shall give the member concerned and 
SIMEX an opportunity to be heard.41 Anyone aggrieved by the decision of the 
MAS may appeal to the Minister" whose decision shall be final.43 However, this 
provision does not exclude the possibility of judicial review.44 
Emergency Powers 
Another dimension of regulatory control exercised by the MAS focuses not 
on entry into the futures market but on the operation or performance of futures 
markets. As mentioned, the economic functions of a futures market is to provide a 
forum for hedging risk and price discovery. Any practices that interfere with the 
efficient transfer of unwanted risk or with the process of price discovery would 
38 Sees. 46(1), ibid. See Internal Disciplinary Procedures in "SI.MEX as Clearing House" below. 
39 See s. 46(2), ibid. 
40 Sees. 46(3), ibid. 
41 See ibid. 
42 See note 18, supra. 
43 Sees. 46(4), ibid. 
44 See the cases mentioned in note 22, supra. 
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stifle the futures market, and the trading of futures would be an exercise suitable 
only for speculative purposes. As such, the MAS has extensive powers under the 
FT A to stifle such malpractices. In particular it can conduct market surveillance 
and routine inspections of SIMEX and other licensed futures market participants, 45 
and is given certain emergency powers to take remedial action in the event of an 
"emergency. "46 
These emergency powers are extraordinarily extensive and are not 
replicated in any other context, in particular, the MAS's supervision of the 
securities and the stock exchange under the Securities Industry Act. Whenever 
the MAS has reason to believe an emergency exists, it may direct SIMEX to take 
such action as MAS considers necessary to maintain or restore orderly trading in, 
or liquidation, of any futures contracts. Such action includes terminating or 
suspending trading on SIMEX,47 confining trading to the liquidation of contracts,48 
ordering the liquidation of all or some positions, 49 limiting trading to a specific 
price range," modifying trading days or hours," fixing the settlement price at 
which contracts are to be liquidated, 52 requiring additional margins for any 
contracts, 53 modifying or suspending any of the Rules, 54 and the wide and cryptic 
45 See s. 48, ibid 
46 Sees. 41, ibid. 
47 Sees. 4l(l)(a), ibid. 
48 Secs. 4l(l)(b), ibid. 
49 Sees. 4l(l)(c), ibid. 
50 Secs. 41(1)(d), ibid. 
51 Sees. 4 l(l)(e), ibid. 
52 See s. 41 (I )(g), ibid. 
53 Sees. 4l(l)(i), ibid. 
54 Sec s. 41 ( 1 )(i), Ibid. 
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action of "requiring any person to act in a specified manner in relation to trading in 
futures contracts. "55 
An "emergency" is defined as including: 
" .. .in addition to threatened or actual market manipulations and corners, 
any act of government affecting a commodity or any other major market 
disturbance which prevents the market from accurately reflecting the forces 
of supply and demand for such commodity or any other undesirable 
situations or practices which in the opinion of the Authority constitutes an 
emergency. "56 
Drastic emergency action such as suspending trading on SIMEX is to be 
cautiously taken. The success of a futures exchange thrives on investor 
confidence. Investor confidence will necessarily rest in a predictable and reliable 
exchange that is prone to the least disruptions and government interference. 
SIMEX, as will be discussed, has emergency powers of its own. 
2. SIMEX as Exchange 
SIMEX is not Singapore's only futures exchange," but it is the only one on 
which financial futures are traded. SIMEX is a public company limited by shares 
incorporated under the Companies Act58 and whose shares are owned by its 
55 Sees. 4l(l)(h), ibid. 
56 Sees. 41(3), ibid. 
57 As mentioned earlier in "FT A and CEA" at Chapter 3 above, SI COM trades in rubber and 
coffee futures. See Chapter 3, notes 6 and 7, supra. 
58 Cap. 50, Statutes of Singapore. 
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Clearing Members. Apart from Clearing Members, there are 3 other categories of 
non-shareholding SIMEX membership. 59 
SIMEX's Memorandum and Articles of Association'" (the "Articles") 
clearly bind SIMEX and its Clearing Members, and its Clearing Members inter se 
under the companies legislation" and the corresponding principle in company law 
of common law origin.62 SIMEX is empowered under its Articles'" to make rules 
which provide for other categories of membership and codify the manner in which 
SIMEX, its Clearing Members and its other members conduct their affairs. The 
Articles provide that the resultant code or the Rules shall be binding upon SIMEX, 
the Clearing Members and all other classes of members. 64 
The Rules were completely revised in 1990 and contain 34 chapters of 
which 22 chapters contain the description and trading terms of the various 
contracts traded on SIMEX. The main body of the Rules set out, inter alia, the 
categories of membership, the procedures for enforcing the Rules, trading floor 
practices, arbitration procedures, the clearing house, margin and settlement 
59 The various categories of membership and the differing levels of rights and duties are discussed 
below in "Market Entry Requirements" in Chapter 5 below. Article 2.02 (a) of SIMEX's Articles 
of Association states that "The Exchange may have other classes of membership as from time to 
time may be provided in the Rules, provided however that membership of any such class shall not 
confer on such member any right to receive notices of any General Meetings required to be given 
under these Articles, to attend thereat or to vote thereat or to participate in the assets or profits of 
the Exchange." The Articles referred to are the Articles of Association of SIMEX dated 22 
December 1983. 
60 The Articles referred to are the Articles of Association of SIMEX dated 22 December 1983. 
61 In particular, sees. 39, Companies Act. 
62 Stirling J in Wood v. Odessa Waterworks Co (1889) 42 Ch D 636 said "The articles of 
association constitute a contract not merely between the shareholders and the company, but 
between each individual shareholder and every other." See also Salmon v. Quin & Axtens Ltd 
[1909) l Ch 311. 
63 See Articles 14.01to14.03. 
64 See Article 14.03. 
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mechanism, the duties of the various categories of members and the mutual offset 
system. 
The Rules may and are often amended from time to time.65 The Articles 
provide that the Rules shall be made, altered or repealed by a resolution of the 
Board of Directors of SIMEX who shall adopt such means as it deems sufficient to 
bring the same to the notice of the Clearing Members and the other classes of 
members. 66 As a matter of practice, SIMEX issues circulars to its members 
notifying them of possible changes to the Rules, and, in certain cases, circulars to 
clarify the interpretation and implementation of the Rules. Any amendment of the 
Rules, however, requires the approval of the MAS under the FT A. 67 The Rules, of 
course, have to comply with the requirements of the FT A and the FTR. 
SIMEX's raison d'etre as such is the running and maintenance of a physical 
marketplace where financial futures trading is centralized, being modelled on the 
CME. SIMEX provides the physical location and facilities for its members to 
engage in financial futures trading. Over and above the provision of a physical 
exchange for such trading, SIMEX maintains and operates the clearing house 
which is essential to a smoothrunning futures marketplace as it eliminates 
counterparty risk. 68 
65 See Article 14.01. 
66 See Article 14.02. 
67 See s. 5, Ff A. See Supervision of SJ MEX in "The MAS" above. 
68 See "Organized Exchanges" at Chapter 2 above. 
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The clearing house is established for the purposes of "facilitating the 
prompt adjustment of contractual obligations 'arising out of contracts" concluded 
on the exchange and to "protect the integrity of such contracts". 69 In practical 
terms, the clearing house manages the margin system and ensures contract 
performance by guaranteeing all contracts. 70 In Singapore, the clearing house is an 
association or organization of SIMEX Clearing Members. It is not incorporated 
separately and may be viewed as a department within SIMEX. 
As a commercial exchange and clearing house, SIMEX regulates itself by 
maintaining several departments with specific areas of responsibility regarding the 
monitoring of the conduct of business on the exchange. These departments 
oversee the day-to-day activities of the exchange and clearing house: 
(a) an Audit and Review Department which monitors SIMEX members 
to ensure that they are financially sound as well as professional in their 
practice and dealings with customers. This is done by conducting regular 
audits of SIMEX members to check that the Rules and any further internal 
procedure requirements are complied with. One of the most important 
exercises done by this department is the liquidity assessment. The 
department is required to consider the liquidity positions of SIMEX's 
Clearing Members daily to assess their ability to meet calls made by the 
I . h 71 c earmg ouse. 
69 See Article 5.01. 
70 This will be discussed further in "SIMEX as Clearing House" below. 
71 For further discussion of the Audit Review Department and its role in the Barings collapse, see 
the Ministry of Finance's Report at para. 15.14 to 15.29. 
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(b) a Trading Floor and Compliance Department which monitors 
trading floor practices to check for possible malpractices, as well as handles 
complaints and ensures that business is fairly conducted. In carrying out 
its duties, the department employs compliance officers to review the 
activities on the trading floor and to check for non-compliance with the 
Rules; 72 and 
( c) a Market Surveillance Department which monitors market activity 
to ensure that no attempts are made to manipulate the market. This 
department also monitors the position limits and large positions of SIMEX 
members and their customers. 73 
Internal Disciplinary Procedures 
Since SIMEX is a self-regulating exchange and clearing house with its own 
body of Rules and regulations, an internal disciplinary system maintains internal 
"law and order." Any breach of the Rules by a member would result in the 
commission of either a major offence or a minor offence. 
Major offences are dealt with by expulsion, suspension, a fine not 
exceeding S$25,000 or by both suspension and a fine. Minor offences are dealt 
72 For further discussion of the Trading Floor and Compliance Department and its role in the 
Barings collapse, see ibid at para. 15.33 to 15.37. 
73 For further discussion of the Market Surveillance Department and its role in the Barings 
collapse, see ibid at para. 15.30 to 15.32. 
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with by a fine not exceeding S$5,000 or suspension for not more than one year, or 
both. 74 Particular Rules expressly state that their infringement would lead to the 
commission of a major offence. 75 Rule 415 further sets out a list of major offences. 
Similarly, Rule 416 sets out a list of minor offences but also states that the 
violation of any Rule, the violation of which is not a major offence, is a minor 
offence. 
Upon a violation of the Rules, the matter may be dealt with by the President 
or by one of the Committees of SIMEX. 76 The various Committees presently 
provided for in the Rules which can conduct hearings into violations of the Rules 
are the Business Conduct Committee, 77 the Clearing House Committee, 78 the Floor 
Committee" and the Pit Committee" Each Committee has a different hearing 
procedure and these are set out in the Rules. 81 
Only the Pit Committee has the capability of conducting "summary 
proceedings.?" Each futures contract is traded in a designated pit. Each pit has a 
74 See Rule 413. 
75 For instance, Rule 917 relating to segregation of customer's money, securities and property, 
Rule 520 relating to the priority of customers' orders and Rule 521 relating to trading against 
customers' orders. The violation of these rules would necessarily lead to violations of s. 37(1), s. 
37A and s. 37B, FfA, respectively. The penalty stipulated in the FfA for these violations is a 
fine not exceeding $30,000 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years or both. See s. 40, 
FfA. 
76 See Rule 405. For the duties of the President, see Rule 401. 
77 See Rules 302 and 402. 
78 See Rules 303 and 403. 
79 See Rules 307 and 404. 
80 See Rules 309 and 404A. 
81 s ee Rules 408, 409, 410 and 410A. 
82 s ee Rules 309, 401, 404A and 4IOA. 
90 
Pit Committee. The Pit Committee has the jurisdiction to deal with basic "trading 
infractions" which are specified as:83 
(a) a bid or offer which is out of line with the market; 
(b) a bid or offer which tends to confuse the other traders; 
( c) a sale which is out of line with existing bids or offers; 
( d) failure to confirm a transaction; 
( e) failure of buyer and seller to announce a change in the last sale price 
and failure to ensure that it is properly recorded; 
(f) use of unbusinesslike language on the floor; and 
(g) conduct which tends to distract or intimidate any SIMEX employee. 
Hearings of the Pit Committee are conducted at the end of the business day 
and the matter decided upon by a majority of votes within the Pit Committee. The 
"trading infractions" are neither minor nor major offences. The Pit Committee may 
reprimand the concerned member, impose fines not exceeding S$1,000 or suspend 
the member for not more than five days or order the member's removal from the 
pit or a combination of any of the above penalties, save that a first-time offender or 
a member who has not been found guilty of a similar or related offence in the past 
year is not to be fined more than S$100.84 There is no appeal against decisions of 
the Pit Committee which involve fines of S$500 or less. 85 Otherwise, appeals from 
83 See Rule 510. 
84 See ibid. 
85 See SIMEX Notice GEN/33of1986 (26 November 1986). 
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decisions of the Pit Committee are made to the Floor Committee whose decision 
shall be final. 86 
For other violations of the Rules, the matter may be dealt with by the 
President. 87 If the President is of the opinion that such violation may be best dealt 
with by either the Business Conduct Committee, the Clearing House Committee or 
the Floor Committee, he shall transmit to the chairman of the relevant committee a 
written statement setting forth the charges against the member involved and 
request that a hearing be held.88 The jurisdiction of the Business Conduct 
Committee covers price manipulation and corners, and the general business 
conduct of members, including conduct affecting non-member customers. 89 The 
jurisdiction of the Clearing House Committee comprises the manner of clearing 
trades, the functioning of the clearing house, margin and financial integrity of 
clearing members and the general business conduct of members, save for 
manipulations and corners." The jurisdiction of the Floor Committee is to 
supervise all matters relating generally to trading practices.91 
Each Committee has a range of disciplinary action available to them ' 
ranging from ordering the member to cease and desist from the offending conduct 
to the imposition of a fine or suspension.f As mentioned earlier, the President may 
decide to deal with a matter himself. However, the Rules do not provide what 
86 See Rule 411. There is no appeal to the Board of Directors in this case. 
87 See Rule 405. 
88 See ibid. 
89 Insofar as jurisdiction over such conduct is not assigned to the other Committees, see Rule 402. 
90 Which are already assigned to the Business Conduct Committee, see Rule 403. 
91 Save for matters already assigned to the Pit Committee, see Rule 404. 
92 See Rules 408:A, 409:A and 410. 
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range of disciplinary action is available to him. It is provided though that after 
investigation, the President may, if there is reasonable cause to believe that the 
violation of the rule is of sufficient importance, send the matter directly to the 
Board of Directors (the "Board").93 Similarly, if after a hearing by the Committee 
the majority of the Committee decides that the matter is of major importance or 
might warrant a disciplinary action in excess of its own authority, the chairman of 
the relevant Committee shall refer the matter to the Board for further hearings and 
decision.94 
All hearings other than a hearing by the Pit Committees shall be preceded 
by a written notice to the member under investigation specifying the offence with 
which he is charged and the date and venue of such hearing.95 The hearing body 
may require any member or member's employee to attend, to testify and to 
produce all books and records relevant to the subject matter under investigation." 
Prior to the hearing, the member under investigation may examine all evidence 
which is to be relied upon during the hearing.97 Formal rules of evidence are not 
applicable. 98 
Any person aggrieved by the decision of the President or any other 
Committee99 may within ten days of any such decision appeal to the Board whose 
93 See Rule 405. 
94 s ee Rules 408:A, 409:A and 410. 
95 See Rule 406. 
96 See ibid. 
97 See ibid. 
98 See ibid. 
99 Other than a decision of the Pit Committee or any appeal from a decision of the Pit Committee. 
See Rule 411 and note 86, supra. 
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decision shall be final unless the member can show that the disciplinary action taken 
was the result of false testimony, was too severe, or was otherwise improper, in 
which case, the member may petition for a rehearing by the Board.100 
Since SIMEX, albeit an essentially a private body and a company 
incorporated under the Companies Act, is regulated by the FT A and subject to its 
governance and authority, it has an element of public ,flavour superimposed upon it. 
The Rules themselves require MAS approval. Furthermore, the SIMEX Board and 
Committees have the authority to determine the rights of persons licensed under 
the FTA. 
As such, it could be argued that in purporting to exercise its disciplinary 
functions, SIMEX has the duty to act judicially in the exercise of that power and is 
therefore subject to judicial review. This was the gist of the Malaysian court's 
argument in O.S.K. & Partners Sdn. v. Tengku Noone Azi/01 wherein it was held 
that the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange was such a quasi-public body subject to 
judicial review. In Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Ltd v. Onshine Securities, 
102 
it 
100 See Rules 411and412. 
101 (1983] I :MLJ 179. See note 22, supra for cases dealing with the principles of judicial review. 
In Ganda Oil Industries Sdn Bhd v. Kuala Lumpur Commodity Exchange [1988] l :MLJ 174, it 
was held that the decision by the Kuala Lumpur Commodity Exchange ("KLCE") which fixed the 
price of a commodity under the exercise of a power expressly provided for in their business rules 
was not and should not have been made amenable to judicial review. However, in the Ganda Oil 
case, the court made it clear that it was not deciding in general whether the KLCE is a public 
body whose decisions are subject to judicial review. In respect of an exchange's disciplinary 
proceedings against members, it is submitted that the O.S.K. case is more to point. 
102 [ I 1 . d . . 1994] l HKC 319. However, it was held that w iere an a ternatrve reme y rs available, in this 
case, an internal disciplinary appeal committee, a party subject to disciplinary proceedings should 
normally be left to pursue that remedy, and that judicial review in such a case should only be 
granted in exceptional circumstances. 
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was assumed that the disciplinary proceedings of the Stock Exchange of Hong 
Kong should be subject to judicial review. 
Inter-Member Arbitration 
Neither the FT A nor the FTR requires SIMEX to adopt a compulsory 
inter-member arbitration regime. However, a speedy inter-member dispute 
resolution mechanism is a bonus to any fast-paced futures market sensitive to 
disruptions. SIMEX provides such a mechanism, though it is unclear whether it is 
compulsory. 
There is no Rule which states categorically that disputes between members 
must be arbitrated.i'" Instead, Rule 600 provides: 
"The Exchange shall maintain a forum for the resolution of all disputes 
where such disputes involve a transaction on the Exchange ... , relate to such 
. h . I h E h "104 transaction or ot erwise re ate to t e xc ange ... 
The wording of Rule 600 is wide enough to catch all manner of disputes relating to 
SIMEX, including transactions actually undertaken on SIMEX or proposed 
transactions which did not come to fruition because of action or inaction that is the 
subject of dispute. 
103 Indeed, Rule 827 alludes to the permission by SIMEX of litigation between members in 
respect of exchange disputes. Rule 827 deals with "give-up trades". See "Inter-Member Issues" 
in Chapter 5 below. 
104 · J· di . I Rule 600 extends to the resolution of all disputes where sue 1 isputes mvo ve a transaction on 
other exchanges with which SIMEX has a mutual offset arrangement. This aspect will not be 
discussed in this paper. 
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Rule 600 continues to state that when any dispute occurs between 
members, it "shall be promptly reported" by the complainant. · This would suggest 
that the pursuance of litigation in the courts without making such a report would 
be a breach of the Rules. Save for the word "promptly," the Rules are silent as to 
when such a report is to be made upon the occurrence of the dispute. However, 
the requirement to report a dispute promptly could be read as a limitation period. 
As a matter of interpretation, the period cannot be unreasonably short. However, 
in the context of a fast-moving futures market, it cannot be as long as the statutory 
limitation periods, for that would defeat the purpose of exchange arbitration. A 
clearer yardstick of time is difficult to formulate, nor is it required to be, for the 
wording presently provided in the Rule allows a certain amount of flexibility, and 
places SIMEX in a position to consider all the relevant facts and circumstances, 
including whether there was any unnecessary delay on the part of the complainant 
in making a report which delay could prejudice the accused member. 
It is a corollary to the rule that a dispute needs be "promptly" reported to 
initiate the arbitration procedure that a complainant would forfeit his right to 
arbitration under if SIMEX considers the report not to be prompt. In such a case , 
the complainant would not be able to resort to a civil action in the courts as all 
SIMEX members are effectively bound contractually to comply with the Rules. 
This would, of course, not prevent the complainant party initiating legal action, but 
this could be struck out by the defendant party on the basis that it discloses no 
cause of action. 
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Upon the complainant or the party requesting an arbitration reporting the 
dispute "promptly" to the President, the President then determines whether the 
dispute shall be arbitrated and informs the parties in writing. 105 At this point, it is 
possible that if the President makes a determination that the dispute is not to be 
arbitrated or remains silent, a civil action may be pursued. 
106 
If the dispute is to be arbitrated, the parties are given a form of arbitration 
agreement for their signatures. The so-called accused, upon receiving notice from 
the President of the matter to be arbitrated has 10 days to file an appeal in writing 
with the Board stating reasons for refusing to arbitrate. The Board would then 
hear the appeal, and after the hearing, either reverse or affirm the ruling of the 
President. Any member of SIMEX who refuses to arbitrate after an initial ruling 
by the President or after an unsuccessful appeal to the Board, is guilty of a major 
offence pursuant to the Rules. 107 
As mentioned earlier, it is desirable that inter-member disputes on futures 
exchanges should be resolved quickly and efficiently. The Rules provide that upon 
the execution of an arbitration agreement between the parties, the President refers 
the matter for arbitration and the matter is heard within 10 days of such referral. 
108 
105 Rule 600 states that the President shall determine whether the dispute shall be arbitrated or 
resolved by another committee (presumably other than the Business Conduct Committee which 
conducts arbitrations) or by the Board. Where the President determines that the dispute be 
resolved otherwise than by arbitration, it is unclear whether the complainant member may pursue 
the matter by litigation. 
106 This could be the conceivable occasion whereby litigation is permitted, as contemplated by 
Rule 827. See discussion on Give-Up Trades, "Inter-Member Issues" at Chapter 5 below. 
107 See Rule 415 and Internal Disciplinary Procedures above. 
108 See Rule 603. 
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Inter-member arbitrations are heard by the Business Conduct Committee.!" 
Legal representation is not specifically disallowed. Rule 604 which governs the . 
conduct of hearings provides that as far as defences are concerned, the so-called 
defendant can make any defence which would be available to him in a court oflaw. 
It goes on to say that the defendant member may "make a counterclaim arising out 
of the transaction that is the subject of the original claim" and counterclaims 
"which do not arise out of the transaction that is the subject of the original claim" 
may be heard only if the complainant agrees. The wording here is somewhat 
confusing as a "counterclaim", in legal parlance, is a cross-action which has a 
separate and independent standing unlike a "set-off' which is a cross-action in the 
nature of a defence. Where the set-off is for damages, it must arise out of the same 
transaction as the original claim or be closely connected with the subject matter of 
the original claim.110 In practical terms, however, it is good practice to plead set- 
offs as counterclaims so that they would have a life of their own should the original 
claim fail and recovery of a counterclaim, but not a set-off, may be in excess of the 
original claim. m Rule 604 essentially provides that counterclaims in the nature of 
a set-off may be brought forward by the defendant member. However, 
counterclaims not in the nature of a set-off may only be brought forward if the 
complainant agrees. Counterclaims, as mentioned, can take on a life of their own 
should the complainant's own claim fail, and the recovery pursuant to a 
counterclaim may be in excess of the claimant's own claim. In such circumstances, 
109 See ibid. Also see Rule 402 for the jurisdiction of the Business Conduct Committee. 
110 See Jeffrey Pinsler, Civil Procedure, 1994, Butterworths at 247. 
111 See ibid at 248. 
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it would be surprising if a claimant would agree to the hearing of a counterclaim 
which does not arise out of the subject of its own claim. This is particularly so if 
the dispute giving rise to the counterclaim was one that had not been "promptly" 
reported pursuant to Rule 600. 
Like most arbitrations, those conducted by the Business Conduct 
Committee are not tied by the strict rules of evidence. The committee is at liberty 
to admit and consider any evidence whatsoever notwithstanding that it may not be 
admissible under the law.112 The Rules provide that an arbitration award may only 
be appealed against where the amount in dispute exceeds S$5,000.113 The 
dissatisfied party has to file a written notice with the President within 10 days from 
the date of award and the appeal is heard by the Board. 
The Board may dismiss the award of the Business Conduct Committee on 
the following grounds: 
(a) where the award was procured by corruption or fraud; 
(b) where there was partiality on the part of the committee or any of its 
committee members; 
( c) where the committee was wrong m refusing to hear relevant 
evidence or guilty of any other misconduct as a result of which the rights of 
any party have been prejudiced; 
( d) where the committee exceeded their jurisdiction; and 
( e) where the committee acted in manifest disregard of the applicable 
provisions of the Articles and the Rules. 
114 
112 See Rule 604. 
113 See Rules 605 and 606. 
114 See Rule 607. 
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It would appear that these grounds are exhuastive. It is interesting to query 
what the phrase "exceeded their jurisdiction" could mean. The Business Conduct 
Committee's jurisdiction as expressed in the Rules embraces generally the conduct 
of arbitrations. 115 It is more likely that the phrase "exceeded their jurisdiction" be 
interpreted, in the spirit of commercial arbitration, to mean that the committee, as 
arbitrators, had decided wrongly on a question of law, either as a result of not 
obtaining legal advice when it should have or having obtained wrong legal 
advice.116 
SIMEX and Non-Members 
The Rules provide that if the Business Conduct Committee has reason to 
believe or suspect that a non-member of SIMEX is conducting his trading activities 
in violation of the Rules, the Committee may give notice to such non-member and 
any members that handle or clear his trades to appear, produce documents and 
testify at a hearing. ll7 The particular non-member who technically is not bound by 
the Rules may choose not to show up, however, commercial sanctions may be 
taken against him. 
115 See Rule 402 states that the "Business Conduct Committee shall supervise the business 
conduct of Members, conduct investigations and hearings on those matters over which it has been 
assigned jurisdiction under the Rules and conduct arbitrations ... " 
116 Rule 604 indeed provides that the committee "shall be the sole judge of the Articles, the Rules 
and tJ1e facts." By being the sole judge on questions of law, it has exceeded its jurisdiction. Rule 
604 continues to state that "if the committee is in doubt in any question of law, it may refer the 
same to the legal advisers of the Exchange for their opinion." In the same respect, in making an 
award based on wrong legal advice, the committee is in excess of its jurisdiction. 
117 See Rule 408:C. 
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If, after the hearing, the Business Conduct Committee determines that the 
actions of the non-member threatens the integrity or liquidity of any contract or are 
likely to result in the manipulation of prices, the Committee may order the member 
clearing the trade to liquidate all or any portion of the non-member's position in 
the threatened contract. Alternatively, the Committee may order that no members 
are to accept new positions in the threatened contract on behalf of such non- 
member.i" The Committee can only take steps against non-members in a limited 
manner with reference to a threatened contract. There is no route of appeal within 
SIMEX with regard to such a decision. A non-member who is aggrieved by the 
decision of the Committee may conceivably apply for judicial review on the basis 
that SIMEX is a quasi-public body whose disciplinary powers are subject to 
judicial review.i" Hardly a practical course to take due to limited effect of the 
sanctions against the non-member. 
Insofar as non-member complaints against a SIMEX member or their 
representatives are concerned, there is an arbitration procedure provided for. A 
non-member customer may submit for arbitration, within one year of the action 
giving rise to the claim where it arises out of a transaction upon SIMEX and where 
the claim does not exceed S$15,000.120 This arbitration procedure is not 
compulsory and nothing in the Rules or the FT A prevents the non-member from 
resorting instead to civil action in the civil courts. Indeed, for claims exceeding 
S$ l 5, 000, resort to the courts is required. 
118 See ibid. 
119 See O.S.K. & Partners Sdn. v. Tengku Noone Aziz [1983)1MLJ179 and note 101, supra. 
120 See Rule 408:0. 
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Customer claims for less than $5,000 may, "in the interests of efficiency and 
economy," be assigned for resolution by the President.121 The President is to 
employ procedures designed to ensure that the costs of prosecuting the claim will 
commensurate with its value. 122 The decision of the President in the dispute is to 
be submitted to the Business Conduct Committee and would be deemed the 
decision of the Committee upon approval by the Committee. Such decision is final 
and no route of appeal is provided within SIMEX. 
Failure to Enforce Rules 
S. 9(1) of the FTA provides that: 
"Any person, who is aggrieved by the failure of an Exchange or a clearing 
house or any of the directors or employees of the Exchange or clearing 
house to enforce its business rules or in enforcing those business rules 
contravenes this Act or any regulations made thereunder, has a right of 
action in damages for the actual amount of damages suffered by that person 
in any transaction that he has entered into on or subject to the business 
rules of a futures market that is directly attributable to the failure to 
enforce or in the enforcement of the business rules, in contravention of this 
' 
Act or the regulations, as the case may be." 
This recourse is available to both members and non-members of SIMEX. 
The aggrieved person in pursuing this action in damages against SIMEX either as 
121 See ibid. 
122 See ibid. 
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exchange or clearing house, has to show that, in failing to take action or in taking 
such action that resulted in a loss to the aggrieved person, SIMEX, or any of its 
directors or employees had acted in badfaith.123 
S. 9(3) expressly states that the right of action conferred by s. 9(1) is to be 
an exclusive remedy available to an aggrieved person.124 This means that any other 
recourse in the civil courts under another cause of action, for example, a tortious 
claim, cannot be pursued if the fact scenario supports a s. 9 action. The aggrieved 
person, therefore, has no choice as to which cause of action to pursue, even though 
a tortious claim based on negligence is prim a f ocie easier to establish on certain 
facts than an action under s. 9 where bad faith has to be established. 
It is an open issue as to what bad faith entails, but it usually includes 
elements of malice.125 It requires an investigation into SIMEX' s intention in failing 
to enforce the Rules and a finding that such an intention was injudicial and wrong. 
This, conceivably, may be shown where there is bias or favour shown to a rule- 
breaking member which is inexplicable in terms of the exchange's overall policy 
and interest or the public interest. 
123 See s. 9(2), FT A. 
124 Sees. 9(3), ibid. 
125 The phrase "bad faith or malice" has been used in various pieces of legislation, eg Legal 
Profession Act, Cap. 161 at s. 106, Accountants Act, Cap. 2A at s. 63 and Architects Act, Cap. 12 
at s. 38, in relation to the issue of when action may be taken against the relevant professional 
bodies for action done under the respective Acts. 
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Fidelity Fund 
The 1995 amendments included provisions for the establishment of a 
fidelity fund by a futures exchange, namely· SIMEX.126 The fidelity fund ·is to 
consist of an amount of not less than S$5 million. 
127 
The fund is to be increased 
every year by an annual payment into the fund of a sum that is equal to 10% or 
more of the annual net income of SIMEX. The fidelity fund is to be applied "for 
the purpose of compensating any person, other than an accredited investor, 
128 
who 
suffers pecuniary loss because of a defalcation committed in the course of or in 
connection with the trading of a futures contract"129 which was cleared or to be 
cleared on SIMEX by a SIMEX member, its director, officer, employee or licensed 
representative. 
The defalcation is to be in relation to any money or property that was 
actually entrusted to or received by the defalcation. Since accredited investors are 
not allowed to make claims from the fidelity fund, this suggests that the fidelity 
fund is conceived to benefit the smaller or retail investor.130 Bearing this in mind, 
the limits to claims stipulated in the fidelity fund provisions do not seem too 
ungenerous. The total amount that may be paid out of a fidelity fund to all persons 
126 Sees. 49A FTA 
127 ' See s. 49F(l), ibid. SIMEX was given six months after the commencement of the Futures 
Trading (Amendment) Act 1995 to comply, sees. 49F(3), ibid. 
128 
129 
See Chapter 3, notes 72 and 73, supra. 
130 
Sees. 491(1), FTA. . . . . " Dr Hu at the Second Reading of the Futures Trading (Amendment) Bill stated. Because of 
the growing interest from retail investors to trade in SIMEX futures contracts, additional 
safeguards to protect their interests are needed. The Bill therefore requires SIMEX to establish a 
Fidelity Fund ... " See Singapore Parliamentary Debates, vol. 64 at col. 46. 
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eligible· to claim compensation and who suffer Joss through defalcations by a 
member of SIMEX cannot exceed in respect of the defalcating member the sum of 
S$500,000.131 Furthermore, the maximum amount payable to each claimant to 
satisfy any claim is not to exceed S$100,000 or 75% of the actual pecuniary Joss 
suffered by the claimant. 132 
To make a claim, a person who has suffered the requisite pecuniary loss is 
to take proceedings in the High Court against SIMEX to establish the claim. 
133 
However, a person cannot commence such proceedings without the consent of 
SIMEX unless SIMEX has disallowed his claim and the claimant has exhausted all 
relevant rights of action and other legal 'remedies for recovery of the money or 
other property, in respect of which the defalcation was committed. 
134 
The 
exhaustion of all legal avenues is potentially a costly exercise. It is harsh to require 
a claimant to do so and to show that such pursuits were futile or insufficient ' ' 
before being able to commence proceedings against SIMEX to claim against the 
fidelity fund. This is particularly so in the case of a retail investor. However, it is 
only in cases where a claim is disallowed that the claimant has to resort to pursuing 
alternative forms of action against other parties and of pursuing SIMEX via the 
High Court. The reasonableness and propriety of SIMEX in meting out claims is a 
stalwart of the system and is presumed. 
131 See s. 491(2), ibid. 
132 See s. 49J(3), ibid. 
133 Sees. 49J(l), ibid. 
134 See s. 49L(2), ibid. 
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Under the Rules, SIMEX itself is obliged to establish and maintain a trust 
fund specifically for the protection of the customers of its members. 
135 
The precise 
terms regarding the amount and contributions to the trust fund as well as claims 
therefrom are not found in the Rules, but in Board resolutions and directions. 
Therefore, at present, SIMEX members' customers can claim from one of two 
funds. 136 One is maintained by SIMEX under the FT A requirements and the other 
under the Rules. 
3. SIMEX as Clearing House 
Generally, the exchange is responsible for trading procedures and the 
overall supervision of its members. The entity which is fundamental to the financial 
operations and integrity of an exchange is the clearing house. As mentioned 
earlier, the clearing house with regards to SIMEX is an association or organization 
of SIMEX Clearing Members. 
. . . t d t I 137 d The SIMEX Cleanng House is not mcorpora e separa e y an may be 
viewed as a department within SIMEX. It is provided in the Articles that wherever 
any provisions of the Rules create a right in favour of the clearing house or impose 
a liability on the clearing house, such right or liability shall be construed as a right 
135 See Rule 915. 
136 It is unlikely that double recovery would be tolerated. 
137 Many exchanges including those in Hong Kong, New Zealand, Bermuda, Australia and Hong 
Kong have had their trades cleared by a clearing house which was a separate entity from the 
exchange. The International Commodities Clearing House Limited ("ICCH") is headquartered in 
London and since 1888 has provided clearing services. Sec generally Chapter 2, Carroll, 
Financial Futures Trading. 
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or liability of SIMEX and shall be enforced by or against SIMEX. 
138 
In a nutshell ' 
any grievance against the clearing house is· a grievance against SIMEX as a 
corporate entity and an approved futures exchange in Singapore. 
139 
The importance and role of the clearing house has been succinctly 
articulated thus: 
" .. .it is the clearing house which effectively transforms what would 
otherwise be forward contracts into highly liquid futures contracts. 
Operationally, the clearing house is responsible for matching the purchase 
and sales transactions, guaranteeing performance under the terms of the 
futures contract and managing the delivery process. It administers the 
margin system and oversees the enforcement of solvency regulations which, 
enhanced by direct guarantees backed by its own capital and that of its 
members, provide financial integrity for the contracts. Its unique legal 
status as the "party to every trade" facilitates the transfer of funds among 
participants, promoting contract liquidity and allowing settlement by 
offset." 140 
The Process of Substitution 
Those who have traded on SIMEX look to the SIMEX Clearing House for 
the performance of contracts and not to the other party of the trade. All contracts 
concluded on SIMEX are sent by Clearing Members for clearing by the Clearing 
138 • See Article 5.05. 
139 Rule 800 states inter a/ia: "Wherever the Rules create a right in favour of the Clearing House 
or impose a liability on the Clearing House, such right or !~ability shall be co~~strued as the right 
or liability of the Exchange, and shall be enforced by or agamsl the Exchange. 
14° Chapter 2, Carroll, Financial Futures Trading at 28 
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House.141 Once cleared or registered by the Clearing House, the Clearing House 
becomes the seller to the buyer and the buyer to the seller. This phenomenon is 
known as "substitution" in the Rules.142 In terms of legal analysis, the contractual 
notion of novation is perhaps the most appropriate to apply here. 
143 
Once substitution or novation occurs, it is fairly clear that the Clearing 
House becomes the counterparty to two futures contracts, as buyer to one and 
seller to another, and takes over all the rights and obligations of the previous buyer 
Clearing Member and the seller Clearing Member. A successful substitution occurs 
when the Clearing House accepts what is termed the "clearing memoranda". The 
clearing memoranda is submitted by the Clearing Members and states the particular 
trades which have been entered into in a particular day. A comparison of clearing 
memoranda must indicate that the Clearing House is long to certain Clearing 
Members and short to others the identical amount of the same contract and at the 
same prices. 144 If clearing memoranda submitted by one Clearing Member does 
not match the memoranda submitted by the opposite Clearing Member, such 
clearing memoranda will be automatically rejected.145 If and only if, after such 
comparison of clearing memoranda, the Clearing House accepts the clearing 
memoranda, the Clearing House shall be substituted as and shall assume the 
141 Rule 800 states inter alia: "All contracts traded on the Exchange shall be cleared through the 
Clearing House which shall maintain a record of these transactions." 
142 , 
See Rule 803. 
143 See David Yeow, "Singapore--Regulation of Futures and ~pti~ns," The Capital Guide to 
Financial Futures and Traded Options in Asia, 1996, ISI Pubhcat1ons at 195 on the effect of 
registration of the contract by SIMEX: "The effect of registration is to discharge the original oral 
contract and replace it with two contracts. ln this regard, the replacement is effected via the 
novation route. Upon the novation of such a trade, SIMEX would act as a seller to the original 
buyer on the flip side and it will be the buyer to the original seller." 
144 s 'b d ee 1 i . 
145 s ee Rule 808:C 
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position of seller to the buyer and buyer to the seller, and shall have all the rights 
and be subject to all the liabilities with respect to such transaction of the Clearing 
Members who were the parties to such transactions. 
146 
When trades are matched and the clearing procedures successfully 
completed, market participants would look to the Clearing House for the 
performance of their orders. The position is less clear when trades are not matched 
and are rejected by the Clearing House. In such a case, a dispute would arise 
between the two traders on either side of the purported execution of the order. An 
" d 147 out-tra e" would have occurred. 
By acting as the party to every trade, a clearing house assumes the credit 
risk of the trading counterparties. This is an immense financial responsibility on the 
part of a clearing house and it thus requires its members to be of a certain financial 
calibre. The financial integrity of its clearing members is essential to the reliability 
and proper functioning of a clearing house system. This is ensured in Singapore by 
the stringent financial requirements required of the Clearing Members of 
SIMEX.14s 
In any case, assuming the credit risk of being substituted as the party to 
every trade completed on an exchange could be an overly onerous burden on the 
part of the clearing house if taken on without any safeguards. It is unlikely that 
146 1 · d See Rule 808 generally for an account of the c earing proce ures. 
147 See Rule 808:D and "Inter-Member Issues" at Chapter 5 below. 
148 See "Market Entry Requirements" at Chapter 5 below. 
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clearing members would take on unlimited risk as a clearing house collective. 
Consequently, a two-tiered means of ensuring the financial integrity of market 
participants or those who trade on the exchange is utilized to contain the risk. 
First, before a contract is allowed to be executed on the exchange, the clearing 
house collects "margin". Second, a daily mark-to-market settlement system 
prevents losses by a single trader from chalking up. 
Daily Settlement 
When a futures trade has been done, prior to offset by cash settlement or 
delivery, the futures obligation remains open. All open positions on SI.MEX are 
revalued on a daily basis, using SIMEX' s end-of-day settlement prices. This is 
known as the "mark-to-market" system. It is not peculiar to SIMEX and is a 
distinct feature of futures exchanges. Losses are not allowed to accumulate for 
more than a day. 
· Depending on whether a futures contracts' pnce has risen or fallen, a 
Clearing Member suffers either a loss or aprofit. If a loss is suffered, payment has 
to be made to the Clearing House. If there is a profit, payment is made by the 
Clearing House to the Clearing Member. All debts are settled daily. 
149 
The 
Clearing Member would then either debit or credit the account of its customer 
149 In practice, this process concerns only the settlement banks with whom the Clearing Members 
have accounts. Adjustments to the various accounts including that of tl1e Clearing House is done 
by way of a settlement variation performed by the settlement banks. The settlement banks, upon 
completion of the procedure, would communicate to the Clearing House a confirmation that 
collections from all Clearing Member accounts have been made for amounts due as a result of the 
particular trading day's mark-to-market. 
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accordingly. As will be discussed, the relevant accounts contain margin deposits, 
made up of initial margin as well as variation margin. 
The daily mark-to-market settlement procedure ensures that all obligations 
for new and existing positions are cleared before the start of each day's trading. 
Members may not trade until they have made good any deficit in their accounts. 
This limits the exposure of the Clearing House. 
Margin Trading 
Under the Rules, Clearing Members are required to place margin deposits 
with the Clearing House.:" To protect themselves, the Clearing Members would 
then impose similar or usually more stringent margin deposit requirements on their 
customers. If such customers are non-clearing members, they would in tum collect 
margin from their non-member customers. SIMEX in any case stipulates the 
amounts of initial margins which must be obtained by all members from their 
customers and the amount of margins that must be maintained by customers on 
open positions.Y' Members are not to accept orders for new trades from a 
customer unless the minimum initial margin for the new· trades is on deposit or is 
forthcoming within a reasonable time and unless the margin on that customer's 
existing open positions complies with the existing maintenance requirements or is 
150 See Rules S 19 and 820. 
151 See Rule 822. 
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forthcoming within a reasonable time. 152 A reasonable time has been defined as 
three business days.153 
Margin trading is essential to futures trading. It is unrealistic to expect 
customers to deposit an amount which would fully reflect their potential liability 
upon maturity of the futures contract. Few contracts are held to maturity and are 
often offset. Without margin trading, the costs of futures trading would be too 
high. 
Furthermore, it is the margin deposits that provide a source of funds to 
draw upon when market losses are incurred. Where, after the daily mark-to- 
market settlement exercise, a loss is incurred, as between the Clearing Member and 
the Clearing House, a deduction is made from the Clearing Member's margin 
deposits. The Clearing Member would then make a corresponding reduction in the 
relevant customer's margin deposits with the Clearing Member. Where the losses 
deplete the amount of minimum margin required to be maintained as a deposit, a 
variation margin call is made, by the Clearing House on the Clearing Member, and 
consequently by the Clearing Member on the customer. 
As a note of clarification, the system of margining in the case of futures 
trading is distinct from the system of margining for equity securities listed and 
traded on the stock exchange. The functions of such "margins" are different. In 
futures transactions, margins essentially serve as performance bonds, protecting the 
152 s 'bid ee 1 . 
153 Sec Circular No. CM-22 of 1988 (27 May 1988). 
112 
clearing house and clearing members against losses due to any potential financial 
default on the part of the clearing member andtheir customers respectively. In the 
equity market, the term "margin" refers to the percentage of the price of shares 
that must be paid as a cash down payment, and the amount which constitutes the 
difference between the price of the share purchase and the margin deposit is an 
extension of credit by the stockbroker to the buyer of the shares. Although 
maximum margins are stipulated in the Securities Industry Regulations, 
154 
margin 
trading is extended to customers at the discretion of the stockbroker concerned and 
is a commercial decision to be taken. 
In the case of SIMEX futures trading, minimum margin levels are 
prescribed by the Board from time to time. The amount of margins required to be 
deposited by any Clearing Member with the Clearing House is calculated and 
determined on a cumulative gross basis with reference to all open positions (both 
long and short) for which such Clearing Member is responsible.155 As a matter of 
clarification, it should be pointed out that SIMEX requires all Clearing Members to 
maintain margins with the Clearing House for proprietary positions separately from 
customers' positions. This means that house and client positions cannot be used to 
offset one another for margining purposes. Furthermore, margins for customers' 
154 Made pursuant to the Securities Industry Act, Cap, 289, Statutes of Singapore. Sees. 55 of the 
Securities Industry Act which states: "For the purpose of preventing the excessive use of credit 
for the purchase or carrying of securities by dealers or member companies, regulations may 
provide for margin requirements, that is to say, for the amount of cred~t that may from time to 
time be extended and maintained on all or specified securities or transactions or class of securities 
and transactions and for matters connected therewith." 
155 S R I ee · u c 820. 
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positions are computed on a gross basis which means that one customer's long 
positions cannot be used to offset another's short positions.156 
Generally speaking, the mmrmum margm requirements required by the 
Clearing House from Clearing Members depends on the volatility of the underlying 
futures contract. As described in the Ministry of Finance's Report: 
"The margin deposits required for particular types of contracts are fixed by 
SIMEX and revised periodically based on market volatility studies in 
accordance with international norms. SIMEX uses the Standard Portfolio 
Analysis of Risk ("SP AN") margin system to calculate margins. SP AN 
evaluates the overall risk of a portfolio of futures and options contracts and 
matches margins to risk. The system is able to consolidate the risks of a 
futures instrument with the risks of an option on the same futures 
instrument. SP AN simulates the reaction of a portfolio to a range of 
possible market changes and then covers the largest reasonable overnight 
loss." 157 
The minimum margin requirements required by Clearing Members from 
their customers would reflect the margin requirements expected of Clearing 
Members by the Clearing House. In practice, prudent broking SIMEX members 
would require more than the minimum margin required by SIMEX as a deposit. 
There is a practical reason as well. In case of adverse and sudden price 
movements, the margin collected by the broking member would cover the variation 
156 S . . . , R t ce para. 15.10, Muustry of Finances epor. 
157 Para. 15.9, Ibid. 
114 
margin the member would have to post with a Clearing Member or the Clearing 
House. 
At first sight, it appears anomalous that futures brokers can top up their 
customers' accounts with their own money. The FTA provides that: " ... a futures 
broker. .. from time to time may advance from his own funds sufficient money to 
prevent any or all customers' trust accounts from becoming under-margined."158 
The Rules provide for such action on the part of the futures broker or member. 
159 
The Rules even permit that a member's money may be paid into a customer's 
account for "the purpose of opening or maintaining" the customer's account. 
160 
The extent of such topping up is left to the broking members' own discretion. 
Such topping up without the customer remedying the position by correcting 
the margin deficit effectively allows a certain amount of credit to be extended to 
the customer by the broking member. However, it is not possible for the allowance 
of topping-up customers' accounts to be abused in this way as under the Rules 
earlier mentioned the SIMEX member is to obtain from their customers minimum , 
amounts of initial margin and variation margin.161 When a customer's account is 
undermargined, the member is mandated to call for additional margins to bring the 
account up to the required margin JeveJ.162 If within a reasonable time the 
customer fails to comply with such demand, the member may close out the 
customer's trades or sufficient contracts thereof to restore the customer's account 
158 
159 Secs. 37(4), FTA. 
See Ruic 917·B·4 160 • ' 
161 
See ibid at a. 
162 
Sec Ruic 822. 
Sec ibid. 
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to th · · d 163 e require margin status. A member may deem one hour to be a reasonable 
time befor t ki 1 · · 164 · e a mg c osmg out action. On the other hand, if the member chooses 
to give the customer a further grace period, the member may, in the meantime, top 
up the customer's account to prevent it being undermargined. This, however , 
cannot go on indefinitely, for the member is required to maintain customer margins. 
If the member fails to do so, SIMEX may order such member to immediately close 
out all or such part of the positions so as to correct the deficiency.165 Failure to 
maintain customer margins as required under the Rules is a major offence. 
166 
The setting of margin levels is a controversial and sensitive area of futures 
trading. A high level of margin is prudent insofar as the clearing house is 
concerned. This ensures financial stability in the event of high volatility. However, 
margin requirements have been said to restrict trading activity, so that exchanges 
and brokers in general are anxious that the margin requirements are not 
unreasonably high.167 So, while margin levels have to be high enough to ensure the 
integrity of the contracts traded, margins that are too high as to lead to adverse 
cons . b id d 168 equences impacting upon trading volume are to e avoi e · 
163 See ibid 
164 . 
See ibid 
165 . 
See ibid 
166 . 
See ibid 167 . . . . See note 16 al Chapter l, Robert w. Kolb, Understanding Futures Marke~s, Fourth Edition, 
.~994, Kolb Publishing Company at 12. Reference is made to L. Kalavatlu and L. Shanker, 
Margin Requirements and the Demand for Futures Contracts," Journal of Futures Markets, 
l l :2, April 1991 at 213-237 where it is argued that increas.ing margins de~reases deman~ for 
futures positions. Another reference is made to Stanley R. Pliska and Catllenne T. Shalen, The 
Etrccts of Regulations 
011 
Trading Aelivily and Re1urn Volalilily in Fu1ures Markei." Journal of 
Futu~es Markets, 11:2, April l99l al 135-151 where the authors. ma111tam that extremely high 
~~1;1rgms can reduce liquidity as measured by open interest and tradrng volume. " 
On the oilier 
1 
d · 1 'ell "re 1.00 low might attract speculators. In Prompt treatment 
ti 
um , marg111s w 11 " . • . ,, or futures shock s· l ed fast to mend its reputation after the Banngs havoc, The 
1 
: mgaporc u1s 1nov n . . . " . , 
Financial Times. 3 March 1995, Peter Montagnon and K1eran Coo~e wrote. lromcally, Sllv1EX 
was panicularly proud of the Nikkei futures in which Mr Leeson s losses accumulated. It was 
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The success of SIMEX's margining system was evident in the Barings 
debacle. As was mentioned in the Ministry of Finance's Report: 
"After the collapse of the Baring Group, SIM.EX took over and liquidated 
BFS' s positions. As it transpired, SIMEX held adequate margins and was 
able to liquidate all of BFS' s positions and refund a surplus of US$86 
·11· 169 mt ion to BFS. Consequently, the common bond was not triggered and 
SIMEX and its other clearing members did not suffer any loss."!" 
Offsetting 
Few contracts are held to maturity. Most futures contracts are completed 
through offset or via a reversing trade. To close an open position, a party merely 
has to sell or buy exactly the same contract that was bought or sold originally. 
This brings the position in a particular futures contract back to zero. 
The offset by liquidation procedure is set out in the Rules.171 To prevent 
unintentional liquidation of an open position of one customer merely by the 
purchase or sale of a contrary contract of similar specifications for another 
customer, the Rules also provide that offset is not automatic.172 An offsetting 
transaction must be reflected as such in the position change sheets submitted to the 
one of the most actively traded instnuncnts on the exchange, attracting business from Japan 
bcca · • . · I · 0 k " "' s"'° Singapore's margln requirements were lower than I iose m sa a. 
170 cc The 0111111011 Bond System below. 
171 
8Para. 
15.48, Mini try of Pinnnce's Report. 
172 
cc Ruic 805. 
Sec Ruic 806. 
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SIMEX Clearing House for the offset by liquidation to be effective.173 Position 
change sheets are to be submitted by Clearing Members every business day after 
the close· of business.174 The position change sheets are documents which inform 
the Clearing House of each Clearing member's calculation of its final gross open 
positions. The submitted position change sheets are used by the Clearing Housein 
working out the margin requirements for each Clearing Member. 
Large Position Reporting 
Position change sheets are submitted to the Clearing House by Clearing 
Members. Other members who deal with Clearing Members are required to submit 
position change sheets to the relevant Clearing Member.175 However, Clearing 
Members and other members of sIMEX have to submit to SIMEX a daily report 
of customers with large positions.176 These reports are not limited to trades 
undertaken on SIMEX. They include positions "whether assumed or entered into 
on the Exchange or elsewhere."177 
The Rules provide that upon request by sJMEX, the member is to identify 
the owner and controlling parties of the large positions.11s It is imperative to 
establish an effective large trader reporting system, as concentrated trades may 
173 ---------- 
174 Sec Rules 806 and 810. · · SIMEX Circular No. 
15 
of 
1984 
(27 Fcbniary 1984) states that pos1~1on change sheets are to 
~7~ submitted by Clearing Members within three hours of the close of business. 
176 Sec Ibid at g. 
177 
Sec Ruic 816. . . Ibid F , . . bl ccounts and for the mm1mum reportable levels 
for S . -or the 1dcnttlicot1011 of reporta. c a f 1984 (J July 1984) and CM-3 of 
lMEX and 11011-SlMEX contracts, sec Circular Nos. 86 ° 
!1~86 (5 March I 986). 
Sec Ruic 816. 
11 s 
indicate either excessive speculation or an attempt at manipulation, both of which 
are hazardous to the well-being of a futures exchange. 
Indeed, right after the Barings episode, SIMEX had assembled an 
international advisory panel to recommend best practices on SIMEX.179 Following 
recommendations, SIMEX implemented a comprehensive risk management 
program which includes the heightened monitoring of positions and market 
. f I ise concentration o arge accounts. 
The MAS, consequent to the Barings crisis, has a larger role to play in 
assessing large trader positions. The post-Barings wave of amendments to the 
FTR included a provision requiring SIMEX to submit to the MAS on a weekly 
basis, or at any time upon request by the MAS, a report showing large trader 
positions which exceeds limits as determined by the MAS from time to time.181 
The Common Bond System 
The "common bond system" refers to the agreement between all the 
Clearing Members to pool their finances so that they effectively guarantee every 
contract traded on SIMEX. This agreement and its mechanics are set out in Rule 
802. This adds to the peace of mind of those who deal on SIMEX. However, if 
the margining system is implemented, in the case of a default by a Clearing Member 
179 See para. 15.45, Ministry of Finance's Report. 
180 See para. 15.46, ibid. 
181 See reg. 28, FTR. 
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upon its obligations, the margin deposits should be adequate, as in the Barings 
case, to cover losses suffered by the parties who dealt with the Clearing Member. 
In any case, if a Clearing Member fails to discharge its obligations to the 
Clearing House, Rule 802 provides that its security deposit, its margins on deposit 
and any other assets or securities available to SIMEX will be applied to discharge 
the obligations. If these assets are insufficient, the Clearing House may resort to 
the following sources to make good the Joss, in the following order of priority: 
182 
a. the surplus funds of SIMEX; 
b. the assets of any trust fund established under the Rules; and 
c. the security deposits of other Clearing Members. 
Any remaining Joss will be met from a levy on Clearing Members. 
183 
182 See Rule 802:B:d 
183 See ibid at 4. 
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CHAPTERS 
MARKET PARTICIPATION 
1. Market Entry Requirements 
SIMEX membership criteria and the MAS' s licensing regime under the 
FTA impact upon the entrance and participation of companies and individuals as 
brokers and traders in the futures market. 
SIMEX Membership 
SIMEX has vanous categories of membership. At present, SIMEX 
provides four categories of membership in its Rules: 
1 
(i) Clearing Members; 
(ii) Corporate Non-Clearing Members; 
(iii) Individual Non-Clearing Members; and 
(iv) Commercial Associate Members. 
Both Clearing Members and Corporate Non-Clearing Members have full 
trading rights on the trading floor and the authority to accept customers' business. 
However, Clearing Members have the authority to clear trades whereas Corporate 
Non-Clearing Members do not. Furthermore, both Clearing Members and 
1 See Rules 201 to 203. See generally Chapter 2 of the Rules for the eligibility requirements, the 
rights, duties and responsibilities of members in the various categories of SIMEX membership. 
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Corporate Non-Clearing Members must own at least three seats on SIMEX. The 
Clearing Member must also own one share in SIMEX. As mentioned earlier, only 
Clearing Members are bound by the Articles as shareholders of SIMEX. 
2 
The criteria for Clearing Membership is the strictest, with the highest 
financial requirements.3 This is not surprising since only Clearing Members are 
allowed to participate in clearing procedures. Furthermore, collectively as the 
Clearing House, the Clearing Members, through the common bond system, 
guarantee every trade done on SIMEX. 
Commercial Associate Members' trading rights are limited to energy 
futures contracts only. They may trade only for their own account and for their 
related and associated companies. Obviously, they have no authority to clear 
trades. They must own at least one seat on SIMEX.4 
Individual Non-Clearing Members can trade only for their own account but 
have full trading rights on the trading floor. They must own or lease one seat on 
SIMEX. Individual Non-Clearing Members are, contrary to the nomenclature, not 
individuals but companies. However, pursuant to the rules, they are required to be 
companies with a maximum of two shareholders, with one shareholder being the 
sole and legal owner of not Jess than ninety-nine per cent of its issued capital. 
5 
2 See "SIMEX as Exchange" at Chapter 4 above. 
3 At present, the minimum paid-up capital required by SIMEX of a Clearing Member is S$8 
million, whereas the requirement for a Corporate Non-Clearing Member is S$5 million. 
4 At present, the minimum adjusted net capital required by SIMEX of a Commercial Associate 
Member is S$100,000. 
5 See Rule 203. 
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MAS Licensing 
S. 11 of the FT A provides that a "futures broker" requires a licence from 
the MAS. S. 12 of the FTA provides that the following types of futures market 
participant also require a licence issued by the MAS: 
(a) "futures broker's representative"; 
(b) "futures trading adviser"; 
( c) "futures trading adviser's representative"; 
( d) "futures pool operator"; or 
( e) "futures pool operator's representative". 
A futures broker's licence, a futures trading adviser's licence and a futures 
pool operator's licence are only granted to corporations. 
6 
Any corporation who so 
carries on business in any of the above capacities without a licence will be guilty of 
an offence under the FT A and is liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding 
S$30,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years or to both.7 
A futures broker's representative's licence, a futures trading adviser's 
representative's licence and a futures pool operator's representative's licence may 
only be granted to an individual. Any individual who so carries on business as any 
of the above without a licence will be guilty of an offence under the FT A and is 
~ See s. 12(2), Fr A. 
Sees. 11(3) ands. 12(2), ibid. 
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liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding S$10,000 or to imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding one year or to both. 
8 
The licences issued by the MAS are valid for a period of one year.9 
Applications for new licences and renewals of existing licences are to be made 
pursuant to the procedure set out in the FT A and the FTR.10 Apart from 
particulars required on the prescribed application or renewal forms set out in the 
FTR, the MAS "may require an applicant to provide it with such further 
information as it considers necessary in relation to the application.':" 
The MAS shall not refuse to grant or renew a licence without first giving 
the applicant an opportunity of being heard.12 Circumstances whereby the MAS 
may refuse to grant or renew licences were considerably expanded by the 1995 
FTA amendments. Previously, the circumstances provided for in s. 14(1) of the 
FT A were limited to situations where, in brief: 
(1) the applicant had not provided information "likely to affect its 
method of conducting business"; 
(2) the applicant had entered into a composition or arrangement with 
creditors or is undischarged as a bankrupt, if an individual; 
8 See s. 12(2), ibid. 
9 Sees. 16, ibid. 
10 Sees. 13, FT A and reg. 5 and First Schedule, FTR. 
II S ee s. 13(2), FTA. 
12 Sees. 13(3), ibid. 
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(3) the applicant, its officers and employees, if a corporation and his 
employees and persons associated with him, if an individual, had been 
convicted of offences involving fraud or dishonesty or have otherwise 
violated the FT A and FTR; and 
( 4) when it appeared to the MAS that there were other circumstances 
which were likely to lead to "the improper conduct of business by, or 
reflect discredit on the method of conducting the business of' the applicant 
and its officers and employees, if a corporation and his employees and 
persons associated with him, if an individual. 
The 1995 amendments did some housekeeping in relation to the 
abovementioned circumstances. Insofar as a corporation was concerned, the 
original provision only provided that a ground for refusing a licence application 
was that "the applicant has at any time prior to the application entered into any 
composition or arrangement with its creditors." This has subsequently been 
expanded to include: 
(i) the applicant or its substantial shareholder being in the course of 
being wound up or liquidated; 
(ii) a receiver or a receiver and manager having been appointed to the 
applicant or its substantial shareholder; 
(iii) the applicant or its substantial shareholder having, whether in 
Singapore or elsewhere, entered into a compromise or scheme of 
arrangement with its creditors, being a compromise or scheme of 
arrangement that is still in operation. 
These amendments are uncontroversial and indeed were necessary to 
bolster the original provisions which were highly inadequate insofar as they related 
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to the potential insolvency of an applicant. The status of the applicant's substantial 
shareholder has also been taken into account. It is a matter of common sense that 
an unstable and shaky substantial shareholder would affect the corporate applicant 
and a licence should not be granted in such circumstances. Similarly, the provision 
relating to the conviction for inter alia offences involving dishonesty now extends 
to an applicant's substantial shareholder as well. 
The 1995 amendments to s. 14(1) of the FTA added more qualitative 
criteria upon which the MAS may refuse to grant or renew a licence. In the case of 
a corporate applicant, these are situations where: 
(a) the MAS is not satisfied as to the educational or other qualification 
or experience of the applicant's officers or employees who are to perform 
duties in connection with the holding of the licence; 
(b) the applicant fails to satisfy the MAS that together with itself, its 
directors, officers, employees and substantial shareholders are fit and 
proper persons to be licensed; 
( c) the MAS has reason to believe that the applicant may not be able to 
act in the best interests of its subscribers, customers or participants having 
regard to the reputation, character, financial integrity and reliability of the 
applicant or any of its substantial shareholders, directors, officers or 
employees; 
( d) the MAS is not satisfied as to the financial standing of the applicant 
or its substantial shareholder or the manner in which its business is to be 
conducted; 
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( e) the MAS is not satisfied as to the record of past performance or 
expertise of the applicant having regard to the nature of the business which 
the applicant may carry on in connection with the holding of the licence· 
. ' 
(f) there are other circumstances which are likely to lead to the 
improper conduct of business by, or reflect discredit on the method of 
conducting the business of, the applicant or its substantial shareholder or 
any of the directors, officers or employees of the applicant; and 
(g) the MAS is of the opinion that it is in the interests of the public to 
do so. 
In the case of an individual applicant, similar grounds apply. In addition, an 
individual may be refused the grant or renewal of a licence if the MAS has reason 
to believe that he "will not be able to perform the functions for which he is licensed 
efficiently, honestly, or fairly.?" 
The added qualitative criteria allows for greater flexibility and consequent 
subjectivity on the part of the MAS in the granting, renewal and revocation of 
licences. 14 In relation to the licensing of financial market participants, the use of 
subjective criteria by a licensing authority in making licensing decisions is not 
novel. The Securities Industry Act has included similar criteria regarding an 
applicant's "good fame and character"15 as well as the applicant's performance of 
its duties "efficiently, honestly and fairly."16 
13 Sees. 14(l)(a)(vi), ibid. . 
14 This had caused some concern during the passing of the Futures Trading (Amendment) Bill in 
Parliament. See Chapter 4, notes 21and24, supra. 
15 Sees. 29(3)(a)(iv), Securities Industry Act. 
16 Sees. 29(3)(a)(v) and (b)(v), ibid. 
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It should be observed that the wording in the Securities Industry Act 
pertaining to the three pronged criteria of efficiency, honesty and fairness uses the 
conjunctive "and" whereas in the FT A, the disjunctive "or" is used. The phrase 
"efficiently, honestly or fairly" is used in the FTA with respect to the granting or 
renewal of an individual's licence as well as in the context ofrevocation oflicences 
for both individuals and corporations.17 It is anomalous that only licences of 
individuals may not be granted or refused renewal on the basis that the MAS has 
reason to believe that the individual applicant will not be able to perform the 
functions for which he is licensed "efficiently, honestly or fairly." There is no 
similar provision regarding the granting or renewal of corporations' licences. At 
the end of the day, the anomaly is academic for the MAS has at its disposal a host 
of tools for dispensing with granting or renewing a corporation's licence which are 
as widely and broadly worded, for instance, the "fit and proper person" test, 
18 
the 
((• f . "19 h "" f th bl" " 20 improper conduct o busmess test or t e interests o e pu ic test. 
There have been no instances in the futures trading context whereby the 
courts have had the opportunity to consider the application of the above criteria. 
Using analogous authority from cases regarding licensed participants in the futures 
industry may cause difficulty due to the differences in wording in the relevant 
legislation. For instance, in Story v. NCSC,21 the Australian courts had occasion to 
17 See s. 20(2)(a)(v) and (vi), Ff A. The.provisions as to revocation of a ~icence on the grounds of 
the licensed person or its directors or employees in the case of a corporation not performing his or 
their duties "efficiently, honestly or fairly" were in the original Ff A. 
18 Sees. 14(l)(b)(vii), ibid. 
19 Sees. 14(l)(b)(xi), ibid. 
20 Sees. 14(l)(b)(xii), ibid. 
21 (1988) 13 ACLR 225. 
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examine the meaning of the words "efficiently, honestly and fairly." The court 
emphasized the "conjunction" of inefficiency, dishonesty and unfairness. 
22 
The use of the disjunctive "or" in the FT A suggests either inefficiency, 
dishonesty or unfairness is all that is required. In other words, the Singapore 
legislature seems to adopt the view that an honest but inefficient licensee can do as 
much harm as an inefficient but dishonest one. Despite the difference in wording, 
it would still be helpful to discuss Story v. NCSC regarding the individual criteria of 
efficiency, honesty and fairness. Young J opined: 
"So far as "efficient" is concerned, someone is an efficient person or 
performs his duties efficiently if he is adequate in performance, produces 
the desired effect, is capable competent and adequate ... 
"I do not think I need dwell on the meaning of the word "honestly" except 
to remark that it is significant that it is used in conjunction with the word 
"fairly". Those words tend to give the flavour of a person who not only is 
not dishonest, but also a person who is ethically sound, indeed, the sort of 
person reflected in the words of Psalm 15. ,m 
With respect, deciding whether a man is either efficient, honest or fair on 
the above basis is an unenviable task. Yet it has to be done and has been done. On 
22 Young J, ibid at 234 stated: "Considerations of this nature incline my mind to think that the 
group of words "efficiently, honestly and fairly" must be read as a compendious indication 
meaning a person who goes about their duties efficiently having regard to the dictates of honesty 
and fairness, honestly having regard to the dictates of efficiency and fairness, and fairly having 
regard to the dictates of efficiency and honesty." 
23 See ibid at 235. Psalm 15, New International Version: "He whose walk is blameless and who 
does what is righteous, who speaks the truth from his heart and has no slander. on his ~ongue, who 
does his neighbor no wrong and casts no slur on his fellowman, who despises a vile man but 
honors those who fear the Lord ... " 
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the facts of Story v. NCSC, Young J decided that the dealer in question who had 
provided inaccurate information to a customer to induce the customer to deal in 
certain securities had fallen short of the level of efficiency reasonably expected of a 
dealer in carrying out his functions under the relevant securities legislation. 
However, it was further held that just because there was a finding of inefficiency, it 
did not necessarily follow that the dealer's licence should be revoked. It smacked 
more of a punitive measure than the protection of the public to revoke a licence 
based on one careless mistake. 24 
Similarly, it should be noted that the jurisdiction of the MAS to mete out 
I . 25 icences was meant to protect the public. S. 14(1) of the FTA allows the MAS 
discretion by the use of the word "may" in refusing to grant or renew a licence. 
The word "may" is also used in s. 20(2) in relation to the MAS' s discretion to 
revoke a licence. Particularly in the case of revocation of licences, it should be 
impressed that the jurisdiction to revoke licences is to protect the public and not to 
punish the licensee. 
The ubiquitous phrase "fit and proper person" found in s. 14 of the FT A 
has been examined in cases relating to the licensing of market participants in the 
securities industry. In P.B. Chapman v. Deputy Registrar of Companies,26 it was 
found on the facts that the licensee had backdated contract notes at a customer's 
request, knowing that the purported contract had not been concluded on the dates 
24 See ibid at 247. . . 
25 See ibid at 239. 
Young J recognized that the decision to revoke should only be taken 1f, for the 
public's protection the dealer should not be pennitted to trade. 
26 ' [1977] 2 MLJ 5. 
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shown on the contract notes. It was held that he was not a "fit and proper person" 
to hold the relevant licence which allowed him to deal in securities. 
Even criteria, which at first blush, do not appear e rcessively difficult to 
interpret could be subject to interpretative problems. For instance, it has been 
queried whether the "educational or other qualification or experience" criteria 
could be fulfilled by a bachelor of business degree. In Doughty v. Corporate 
Affairs Commis ion,21 the Australian courts held that based on the evidence in the 
case, in order to be able to give investment advice on securities, it was essential for 
the applicant to have experience in a subordinate but responsible position first. and 
that a bachelor of business degree was not adequate.28 
Insofar as the 
ha ample discretion in deciding whether a licenc 
should be is ued it has ample discretion over the form of the licence issued. A 
licence may be granted or renewed subject to such condition or restriction a th 
MA thinks fit.29 Furthermore during the course of the licence, condition r 
restriction may e impo d y the 
or xisting condition or r stricti n ma 
be vari d by n tice in writing to the lie n e .30 l per on contra n 
r ail t 
c m ly with any c nditi n r r t icti n tipulated in hi lie n th. t r n v uld 
shown on the contract notes. It was held that he was not a "fit and proper person" 
to hold the relevant licence which allowed him to deal in securities. 
Even criteria, which at first blush, do not appear excessively difficult to 
interpret could be subject to interpretative problems. For instance, it has been 
queried whether the "educational or other qualification or experience" criteria 
could be fulfilled by a bachelor of business degree. In Doughty v. Corporate 
Affair Cammi sion" the Australian courts held that based on the evidence in the 
case, in order to be able to give investment advice on securities, it was essential for 
the applicant to have experience in a subordinate but responsible position first. and 
that a bachelor of business degree was not adequate.28 
Insofar as the MA has ample discretion in deciding whether a licence 
should be issued it has ample discretion over the form of the licence i sued. A 
licence may be granted or renewed subject to such conditions or restriction a the 
MA thinks fit.29 Furthermore during the course of the licence condition r 
restriction may e impo ed by the or isting condition or restriction ma 
b vari d y notice in writing to th r fail t 
c mply with any c nditi n r r tricti n tipul t din hi lie nc , th t p r n \l ould 
I l 
be guilty of an offence although the relevant section in the FT A does not provide 
for any specific penalties.31 
Contravention or failure to comply with conditions or restrictions attached 
to the licence would constitute grounds for the revocation of the licence by the 
MAS. 32 Any of the grounds in s. 14( 1) of the FT A would also suffice to be a 
ground upon which the MAS may revoke a licence.33 In the case of an individual 
this includes the ground that "the Authority has reason to believe that the applicant 
will not be able to perform the functions for which he is licensed efficiently, 
honestly or fairly." Other grounds set out in s. 20 of the FT A upon which the MA 
may revoke a licence are inter aha, the failure or cessation of the licensed business, 
the revocation of the main licence with respect to a representative's licence and, as 
mentioned above 'if the Authority has reason to believe that the licensed person 
has not performed his duties efficiently, honestly or fairly. "34 
Minimum • inancial Requirem nt 
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Futures trading advisers and futures pool operators need only meet 
requirements pertaining to paid-up capital. The paid-up capital of a futures trading 
adviser and futures pool operator cannot be reduced without the prior approval of 
the MAS.37 More onerous financial requirements are placed on the futures broker. 
First, the amount of paid-up capital required of a futures broker is higher than that 
of a futures trading adviser or a futures pool operator. Similarly, the paid-up 
capital of a futures broker cannot be reduced without the prior approval of the 
MAS.38 Next, apart from meeting the particular requirements as to paid-up capital, 
the futures broker also has to meet requirements pertaining to its adjusted "net 
capital."39 "Net capital" roughly means the amount by which current assets exceed 
liabilities. 40 Having minimum adjusted net capital requirements limits a 
corporation's liabilities and prevents a corporation from being overleveraged. 
he FT A stipulates that any inability to comply with the minimum adju ted 
net capital requirements must be reported by the future broker immediately to the 
MA . 1 ·urtherm re the future brok r i to cea e carrying on it bu in a a 
futur br k r therwi e than for the purpos f i ing effect to tran action 
ntcred int 
I . ' f th n n-c mp ianc . A may rmit 
th utur ntinu car in on it 
n \ hate r nditi n it 
11 it rn m 1m 
g 1 , 1b I 
It is recognized that a sudden cessation of business on the part of the 
futures broker might do more harm than good for customers of the futures broker. 
The FTR sets out various options for the MAS in handling the situation. 
Depending on the extent and period of non-compliance with net capital 
requirements, the MAS at its discretion may direct the futures broker to 
immediately do any one or more of the following: inter alia, transfer customers' 
futures trading to another futures broker, cease increases in positions or "operate 
its business in such manner and on such conditions as the Authority may 
determine. "45 The MAS is allowed a generous amount of flexibility in dealing with 
a non-compliance situation. Another direction that the MAS may make in less 
serious cases of non-compliance is to require the submission of statements pursuant 
to reg. 12(6) of the FTR on a weekly basis instead of on a monthly basis. This 
would allow the MAS to monitor the situation whilst preventing disruption to 
business. 
To ensure that futures brokers continue to meet the adjusted net capital 
requirements, under reg. 12(6), futures brokers are to prepare and lodge monthly 
statements in a pre cribed form with the MA .46 These are tatements which set 
out the futures broker' financial condition the c mputation f adju ted net capital 
and the n c nd I cati n f r gated cu t m r fund . 
7 
The as t c nd 
liabilitic f the u in ar t pr nt d in the e tat ment uch th .t th 
• fl ti 
statements give a true and fair view of the state of affairs. "48 This ensures that the 
MAS is continually and periodically informed of a futures brokers' financial 
situation. 49 
Accounts and Audit 
Apart from submitting monthly statements pursuant to reg. 12(6) of the 
FTR, every financial year, the futures broker has to submit to the MAS a "true and 
fair" profit and loss account and a balance sheet of the futures broker. so Accounts 
of futures brokers are required to be kept in a way approved by the MASs1 and be 
audited." Futures brokers are required to appoint an auditor to audit their 
accounts. SJ However, if the MAS is not satisfied with the performance of the 
auditor it can require the futures broker to appoint another auditor to replace the 
prior auditor." 
Under s. 28 of the FT A, auditors appointed by the futures broker are under 
an obligation to report any matter which "adversely aff cts or may ad ersely affect 
the financial position of the futures broker to a material extent" to the MAS.ss 
·urthermore, auditors of future brokers are required to report t the MA ' here 
accounting record ar not k pt in accordance with the FT A and where u tamer 
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accounts are not properly segregated in accordance with the FT A. 56 If such a 
report is made by the futures broker's auditor under s. 28, the MAS may then 
appoint its own auditor and the appointed auditor would have extensive powers to 
examine and audit the books, accounts and records of the impugned futures 
broker." 
In any case, under s. 3 5 of the FT A, the MAS has the power to appoint its 
own auditors for futures brokers, futures trading advisers or futures pool 
operators, and even SIMEX itself Where such an appointment is made, the FT A 
obliges the appointed auditors to report matters of breaches or non-observances of 
the FTA to the MAS immediately.58 
For breaches of certain of the accounts and audit provisions of the FT A, a 
licensed participant may be liable to fines ranging from $$10,000 to S$30,000 or 
imprisonment. In the case of a corporation, the fines might be inconsequential and 
the threat of a jail term is an empty one. The greatest punislunent to a licensee is 
perhaps the loss of the licence. 
A far a the auditor are concerned, no penalty i pro ided in the FT 
r ardin the failur t perf rm any f th du tie and obligation requir d f th m 
und r tho ·TA. udit r ar ntial in th practical v rkin f th r gulat ry 
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certain dependence on auditors. Although no criminal penalties are provided, it is 
inevitable that the failure to perform their required duties would affect the auditors' 
professional reputation and relationship with the MAS. Auditors, who are grossly 
or professionally negligent in performing their duties, face the risk of being 
permanently or temporarily barred from acting as auditors for futures brokers. 
59 
2. Licensed Market Participants 
Futures Broker 
The FT A defines a "futures broker" to be: 
"a person, whether as principal or agent, who ... carries on the business of 
soliciting or accepting orders, for the purchase or sale of any commodity 
under a futures contract on any Exchange or futures market." 
60 
The 1995 amendments also expanded the definition of a "futures broker" to 
include one who "carries on the bu iness of leveraged foreign exchange trading." 
The amendments then al o included in the licensing prov1sions of futures brokers in 
s. 11 certain exemptions from licen ing requirements. 
The ex mpti n t ecti n 11 ( l are fi und in ection 11 2). 
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certain dependence on auditors. Although no criminal penalties are provided, it is 
inevitable that the failure to perform their required duties would affect the auditors' 
professional reputation and relationship with the MAS. Auditors, who are grossly 
or professionally negligent in performing their duties, face the risk of being 
permanently or temporarily barred from acting as auditors for futures brokers. 59 
2. Licensed Market Participants 
Futures Broker 
The FT A defines a "futures broker" to be: 
"a person, whether as principal or agent, who ... carries on the business of 
soliciting or accepting orders, for the purchase or sale of any commodity 
under a futures contract on any Exchange or futures market." 60 
The I 995 amendments also expanded the definition of a "futures broker" to 
include one who "carrie on the busines of leveraged foreign exchange trading." 
The amendments then al o included in the licensing provision of future brokers in 
s. 11 certain exemptions from licen ing requirements. 
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"(a) a person who carries on the business of leveraged foreign exchange 
trading only with accredited investors but not with any other person; 
(b) a person who carries on the business of trading in futures contracts 
or leveraged foreign exchange trading for his own account or for the 
account of a related corporation or related person; 
(c) a person who is licensed under the Securities Industry Act or who is 
exempt under that Act or any regulations made thereunder from holding 
such a licence and who trades in futures contracts or enters into leveraged 
foreign exchange trading wholly in connection with and solely incidental to 
the purchase or sale of securities or for the purpose of hedging a portfolio 
of securities.?" 
As mentioned earlier, since the definition of "futures market" 
incontrovertibly includes foreign futures exchanges,62 a futures broker is an 
individual or corporation who accepts or solicits orders to buy and sell SIMEX 
futures, as well as futures traded exchanges elsewhere. 
Futures Trading Adviser: 
A "futures trading adviser" is defined in the FT A a a person who: 
"(A) arne n the u ine f advising ther per on ... cone ming 
future ntract , rci an ch, nge tradin or I crag d f r i n · hang 
t adin , includin advice n whcth r t ngag in trading in futur 
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e . 11 (2 • bld. 
Sec" ulu . Mnr n" nt lrnpl r 
(b) as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates any analysis or 
report concerning futures markets or foreign exchange markets; or 
(c) pursuant to a contract or an arrangement with a client, undertakes 
on behalf of the client (whether on a discretionary authority granted by the 
client or otherwise) trading in futures contracts, foreign exchange trading 
or leveraged foreign exchange trading for tht purposes of managing the 
client's funds ... "63 
Excluded from the definition of futures trading adviser are banks, merchant banks, 
accountants, lawyers and newspapers.64 
The 1995 amendments expanded the definition of "futures trading adviser" 
to include the management of funds, whether on a discretionary or non- 
discretionary basis, for investment in futures contracts, foreign exchange trading 
and leveraged foreign exchange trading as the legislature recognized that the 
futures trading adviser's scope of activities had been expanded to include the 
management of customers' funds.6~ Prior to the 1995 amendments, a futures 
trading adviser's licence could be granted to either a corporation or an individual. 
A futures trading adviser ' licence can now only be granted to a corporation.66 
This is an additional safeguard for the customer a corporation are subject t 
additi nal regulati n under the ompani Act. 
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Futures Pool Operators 
The FT A defines a "futures pool operator" as: 
"any person who carries on a business, in the nature of a unit trust or other 
interest to which Division 6 of Part IV of the Companies Act applies, and 
who in connection therewith accepts or receives from other persons funds, 
security or property, either directly or through capital contributions, the 
sale of shares or other forms of security or otherwise for the purpose of 
trading in futures contracts, foreign exchange trading or leveraged foreign 
exchange trading ... "67 
Futures pools essentially consist of a collection of funds used to engage in 
futures trading activities. Typically in the US, a number of individuals contribute 
funds to form the futures pool. The pool operator then uses those funds to engage 
in speculative futures trading. The individuals who contributed monies to the pool 
own a share of the entire pool. Thus, it is similar to a unit trust in which 
individuals contribute funds for investment in securities. 
The FT A stipulates that a future pool operator's licence may only be 
granted to a corporation." At present there are no future pool operator r 
futures pool op rater' r pr entative licen d in ingapore." 
67 c .2, 'fA. 
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Representatives 
A futures broker's representative, a futures trading adviser's representative 
and a futures pool operator's representatives are essentially those individuals who 
are in the direct employment of, act for, or by arrangement perform the functions 
of a futures broker, futures trading adviser and futures pool operator respectively. 
One of the 1995 FTA amendments which made a significant practical 
impact upon market participants is the amendment made to the definition of 
"futures broker's representative" to include those in the direct employ of futures 
brokers, including directors, officers or employees." The effect is that directors, 
officers and salaried employees of a futures broker who perform the functions on 
behalf of a futures broker are required to be licensed as futures broker's 
representatives. Previously, such persons were exempt from the licensing 
requirements. The added licensing requirement for such persons is said to "ensure 
that only individuals with the requisite experience, qualification and integrity are 
permitted to participate in the financial futures industry.?" 
Unlicens d Market Participants 
Th c n qu nee f a Iailur t obtain the 11 ce ary licence b for 
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7° C dcfluiti II 
11 T • dina meudmcnt ill, 
l \I 
operator's business, as mentioned, could be a fine or imprisonment." 
Furthermore, any contracts entered into could be considered "illegal." The 
Singapore courts in Tokyo Investment Pte Ltd v. Tan Chor Thing73 have held that 
the FT A was meant to prohibit transactions entered into by unlicensed futures 
brokers and any such transactions should be treated as illegal and unenforceable. 
Yet the respondent in the matter was allowed to recover property pledged to the 
unlicensed broker. 
In brief, the facts of Tan Chor Thing are as follows: 
Tokyo Investment Pte Ltd ("Tokyo") were a company in Singapore, who 
had been convicted under s. 11 ( l )(a) of the FT A for having carried on the 
business of trading in Hang Seng futures without a licence. Tan Chor Thing 
("Tan") had pledged shares to a company called Heritage Commodities Pte 
Ltd ("Heritage") through whom he had a trading account. The account had 
been closed but the shares were not returned. Subsequently the shares 
were seized by the police in the course of investigations concerning Tokyo. 
Tokyo claimed to be entitled to the shares on behalf of their principal, a 
Hong Kong company ("HK"), which was also unlicensed. Tokyo 
contended that the shares were pledged to HK Co as security for the 
trading account of Tan's brother, with Tan's consent. Tan denied giving 
consent to such an arrangement. 
The c urt had t c n id r th que ti n fill gality: did th fa t thnt neith r 
T ky n r HK wn r gi t r d und r th • 'A r nd r the tran acti n nt r d int 
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brother, illegal and unenforceable?" The court held that Tan should be assisted in 
recovering the shares as he was not in pari delicto with HK. As phrased by Chao 
Hick Tin J: 
"The scheme of licensing prescribed under the FT Act is intended to protect 
the class of investing public of which the respondent [Tan] was a member. 
The Act places the burden to obtain a licence on the person who seeks to 
trade as a futures broker and not on the clients. the penalty is imposed on 
the unlicensed futures broker. Accordingly, the respondent [Tan] was not 
in pari delicto with the second appellants [HK]. It further seemed to us 
that in line with the policy behind the Act the respondent [Tan] must be 
allowed to recover the shares; otherwise we would be encouraging illegality 
rather than deterring it."n 
Tan was not relying on the illegal agreement to found his claim to 
possession of the shares or to support the claim, and he was a member of the class 
of investing public which the FT A was intended to protect. In addition, neither 
Tan nor his brother knew that they were dealing with an unlicensed futures broker. 
It is pertinent that Tan who sought possession of his shares was the customer and 
not the broker. 
3. X" ocal" 
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broker's representative, that person cannot carry on the business of soliciting or 
accepting orders for the purchase or sale of futures. Such a SIMEX "Local" 
would then be trading solely for and on his own behalf. 
On the other hand, there exists a group of SIMEX "Locals" who do not 
trade on their own behalf, but take orders from other members of SIMEX. These 
are the "order fillers" who are exempted from the licensing provisions of the FT A. 
Reg. 22B(6) of the FTR describes an "order filler" as "an individual who is 
registered as a member of an Exchange for the purpose of entering into contracts 
on the floor of that Exchange only on behalf of members thereof which are licensed 
as futures brokers under section 11 ( 1) of the Act." 
As provided in reg. 22B( 1) of the FTR, an "order filler" need not comply 
with the licensing requirements for futures brokers or futures brokers' 
representatives and consequently need not present accounts to the MAS in 
accordance with Part IV of the FT A. Furthermore, order fillers need not 
segregate customer funds in accordance with s. 3 7 of the FT A, nor comply with s. 
37 A in relation to front running, 37B in relation to trading against a customer, or 
37C in relation to cross-trading. However, it should be noted that as a member of 
SIMEX the "order filler" i bound by the Rules and will still have to comply with 
th rule a t the priority of cu tom r rders" trading again t cu tamer ' 
rd r 78 and er " rder filler " n d not c mply ' ith . 
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39 of the FTA which requires a risk disclosure statement to be provided to a 
customer. 
A SIMEX "Local" as an Individual Non-Clearing Member of SIMEX is not 
allowed to execute a contract on SIMEX unless qualified by a Clearing Member. 80 
Qualification is defined in the Rules81 as the guarantee of a Clearing Member to 
accept liability for all contracts executed on SIMEX by a member which it has 
qualified until such trades have been accepted by the Clearing House. "To qualify 
is to so guarantee to accept the liability." The Individual Non-Clearing member is 
obliged prior to executing any trade on SIMEX to inform SIMEX in writing of the 
Clearing Member who shall have agreed to qualify him. 82 
4. Inter-Member Issues 
Out-Trades 
Disputes between Clearing Members usually concern "out-trades." Out- 
trades occur when clearing memoranda is rejected. As mentioned earlier for the 
clearing house ystem to function Clearing Members must submit to the Clearing 
Hou e clearing memoranda. 3 learing memoranda which do not match the 
lc.'lrin ~ in 111 r c. nnot be qunli icd b mo th. n one 
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memoranda submitted by the opposite Clearing Member are automatically rejected 
. u . m accordance with the Rules. Such unmatched trades are called "out-trades." 
The term "clearing memoranda" actually relate to a series of clearing slips 
submitted constantly throughout the day by buyers and sellers to every 
transaction. 85 The clearing slips would include the buyer or seller's own name or 
symbol, the name of the Clearing Member clearing the trade, the opposite party on 
the floor, the opposite Clearing Member as well as the date, price, quantity, 
commodity and contract month and time bracket." These slips are required by 
SIMEX to be submitted within thirty minutes after execution of the trade. After 
the clearing slip is submitted, the buyer's slip is matched with its corresponding 
seller's slip by SIMEX. This is performed at regular intervals during the trading 
day and SIMEX provides the results of the matching processes to show a listing of 
transactions which have been successfully matched with the opposite side and also 
those which were not, being out-trades. At the end of each trading day, SIMEX 
will perform a final matching run.87 
Where an out-trade occurs, Rule 808:D states that "Clearing Members will 
be notified of the discrepancy and will be required to adjust the differences between 
themselves and to resubmit corrected clearing memoranda within a time limit 
"Doubl ~ lip T • de Matching 
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specified by the Clearing House." It is impractical to expect Clearing Members to 
resolve the discrepancies, where they have only qualified trades" and were not 
actively involved in the execution of such trades. Therefore, SIMEX provides out- 
trade reports to all members. SIMEX has stipulated in an internal circular that 
each member is to use its out-trade reports to examine its own records, consult the 
person who executed the trade, and where appropriate, discuss with the opposite 
firm to resolve the difference in data. 89 
Discrepancies can anse when both parties to a trade have submitted 
clearing slips for matching but the details of the key fields on the slips do not agree. 
Discrepancies can also arise where one party to the transaction did not submit a 
clearing slip.90 Out-trades, therefore, are a rife area of dispute amongst members 
inter se. 
The fact is that few of these disputes are arbitrated. This may be because at 
the end of the day, the mistake resulting in an out-trade originates on the trading 
floor. Due to the hectic environment on the trading floor, it is inevitable that 
mistakes do occur. There is a spirit of give and take amongst those executing 
trades and ways and means are found for resolving matters quickly and amicably. 
IMEX literature has stated: 
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"Generally, the trader responsible for the error will bear the loss, although, 
when it appears to have been an honestmistake with no clear fault on either 
side, the traders involved will split any loss arising from the error between 
them."91 
Giv~-Up Trades 
The "give-up" trade is another potential source for inter-member disputes. 
A "give-up" trade occurs either when a Clearing Member executes a trade on the 
floor but gives up the contract to another Clearing Member, or when a non- 
clearing member executes a trade on the floor but gives up the contract to a 
Clearing Member other than its qualifying Clearing Member.92 The give-up occurs 
after the trade is executed on the floor but before the trade is submitted to the 
clearing house and subjected to matching.93 As mentioned earlier, a clearing slip 
has to be submitted within thirty minutes of an execution of a trade. A "give-up" 
has to take place within these thirty minutes. 
Give-up trades were not initially recognized by the Rules. Rule 827 has 
been amended to provide for give-up trades. The relevant provisions a to give-up 
transactions are Rule 827: 1 :e and Rule 827:3. When faced with the concept of a 
give-up tran action, it is inevitable that one que tions why member would want to 
give up trade . 
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There appears to be two types of give-ups occurring on SIMEX. 
(a) A non-member customer may instruct its futures broker, either a 
Clearing Member or a non-clearing member, to give up a trade to a 
particular Clearing Member. The customer may use the services of several 
futures brokers, both Clearing Members and non-clearing members, to 
execute trades but may wish to centralize the clearing of trades with one 
Clearing Member. 
(b) A Clearing Member may instruct an order-filler to execute a trade 
which would then be given up to it. Such a Clearing Member is not the 
qualifying Clearing Member of the order-filler .. Therefore, instead of the 
trade being cleared by the order-filler's qualifying Clearing Member, it is 
cleared through the Clearing Member who placed the order and gave the 
give-up instruction. 
In scenario (b ), there was always the danger of Clearing Members who had 
so instructed order-fillers to execute trades to be given up to them, to engage in the 
unscrupulous practice of rejecting such trades, especially when the trade turns bad, 
resulting in the qualifying Clearing Member of the order-filler bearing the loss. A 
dispute would consequently arise between the qualifying Clearing Member and the 
instructing Clearing Member purporting to reject the trade. The amended Rule 
827 provides a route intended to facilitate the better management of such disputes 
y IM X. It essentially provides: 
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Clearing member and/or the qualifying Clearing Member of the order-filler 
to produce evidence to SIMEX regarding the purported rejection; 
(ii) if SIMEX is not satisfied with the evidence adduced, it is 
empowered to require the instructing Clearing Member to accept the 
transfer of all or such part of the trades purported to have been rejected; 
(iii) the instructing Clearing Member must always be ready and willing 
when it rejects a trade to produce evidence immediately validating any 
purported rejection. 
Where the instructing Clearing Member did give the instruction to execute the 
trade to be given up to it, it is virtually impossible for it to assert that a rejection is 
a proper and valid one. 
Rule 827 further provides that any decision by SIMEX "shall be without 
prejudice to the rights of any Member to pursue its contractual rights inter se either 
by arbitration pursuant to the Rules (or where permitted) by litigation." 
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CHAPTER6 
DUTIES OF BROKER TO CUSTOMER 
1. Agency Relationship 
Whether the relationship between a broker and customer is one of principal 
and principal, or, principal and agent, has generated much discussion and 
conflicting views. The FT A definition of the term "futures broker" describes a 
broker "whether as principal or agent."! The case law is in a confused state and 
the issue remains unresolved. The difficulty arises because the peculiar 
arrangements of a futures exchange make it difficult to pigeonhole the broker- 
customer relationship into the usual contractual or agency paradigms. 
It comes as no surprise upon an examination of the case law, that the 
coherent theme appears to be that whether the relationship between broker and 
customer gives rise to an agency relationship depends very much on the particular 
factual scenario at hand. Brokers function within a framework of exchange rules 
and accepted market practices. Different futures exchanges have different rule 
and market practice , and trading practice allowed on one xchange may be taboo 
nan th r . 
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In general, the view that an agency relationship exists between broker and 
customer is attractive for the following reason's. First, such a relationship would 
impose upon the broker the duties owed by an agent to its principal, in this case, 
the customer. Second, in the event of the insolvency of the broker, the customer 
would retain proprietary rights as principal over monies placed with the broker as 
margm. 
In accordance with this view, Kerr J in E. Bailey & Co. Ltd v. Balholm 
Securities Ltcf described the broker and customer relationship in the following 
terms: 
"Although brokers deal in the market as principals by concluding contracts 
of purchase or sale in their own name on which they are personally liable to 
each other, and although their clients will not even know the identity of the 
other broker let alone that of his client, the relationship between a broker 
and his client is that of agent and principal and not of buyer and seller. "3 
For all intents and purposes, the terms "client" and "customer" may be used 
synonymously. The term "customer" is preferred as it is used in the FT A and the 
FTR. A customer may be roughly defined as a person on behalf of whom the 
broker deal or from whom the future broker accepts instructions to deal in , 
future .4 
1 2 
Kerr J relied upon English authorities Woodward v. Wolfe5 and Weddle, 
Beck & Co v. Hackett. 6 There have been Australian authorities which also adopt 
the position that the relationship between broker and customer is that of principal 
and agent, for instance, Jackson Securities Ltd v. Cheesman. 7 This position is 
supported by Australian commentators such as Frohlich8 and Hains.9 There are 
other authorities and commentaries which acknowledge that the principal-agent 
relationship is far from clear, but for the sake of a meaningful discussion of 
brokers' duties, analogized to those of agents, it was assumed that the relationship 
between broker and customer is that of principal and agent. This occurred in the 
Australian case of Option Investments (Aust) Pty Ltd v. Martin'" and in the works 
ofMarkovic.11 
A factor which suggests that the relationship between the broker and 
customer is one of principal and agent is that the broker often acts upon orders of 
5 [1936] 3 All ER 529. 
6 [ 1929] J KB 321. This is a case involving stockbrokers. Rojers J in Dalton v. AML Finance 
Corp Ltd ( 1980) ASLC 76-0006 at 86, l 72 opined that although Kerr J in E. Bailey , Co. ltd v. 
Balhom ecuritie Ltd did not specificall say so, he may ha e concluded that the relationship 
between broker and customer ' as one as bet' een agent and principal becaus of the tablish d 
line of English case authority that this is u.e relationship between stockbrokers and their clients. 
Howe er Kerr J's sition h, s been less than consistent. In I ilson, 'mithett ' Cop ltd v. 
Terruzl ( i975J 2 Lio d's Rep 6 2, Kerr J stated tJu1t the trading machinery on the London ~nl 
xchan e wa tJ1c same a that described in hi judgment in relation to th cocoa L, de in E. 
Batt y o. Ltd v. Balholm icurltl ltd. Ho" er, he then \ nt on to n that th contract 
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the customer on a commission basis. In Woodward v. Wolfe, Hilbery J expressed 
this point thus: 
" ... the plaintiffs in the case before me did in fact act in every transaction as 
brokers. They made a genuine contract in the market binding them in 
respect of that and exactly that which the defendant was buying or selling. 
That afterwards, because the rules of the association and the market bound 
them so to do, they sent a form of contract as between themselves and the 
defendant as direct contractors obscures and, I think, falsifies the true 
position. It is noteworthy that that contract in express terms adds to the 
price a charge for brokerage, a charge wholly inconsistent with the plaintiffs 
being in reality principals in a plain vendor and purchaser contract with the 
defendant." 12 
Furthermore, where the customer places margin deposits with the broker, it 
is undoubted that the broker cannot deal with the margin as he pleases. Deferring 
to an American authority, Re Rosenbaum Grain C01p, 13 it was observed that the 
broker and customer relationship "contemplating as it does the holding by the 
broker of a customer's money and other property is primarily fiduciary in nature." 14 
It should be noted that the term "fiduciary" is not synonymous with "agent." 
However, a fiduciary's duties are based conceptually on tho e owed by agent . 
It would be appropriate at thi point t xarnine the authoritie ' hich g 
against the pr p ition that the r Inti n hip tw n a cu t mer and br k r i ne 
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of principal and agent. There have been English and American cases" which state 
that the relationship between a broker and a customer is that of principal and 
principal. The most well-known English authority in support of this is Limako BV 
v. Hentz & Co Inc. 16 The Court of Appeal therein dismissed an appeal against a 
decision of Ackner J in the court below which held in effect that on the London 
Cocoa Terminal Market Association ("LCTMA"), brokers dealt with their 
customers as "principal to principal" and therefore entered into "back to back 
contracts" when trading on the instructions of customers. Ackner J, in tum, had 
merely upheld an award made by arbitrators appointed under the rules and 
regulations of the LCTMA. 
In the Limako decision, the Court of Appeal held that the fact that the 
brokers were entitled to commission under their contract with the customer did not 
involve the proposition as a matter of law or as a matter of market practice in the 
light of the arbitrator's findings that the transaction was and throughout continued 
to be a transaction of agency and agency alone. It is noted that the Court of 
Appeal's deference to the arbitrator's findings was a recurrent theme in the 
judgment. Although acknowledged in the judgment of Megaw LJ for the Court of 
Appeal that the "true nature of the relevant contract or contracts, and of its or their 
term , is a question law " he c ntinued: 
I 5 
" ... it is a question of law of such a nature that the practice of the market 
and the opinions of the arbitrators, as independent persons with knowledge 
and experience of the market and its practices, must be of very great 
importance in the decision of the issue oflaw."17 
It is submitted that whether the relationship between broker and customer 
is one of principal and principal or otherwise is a question that depends highly on 
the market practices in force and the factual matrix of transactions. The 
differences between the practices of the LCTMA as presented in the Limako case 
and that of SIMEX makes Limako a difficult case to apply in Singapore without 
qualification. Based on the arbitrators' findings of fact, certain differences between 
market practices on the LCTMA and on SIMEX can be highlighted: 
(i) Brokers trading on the LCTMA, upon receiving orders from their 
customer may place an order in its books for the customer yet need not 
necessarily preserve a back-to-back position with the clearing house.18 This 
is not allowed in Singapore. Brokers of futures contracts in Singapore must 
execute customers' orders on SIMEX. Failure to do so is an offence 
known as "bucketing.l'" 
(ii) Brokers trading on the LCTMA are permitted to maintain a single 
account with the clearing house that makes it impossible to distinguish 
between contracts entered into pursuant to customer ' orders from those 
concluded on the broker's own account. 0 Thi is not allowed in ingap re 
o Inc (197 l 1 Lio d's 
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as there are clear provisions as to the segregation of customers' accounts in 
the FT A, the FTR and the Rules.21 
(iii) Brokers trading on the LCTMA are also permitted to trade for their 
own accounts against their customers' positions.22 In Singapore, trading 
against a customer is an offence under the FT A if done without the 
customer's prior consent and in accordance with the Rules and the 
practices of SIMEX. 23 SIMEX has issued circulars which set out a certain 
procedure to be followed before trading against customers' orders are 
allowed.24 
(iv) Brokers who have purchased options on the LTCMA for a 
customer could exercise the option if the customer fails to do so. 
Furthermore, a broker who has sold an option for a customer on the 
LTCMA, could conceivably exercise the option against the customer." 
This situation would not be allowable on SIMEX. According to the Rules 
and practices of SIMEX, where brokers have purchased options for a 
customer and such options are not exercised, if they are in-the-money, 
these will be automatically exercised. The SIMEX Clearing House accepts 
all option exercise notices and assigns them through a random selection 
process to Clearing Members who have sold similar options.26 In practical 
terms it is impossible for a broker to exercise an option against a particular 
customer. 
nt the 
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The above differences suggest that the principal and principal analysis is not 
suited to describe the broker and customer relationship on SIMEX. Indeed, in 
holding that the relationship was one of principal to principal, the Court of Appeal 
and Ackner J in Limako placed emphasis on the market practice set out in (iv) 
above which allowed brokers on the LTCMA "to "buy" from themselves the 
option which they were "selling." Ackner J commented: 
" ... if the relationship of broker and client were to be that of principal and 
agent then there could be no question of the action described ... being other 
than the most obvious breaches of the agent's obligation to his principal. 
Quite clearly, the market, in allowing such conduct, is only doing so on the 
basis that it is the accepted practice that brokers act as principals when 
dealing with their clients and with the clearing house. "27 
That is not to say that on SIMEX, where such practices are not condoned, 
the position is indubitably that of principal and agent. According to the Rules, 
brokers are personally liable for all futures contracts entered into on the floor of 
SIMEX and are deemed to contract on a principal to principal basis, before the 
SIMEX Clearing House matches the transaction. 28 Once the transaction has been 
matched and cleared the broker is in a principal to principal relationship with the 
!earing House due to the process of sub titution.29 This appears to be in dir ct 
conflict with the impo ition of a principal-agent r lationship on the ustomer and 
the br ker. 
"In any event I find it difficult to see how a person who is acknowledged to 
be in a relationship of principal to principal with a third party in a particular 
transaction can, in the very same transaction, be regarded as someone else's 
agent. I ca~ understand that the relationship between those two persons, 
that is to say the client and the broker, may include some or all of the rights 
and obligations of principal and agent, but that is not to say that they are 
principal and agent." 30 
In short, a principal-agent relationship as between customer and broker is 
ostensibly irreconcilable with the deeming of a principal-principal relationship 
between broker and the clearing house. 
The corollary that the customer or undisclosed principal would have rights 
and owe obligations, initially to the other party to the trade,31 and after the process 
of substitution, 32 to the clearing house, however, seems to be the only problem 
identified" with the imposition of the principal-agent relationship between the 
customer and the broker. If this, indeed, is the only barrier to the full acceptance 
of a principal-agent relationship between the customer and the broker, it is a 
surmountable one. The drawing of the above corollary to a principal-agent 
relationship is based on the so-called "doctrine of the undisclosed principal" which 
hi hli ht d in • Illich, note 8, upro nt 22 Michnel G. 
d 
Lnw mu/ r cllc 2 7 nt 27 . 
is recognized as an anomalous legal doctrine. Markesinis and Munday34 have 
summarized the position as follows: 
"Since the late nineteenth century a distinguished chorus of writers has 
despaired of offering any principled explanation for tills highly peculiar 
doctrine. Sir Frederick Pollock, for instance, characterised it as 
"inconsistent with the elementary doctrines of the law of contract.?" whilst 
Oliver Wendell Homes thought it was "opposed to common sense.?" 
Ames argued that the doctrine of the undisclosed principal u• ignores 
fundamental legal principles" and, for that reason, it was "highly important 
that it should be recognised as an anornaly.?" 
The curious doctrine of the undisclosed principal has provoked a 
[sic] considerable literature, but defies any entirely satisfactory explanation. 
Whilst academic writers have variously sought to explain the principal's 
right of intervention as a form of trust or as a primitive and highly restricted 
form of assignment,38 the courts have preferred to justify the doctrine 
simply on grounds of commercial convenience.Y" 
34 See B.S. Markesinis and RJ.C. Munday, An Outline of the Law of Agency, 3rd edition, 1992 
Butterworths at 167-8. 
35 (1887) 3 LQR 359. See also (1898) 14 LQR 2,5. As cited by Markesinis and Munda . 
36 Sec "The History of Agency" in elect Essays in Anglo- merican Legal Histor ol. 6 at 40.J. 
As cited by Markesinis and Munday. 
37 18 Yale LJ 43 (1909). As cited by Markesinis and Munda . 
8 See notably Goodhart and Hamson "Undisclos d Principals in ontract" (1931] .J CLJ 32 at 
336. The various theories elaborated o er the years arc passed in re iev in Stoljar, The Law of 
Ag ncy ( 1961) at 228- . A cit d by Mnrkcsini and Mundo . 
9 Marke inis find Munday cite Lord indlc in K •ighl , fax t •d Co '- Durant {I l J AC 
24 al 2601: "As n ontrnct i con titu: d by the concurrcnc of two or more rs ns and b 111 ir 
agr Ill nt 10 the same term , there i nn anornnly in holding on person bound 10 anoth r of 
whom he know nothtn and , ith ' hoiu he did not, in foci, intend to contract. ut middl m 11, 
throu h , hom cont ct nre m de, are common and u Cul in bu in tmnsnctions. and in tJ1 
'!'Cit mn r contract it is n mnlt r of indiffcrcnc to either part ' h th r Lh re is an 
undi clo d principal or n t. Jf h c. I t it i , to say th I <i t. c tr mcl conv nicnt th t he 
hould be, blc t 110 nnd be u d n principal, nd he 1 only allowed to do o upon t rm ' hich 
cxclud lnju. ti c." 
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It goes against commercial sense and convenience to adhere blindly to the 
anomalous legal doctrine of undisclosed principal in the context of futures trading 
in a Clearing house system, to allow the ultimate customer to sue and be sued as a 
principal. The reality of the situation on SI.MEX is that the principal or customer is 
deprived of any rights and freed from any obligations arising out of a principal- 
agent relationship with the broker as the Rules deem the broker to contract as 
principal in relation to other brokers and the Clearing House. The Australian and 
English courts have consistently stated that a clearing member is personally liable 
with respect to contracts entered on an exchange, regardless of the type of legal 
relationship between broker and customer and even when the principal-agent issue 
was not decided upon." 
2. Fiduciary Duties 
As mentioned earlier, the term "fiduciary" is not synonymous with "agent." 
Exact legal definitions are difficult to formulate, but it is undisputed that "fiduciary 
duties" extend beyond duties which arise out of an agency relationship derived 
from an agreement. In short, rights and duties of principal and agent may derive 
either from an agreement into which they have entered or simply from the fiduciary 
nature of their relationship. An agency relationship has its basis in the law f 
, supra nt 1101c 127. The cxnmp! cited arc E. Boil 
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contract, whereas a fiduciary relationship has its basis in equity. McCardie J 
pointed out in Armstrong v. Jackson: 
"The position of principal and agent gives rise to particular and onerous 
duties on the part of the agent, and the high standard of conduct required 
from him springs from the fiduciary relationship between his employer and 
himself. His position is confidential. t readily lends itself to abuse. A 
strict and salutary rule is required to meet the special situation. The rules 
of English Law as they now exist spring from the strictness originally 
required by Courts of Equity in cases where the fiduciary relationship 
exists.':" 
One of the more succinct and helpful formulations of a fiduciary relationship is that 
of Ross Innes:42 
"Broadly speaking, a fiduciary relationship will anse when one person 
undertakes to act on behalf of or for the benefit of another, often as an 
intermediary with a discretion or power that affects the interests of the 
other, and that other is in a position of vulnerability in relation to the 
fiduciary. Vulnerability may arise from dependence upon the fiduciary for 
information and advice, the existence of a relationship of confidence, or the 
significance of a particular transaction for the parties." 
The exact scope of a fiduciary' duty depends upon the nature of the 
fiduciary relati n hip. Where the fiduciary r lation hip i ba ed n a c ntractual 
a ency, what th fiduciary pr ~ci ly and p cifically und rtak d n half of 
41 11 l 71 2 
2 hnptcr 
1 
• iducin 1111 nnd Regulatory Rul " in Parry, uclhcim nod Re , ds, 
Futur s Trtulfng L wand R 11/nt/011 nt 4 . 
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the customer is vital in determining the extent of the duty. The difficult question to 
answer is which came first: the contractual egg or the fiduciary chicken? It is 
accepted that contractual agreement can vary fiduciary duties. It is also accepted 
that fiduciary duties arise extra contractual agreement. In attempting to weave 
fiduciary duties into an existing contractual framework, the question is whether the 
emphasis should be on some notion of agreement and intention of the parties (are 
fiduciary duties implied?) or on a wider and more abstract consideration of public 
policy (are fiduciary duties imposed?). 
As a starting point, it is useful to delineate the discussion by establishing 
basic fiduciary duties. There are as many formulations of specific fiduciary duties 
as there are commentators of the same. 43 The most well known fiduciary duty 
from which many other specific duties are derived is the duty of the fiduciary not to 
place himself in a position where his own interest conflict with that of his customer. 
This is known as the "no conflict" rule and related to this is the "no profit" rule 
which provides that a fiduciary must not profit from his position at the expense of 
his customer. 
At times the profit is not gained for the fiduciary himself but for another 
customer. In this case the fiduciary is still in breach of his duties as he offends 
another d rivativ of the "n conflict' rul the undivided loyalty rule. It has be n 
aid that a Iidu iary w undivid d I yalty t hi u tamer and ther or mu t not 
0 Ibid nt i • 7. Th cntc oriintion f a ic fiduciary duties b Ros Innes is' helpful startin 
Int. c •cncrnlly in I lion to the "no c nflict" rule, Marko ic "The inures Broker nd 
lieut R I ti 11 hp in Au 1 II , 'note 11, .wprn and Hnins, note , upr . 
place himself in a position where his duty towards one customer conflicts with a 
duty that he owes to another customer. As an extension of this rule, a fiduciary 
owes a duty of confidentiality to his customer and must not use information 
obtained in confidence from his customer for the benefit of another customer nor 
' 
for his own advantage and profit. 
"No Conflict" 
The "no profit", undivided loyalty and confidentiality rules are simply 
derived from the basic rule that a fiduciary shall not place himself in a situation 
where his duties to the customer conflict with his own interests (his own interests 
being inclusive of the interests of his other customers.) In Parker v. Mclcenno" 
Lord Cairns LC said of the "no conflict" rule: 
"Now the rule of this court ... as to agents is not a technical or arbitrary rule. 
It is a rule founded on the highest and truest principles of morality. No 
man can in this court, acting as an agent, be allowed to put himself in a 
position in which his interest and his duty will be in conflict." 
A stockbroker has been held to be under a duty not to compete with his 
customer" and the courts in F Finance Ltd v. Ma rt16 had the occasion to 
d cide whether a future broker wa under a irnilar duty. In that case a brok r 
had c mm need pr ce din t r cov r m ni fr m cust m r wh h d incurr d 
(1874) LR 10 h App 9 nl 118 
c Ibid. 
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substantial losses through trading in commodity and financial futures. The 
customer pleaded, inter alia, that the broker had traded on US futures exchanges 
on their own account and had put themselves in a position of conflict of interest. 
Legatt J found that there was no conflict of interest: 
"The procedure and methods of business used by the plaintiffs conformed 
with the standard of conduct and market practice which is expected of 
London futures brokers and gave rise to no conflict of interest between the 
first defendant and themselves ... "47 
The holding that there is no conflict of interest implies that a duty to avoid 
conflict is owed. The very existence of a duty to avoid conflict presents a problem 
as there is a view that a broker cannot exonerate himself by saying that the 
impugned trading "conformed with the standard of conduct and market practice.'?" 
As Lord Hodson declared in Boardman v. Phipps: 
"No person trading in a fiduciary position, when a demand is made upon 
him by the person to whom he stands in the fiduciary relationship to 
account for profits acquired by him by reason of his fiduciary position and 
by reason of the opportunity and knowledge, or either, resulting from it, is 
entitled to defeat the claim upon any ground save that he made profits with 
the knowledge and assent f the other per on."49 
m re nppropria: to n J th t no dut ' s 
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Furthermore, as has been pointed out, the "logic that brokers will avoid a conflict 
of interest if they act in accordance with market practice has the obvious inherent 
danger that if a sufficient number of brokers adopt a questionable practice, then 
there will be no conflict of interest. "50 
To avoid the danger that a number of brokers might be tempted to adopt 
such questionable practices without sanction, the Rules, FT A and FTR all contain 
various provisions which prevent brokers from essentially taking positions contrary 
to their customers, or set out the parameters within which brokers may do so. The 
following are three situations whereby a broker could be in conflict with a 
customer's interests by preferring his own or another customer's: 
(1) Front-running 
Front-running is an abusive practice whereby brokers reserve for 
themselves favourable prices at which to execute their own orders at the 
expense of their customers. S. 37 A of the FTA provides no futures broker 
shall knowingly buy or sell any futures contract for "its own account an 
account belonging to a connected person or for an account in which it has 
an interest (including any account over which it has di cretion)' when that 
future br k r ha r c iv d an order to buy or sell that type of futur s 
c ntract and ha n t cut d th t r er 'e c pt in accordance with the 
bu ine rul and practic fan xchan e r a futur market. ' 
· M rk ic, "The Fu111 r, nd Ii ut R lntiou hip in A11 trnlin." not 11, supra nt 93. 
For the purposes of s. 37 A, a "connected person" of an individual 
as defined in the FTA51 means: 
"(i) the individual's spouse, son, adopted son, step-son, 
daughter, adopted daughter, step-daughter, father, mother, brother 
or sister; and 
(ii) a firm or a corporation in which the individual or any of the 
persons mentioned in sub-paragraph (I) has control of not less than 
20% of the voting power in the firm or corporation, whether such 
control is exercised individually or jointly" 
In relation to a firm or corporation, a "connected person" means 
"another firm or corporation in which the first-mentioned firm or 
corporation has control of not less than 20% of the voting power in that 
other firm or corporation." 
Front-running i also prohibited in the Rules. Rule 520 relates to 
the priority of customers' orders and states that: "A Member shall not buy 
a futures contract for his own account or for an account in which he has an 
interest when he ha in hand order to buy a futures contract ... for others at 
the market r at the am price.' Rule 520 state that the iolation thereof 
i c maj r ff nc . 
, . 2. I· A. 
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Although the Rules only mention "an account in which he has an 
interest," which if interpreted narrowly would become more limited in its 
coverage than s. 3 7 A and lead to evasion of the Rule, the· vague language 
leaves the Rule open to a wide interpretation by SIMEX. It is submitted 
that it is likely that SIMEX would interpret this Rule widely. 52 
(2) Trading against customer 
S. 37B of the FTA provides that: 
"No futures broker shall knowingly enter into a transaction to buy 
from or sell to its customer any futures contract for its own 
account, an account of a connected person or for an account in 
which it has an interest (including any account over which it has 
discretion), except with the customer's prior consent and in 
accordance with the business rules and practices of an Exchange or 
a futures market." 
Rule 521 states that a member having in hand a customer order shall 
not assume the opposite side "for his account or for the account of an entity 
of which the Member is an officer" except with the "prior written consent 
of such customer," and that the violation thereof is a major offence. The 
drafting here is dd f r "the account fan entity of which the M mber i an 
m er" d not m t pr nt earn and nornin e 
ac unt , f r in ranee a cc unt, t trade. An int rpretation 
2 co JM · X' Int rprctntlon clrculnr in Int Ion to Ruic 521 011 tmdin agair t customers nt 
note , l11frn. 
circular issued by SIMEX (the "Circular") has addressed this issue and Rule 
521 has since included "an account in which he [the member] has an 
interest. "53 
The prohibition against trading against a customer is not a blanket 
one. A broker is allowed to trade against a customer outside Rule 521 and 
s. 3 7B of the FTA provided, inter alia, the customer's consent is acquired. 
The abovementioned Circular provides that a member cannot trade against 
his customer's order unless the following criteria are met: 
(a) the customer has given written consent; 
(b) the transaction is executed in the same manner as a cross- 
trade;" 
(c) the fact that the member has assumed the opposite side of 
the order has to be identified on certain cards or forms used in the 
order execution process; 
( d) such card or form is to be presented to a SIMEX official for 
verification and initialling; and 
( e) the written confirmation of the transaction issued to the 
customer is to clearly denote the fact that the member has assumed 
the opposite side of the order. 
Furthermore eva ion of Rule 521 by other mean expre sed in 
the ircular n t t bet I rat d: 
Mn h I 87. 
Rule 2 . 
"Members are also reminded that resorting to other methods of 
trading against customer's order, such as the passing of customer's 
order to another order-filler, or the enlistment of accommodating 
trader to trade indirectly against the customer's order, will be 
deemed a violation ofRule 521." 
(3) Cross-trading 
Cross-trading occurs when a futures broker has in hand at the same 
time both buying and selling orders from different customers. Disallowing 
cross-trading prevents the broker from simply matching both orders, and 
not necessarily getting the best market prices for each. 
S. 37C of the FTA provides: 
"No futures broker shall knowingly fill or execute a customer's 
order for the purchase or sale of a futures contract on a futures 
market, by offsetting against the order or orders of any other 
person, without effecting such a purchase or sale of the futures 
contract on the trading floor or electronic futures trading system 
and in accordance with the business rules and practices of an 
xchange or a futures market." 
Rule 2 pr vid that er -trade may be ex cut d pro ided the 
m mb r hall ' fir t id and ffi r penly and c mp titi ly by op n outcry 
at the ame price I tin numb r f c ntract , at lea t thr e tim in th 
pr cnco f an xchan flicial" an "[i]f n ith r the bid nor the off r is 
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accepted within a reasonable time, the orders may then be matched in the 
presence of and with the approval of the Exchange Official." Furthermore, 
like trading against a customer, the cross trade is to be clearly identified by 
the member on the relevant cards and forms, and be verified and initialled 
by the appropriate SIMEX official. These are safeguards to ensure that the 
trades are crossed only after participation in the competitive bidding 
process to ensure the best possible price for the customer. 
The violation of Rule 523 has not been expressed to be a major 
offence and is therefore a minor offence. This suggests that SIMEX views 
cross-trades as a less serious form of breaching a duty to avoid conflict. 
On the other hand, the breach of s. 3 7 A in relation to front-running, s. 3 7B 
in relation to trading against customers and s. 3 7C in relation to cross- 
trading all carry the same penalty, being a fine not exceeding S$30,000 or 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years or to both. 55 
Duty of Skill, are and Diligence 
The duty of a broker to exercise skill, care and diligence is not 
controversial. The standard of care required is. At the extreme end it has been 
held that where a broker give advice to a customer and such advice ha resulted in 
cc s, 4 • FT A. Prior to the l 95 am ndrncnt , pro is ions similar to . 7 A and :37B of the 
• A , ere found in the FTR. outrnvcuticn of nn pro i ion of the FTR ' • liable on con ict ion 
only t 11 1110 not exec din S5, he prohibition of cros -t , des in s. 7 of the FT A ' s 
intr due d b the 19 5 niucndm nt and till th 11, hnd onl n p hibit d in th Rules. 
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customer's losses increase the longer the broker waits to close out. In Option 
Investments (Aust) Pty Ltd v. Martin, 58 the customer alleged that the broker should 
have sold the contracts earlier than it did. As a result of the delay, the customer 
had suffered more losses and it was alleged that the broker was negligent or in 
breach of a duty to exercise care to make a reasonable sale having regard to the 
defendant's interest. It was held that the customer could not make out a case of 
failure to regard his interest or of negligence in the conduct of the sale, by 
reference to delay alone. Lush J observed: 
"A broker's duty is to execute the orders which his client gives him. He is 
under no duty to give advice, though if he does he must of course do so 
honestly and with appropriate skill and ability. He is under no duty, and has 
no general authority, to initiate transactions, for instance, the sale of 
securities held, without his client's instructions. The relationship has 
fiduciary aspects relating to moneys and securities held by the broker, but 
otherwise the broker's duty is to execute orders ... " 
" .. the giving of authority to a broker to close out his client's open positions 
upon default in meeting a margins request appears clearly as a right in the 
nature of security given to the broker to protect himself against liability or 
loss. It is, in fact, a power of sale given as security to the broker as an 
actual or contingent creditor of the client."59 
Lush J's obiter ob ervation on a brok r' duty in clo ing out are v orth 
r pr ducti n: 
"(19811 VR l 8. A irm d n appeal. lartin v. pt/on lnvestm nt (A11 t) Pr ltd lo 2) [19 2) 
VR4 . 
cc Ibid. I I 2. 
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"On principle, the broker who closes out must be under a duty to sell in 
good faith: in most cases sale on an open exchange will satisfy this 
requirement. Since he sells for the protection of his own interest he is 
entitled to select the time of sale unless he is otherwise contractually bound. 
He is bound to have regard in making the sale to the client's interest and 
may be under a duty to exercise care for the. protection of the client's 
interest. Both these concepts must be understood in the light of the fact 
that the broker has the power for the protection of his own interest. In any 
case I do not find it easy to give practical content to these last stated 
principles in a situation where the broker has the right to choose the time of 
sale and sells through an open exchange.T" 
Similarly, in Dalton v. AML Finance Corp Ltd (No 2)61 where the customer 
alleged that the broker was under an obligation to sell contracts immediately upon 
its repudiation by the customer, the court held that no such obligation existed and 
Rogers J opined: 
" ... it must be self-evident that a broker must be given a great deal of 
freedom of movement in determining when and in what amount he should 
make a margin call, and whether or not upon failure to meet a margin call 
he should close out a contract then and there or whether his interests are 
better served by postponing the sale." 
It is understandable that the courts do not wish to stipulate what is or is not 
rea enable with regard t a commercial deci ion to close out.62 
60 cc Ibid at I 
1 (1980) ASL 76- 0 m 8 , 174. Affirmed on appeal (unrcport d, N W ourt of Appeal, 1 
April 19 2). 
62 The courts lh vc 11 pron to decide in fo ur I brok rs in ituntions ' h re brok rs do ctos 
out for failure t me l mnr in ci II , and nllo. ine br kc 1 c rtain amount of I \\, in making 
the d ci ion. F r . nmpl , see urthcr, Dr I Burnham lamb rt Int matlonal v. Ioham d 
link r allm Ab 11 il Nosr 119 J l lo d' R p 5 , NW ommodtti v, Fnlik [19 4) 2 
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3. Statutory Duties 
A broker is specifically imposed duties towards its customers under the 
FTA and FTR. Those relating to the conduct of trade, for instance, front-running 
have already been discussed. Further broker's duties relating to the customer 
include the issue of contract confirmation notes, 63 the provision of monthly 
confirmation statements" and the duty of confidentiality with regard to customer's 
orders. 65 Two further duties require more discussion. These are the provisions 
relating to the segregation of customers' monies and the requirement of risk 
disclosure. 
Segregation of Customers' Monies 
S. 37 of the FTA provides that every futures broker shall: 
"(a) treat and deal with all moneys, securities or property 
received by him from a customer as belonging to that customer; and 
(b) account in a separate trust account, designated or evidenced 
as such, for all the money, securities or property received from the 
customer or accruing to the customer pursuant to paragraph (a), 
Lio d's R p 224, E. Bat! y o. Ltd v, Balhohn curttt Lr/ ( 197 ] 2 Lio •d's Rep 404. Also 
cc • nc , lly Hain , n to , upra. 
cc re . 17, FTR and Ruic 914. 
~ o rcu, 18, fTR. 
c re •. 21 (2) and Rule 22. 
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and shall not commingle that money, security or property with the funds of 
the futures broker or use them to margin, guarantee or to secure the 
contracts or extend the credit of any customer or person other than the 
person for whom they are held." 
The provisions relating to the segregation of customers' monies are in place 
to protect the customer. It extends to all monies received by the broker from a 
customer and covers monies received in connection with futures transactions as 
well as customers' funds received for the trading in other financial instruments. 
Further regulations in the FTR stipulate in detail how customer's accounts are to 
be maintained and what records of transactions and of particulars of customers are 
to be kept by futures brokers, as well as the necessity for daily computation.66 The 
Rules also have detailed provisions pertaining to the segregation of customer's 
money.67 
The FTA defines a "customer" in S. 37(9) and this definition has been 
adopted by the Rules. A "customer" for the purposes of segregating customers' 
monies rs: 
"a person on behalf of whom the futures broker deals or from whom the 
futures broker accepts instructions to deal, in futures contract ... but doe 
not include- 
116 c re is. l , 15A, 158, 15 and 1 , , It fan detailed rcquir mcnt ' re na t d aft r 
the aring d baclc, Nick L on had mnnn d 10 blur hou and custom r monies. In P• ra 
J .19 of the Mini try of Innncc' R port, it w; tot d: " use of tr on f ilu to 
pr p rly di tin •ui h and port housc : nd client mnr in ... the 'I nt to ' hi.ch the lnr c xposurc 
limit had en exceeded b th B, rina r up' • n l accumt I rclcctcd 111 th I rgc xposu 
r p rt 11b111i11 b the nrin ' 11p." 
67 c Ruic 17. 
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(a) the futures broker itself with respect to dealings for the 
proprietary account of the futures broker; 
(b) a director, officer, employee or futures broker's representative 
of the futures broker; or 
(c) a related corporation" of the futures broker with respect to 
instructions accepted to deal for an account belonging to and wholly 
for the benefit of that related corporation." 
The segregation provisions safeguard the customer's interests in two ways. 
First, the detailed administrative provisions relating to the maintenance of 
customers' accounts make it more difficult for brokers to indulge in the 
misapplication of customers' funds. Second, the customers' monies are not to be 
made available for the payment of the debts and liabilities of the broker." 
Directors, officers, employees, futures broker's representatives are not so 
protected. Insofar as a related corporation is concerned, it is anomalous that 
related corporations dealing for an account belonging to and wholly for the benefit 
of itself are not customers to be protected by segregation provisions whereas 
related corporations dealing for an account belonging to and wholly for other 
related corporations (and perhaps even including itself) would be customers worth 
68 . 2 of the FT A defines "related corporation n ha ing the nmc meaning a in th ornpani 
Act. A "r lntcd corporation" a d fined in the ompanics is a corporation thnt is eith r th 
holdin cornpnny or the sub idiu of another corporation. or a ubsidiary of the holding cornpnn 
of another corp mt ion. c . 4 and . ompani Act. , I o s. 5 of th ompanics Act for 
the dcfin tion of "sub idinry" and· holdin co111pn11 ." 
6 cc . 7( ), FT A ' hich tot that: "Money, sccuriti or property 11 cci cd from a customer 
and held by n future b ker inn cpn , le Im l account under ubs tion (1) hnll not be a ail ble 
for po mcnt f the d bts of the futu br ker to n c ditor of th futures brok r ... unless the 
er dil r i n cu tomer f the future b kcr nnd the debt O\\ d to the creditor was incurred dire ti 
in 01111 ctl n with trndin ' in futu c 111 ct ... cnrri d out on half of th t cu t mer." 
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protection. It is submitted that the latter related corporations deserve less 
protection that directors, officers, employees and representatives. 
Risk Disclosure Statement 
S. 39(1) of the FT A provides that: 
"No futures broker shall open a futures trading account. .. for a customer 
unless he furnishes the customer with a separate written risk disclosure 
document which shall be in such form and manner as may be prescribed by 
the Authority, and receives from the customer an acknowledgment signed 
and dated by the customer that he has received and understood the nature 
and contents of the disclosure document.t'" 
The form of the requisite risk disclosure document is found in the FTR.71 
At the SIMEX level, it is provided in Rule 913 that a member may not open an 
account for a customer unless the member first provides to the customer a separate 
written disclosure document prescribed by the exchange and receives from such 
customer a signed and dated acknowledgment that such customer received and 
understood the disclosure document. Rule 913 effectively tracks the words of s. 
39(1). Whereas breach of Rule 913 results in a minor offence, breach ofs. 39(1) 
70 Th re arc imilar pr i ion for ri k di clo urc docum nr to be deli d b futu 
opcrnt r , c . (2), r:TA, and b futu t , din nd i r • s s, 39(3), FTA. 
71 onn 11 of the FTR n amended b the utur T • din' (Amcndm nt) Re ulatlons 199 . 
81/ • \: hich came into cro· 1 011 I ·cb in 19 . 
l7 
leads to the comrrussion of an offence, liable on conviction to a fine or 
imprisonment. 72 
The extent of the statutory duty is to furnish a risk disclosure statement and 
then to receive an acknowledgment signed and dated by the customer that hehas 
received and understood the nature and contents of the disclosure document. 
There is no requirement for the broker to assure himself that the customer has 
indeed understood the nature and contents. 
The question is whether the broker has a greater fiduciary duty to explain 
the contents of the risk disclosure document, in particular, to a customer who is 
unfamiliar with futures trading. One case seems to suggest that the broker owes 
such a duty. In Rest-Ezi Furniture Pty Ltd v. Ace Shahin." representatives of the 
defendant company importuned the plaintiff company who had no prior experience 
in commodities futures to invest in red beans on the Tokyo Commodity Futures 
Exchange. The plaintiff represented by its managing director was given some 
contract documents which contained reference to "margins." Although he said he 
did not understand various terms, he signed the documents. A few days after 
signing, the market dropped and the plaintiff was asked to pay a substantial margin 
call, which it did pay amidst protest to the defendant for not having been informed 
a out margin call . More margin call wer made and the plaintiff r fu ed t pay 
and in te, d Id a p rtion fit c ntract at a lo . he laintiff then ued th 
72 s. 40 of the ff A p 
con icti n t n flne not x 
lh. 
cnce, liabl on 
rs or 
ptcm r 198 , Y ldh 111 J, uprcme ourt of Ne' outh Wol . The facts 
m111 nm b Ft Illich, "R 111 '\ " I 1 87) >I AU 1 2. 
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Although the decision in Rest-Ezi Furniture has been criticized, 77 a case of 
a broker failing to explain the risk disclosure document to a customer who 
obviously is incapable of understanding an English document would pose a 
problem. For one who understands English, the wording of the statement in 
relation to "margin" prescribed by the FTR is clear and simply drafted.78 The case 
for the broker is worsened, where the broker has actively solicited or importuned 
the customer. 
Before ending the discussion on the risk disclosure requirement, it is 
worthwhile reflecting upon the effects of a breach of the statutory obligation on the 
part of the broker to furnish a risk disclosure statement to a customer. Could a 
failure to provide a risk disclosure statement or receive an acknowledgment be 
used as an effective illegality defence on the part of the customer? Tan Chor 
Thing79 made it clear that a contract entered into with a broker who had breached 
the requirements of the FT A could be illegal and unenforceable. This is 
particularly so when the customer is not in pari delicto and did not know of the 
futures broker's infringement of the FT A. This would weed out savvy customers 
who are merely relying on a technical defence to defeat a broker's claims. As far 
as the genuinely prejudiced ignoramus is concerned, the mandatory risk disclosure 
77 The dismi :ii f the application f an exclusion clause, the Inilur to to pince mphasis on a 
, ritten contract and the igniCie< nee of the foct thot the plaintiff had aid 10 the d f ndont t\ o 
mar in call , ar ~u. bl nffinnin r the contract, hnd n hi hlighted by Frohlich not 7 . upra. 
78 cc Fonn 12, cond chcdulc, FTR for tl1c "Ri k i closure tat m nt R qui d to be 
•umishcd by a Future B kcr" \ hich sintcs at clnusc 2(a): "If the market mo cs against our 
ition or mnr in le I ore inc d, ou ma II d upon to pay sub tnntiol additional 
fund on hort notic in order t mnint in 11r p ition. lf you fail to com pl ' ith n request for 
nddliicnnl fund , ithin the timo p cri d, our position mn be liquidnt d nt a lo sand ou v ill 
llnbl f r any r ultin • d Ilclt in 
7 c hnpt r , 1101 7 , s11~ r . 
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requirements are there to protect him and it would be against policy to allow the 
broker to claim upon such a contract. 
CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
In a thorough discussion on futures trading, the problem of futures market 
fraud and other malpractices ought to be discussed. However, this is but an 
introduction and due to various practical reasons, such futures frauds, malpractices 
and the criminal sanctions which they attract will not be discussed. Suffice it to say 
that in this area of governing the futures market, questions of policing, detection, 
enforcement and the imposition of effective penalties abound. 
Indeed, it is odd to leave this topic for the last as the body of futures law 
and regulation that has been built up had as its underpinnings legislation and 
regulation designed to deal with the issue of fraud and malpractice and the 
maintenance of a fair market, or level playing field. The absence of this topic from 
this introductory text can only be justified on the grounds that it deserves separate 
and exclusive attention. The issues arising in policing futures malpractice are 
complex. The entire juridical basis of criminalizing certain financial markets abuses 
is uncertain. What are the paramount considerations? The protection of the 
underdog consumer, the protection of whole societal economic ' ell-being the 
pr t cti n f the ba ic rn ral of a le el laying f Id? 
authoriti ha guard again t abu s and 
matpractic n t am untie t criminal fraud in particular pric manipulation 
insider dealing and excessive speculation. A futures exchange witnesses the daily 
turnover of a large amount of money and the easy opportunities of making a large 
amount of money. As the apostle Paul continues to warn us: "For the love of 
money is a root of all kinds of evil. Some people, eager for money, have wandered 
from the faith and pierced themselves with many griefs.": 
The sophistication of the unscrupulous is evergrowing and herein lies the 
urgency behind global cooperation in regulatory efforts. The Barings episode has 
highlighted the importance of international cooperation in the policing of financial 
futures markets which are inextricably linked to one another in an international 
financial network. Developments in technology have drawn international markets 
closer to one another. Many players in the market are institutions with a presence 
in several jurisdictions. Furthermore, even if a player is based in one jurisdiction, 
due to advances in telecommunications and computer technology, it is common to 
trade on various international exchanges. In this environment, it is not enough for 
regulators in one jurisdiction to monitor the positions of their exchange members 
and their customers only in one jurisdiction. What happens in another jurisdiction 
may have tremendous consequences. Wrote the Inspectors in their Report: 
"Thi episode reflects the need for greater co-ordination between the 
regulr t ry , uthorities 
L nd n and ingap r . 
f different jurisdiction · in thi case, betw n 
Th re i als a n d f r close m nitorin f 
financial in tituti n with er d 
. ..2 r r p rau n . 
1 l Tim thy : I , N ' 
2 Pnrn, I .4 , M nl I 
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SIMEX has appeared to commit itself to greater global cooperation. One 
year after the Barings episode, in March 1996, SIMEX signed an International 
Information Sharing Agreement and Memorandum of Understanding' with more 
than 45 other exchanges and clearing houses for futures and options located in the 
Asia.-Pacific region, the 1:]S, Europe and Africa. The agreement is aimed at 
enabling exchanges and clearing houses to share information about their common 
and related members. The agreement is unprecedented in the number of 
organizations and jurisdictions participating and in its scope, covering both market 
and financial surveillance issues. 
This international agreement was the work of a Global Task Force on 
Financial Integrity established by the Futures Industry Association in March 1995 
as a result of the Barings crisis. In its short history, the agreement has already been 
successfully invoked by the US during the Sumitomo copper crisis which erupted 
in mid-1995.4 The adequate and complete governance of a local market comprised 
of international players requires a concerted global regulatory effort. This is most 
true in the case of SIMEX where international institutional investors, make up 83 
per cent of its business. 5 
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